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Abstract 
Through a longitudinal case study of five acquisitions made by the same 
acquirer, I explore the relationship between organizational identity, post-
acquisition integration and acquisition outcomes. The concept of 
organizational identity has received a substantial amount of attention over 
the last decades. Even so, knowledge of the consequences of organizational 
identity in organizations, and the mechanisms through which identity 
dynamics generate organizational outcomes is lacking. This thesis aims to 
contribute to our knowledge of the implications of organizational identity in 
post-acquisition integration processes, and through this, how value is created 
in acquisitions.  
Prior literature on acquisition integration has to a great extent focused on the 
actions of managers from the acquiring firm, and not attended to the target as 
an active party. This study argues that to understand the complex processes 
involved in acquisition integration, the managerial perspective traditionally 
taken by strategy researchers needs to be complemented with a perspective 
that takes into account the interaction of target and acquiring firms’ 
capabilities, competencies and organizational identities. 
My data shows that characteristics of both the target and the acquiring firm 
interact in the integration process to create expected and serendipitous value. 
The concept of contributive capacity is introduced, referring to the target 
firm’s active role in the creation of value in post-acquisition integration. 
Contributive capacity is theorized from the target performing mitigating and 
mobilizing actions, the development of cross-organizational roles and 
perceptions of individual decision power. Furthermore, my data shows that 
these actions are triggered by perceived threat to the target’s organizational 
identity.  
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1 Introduction 
“In “Datagon” I would never have wanted to be a leader (…) I 
felt it conflicted with my integrity. When I was asked to become a 
leader here (in Multifirm) in November, I already had that feeling 
that made me say yes immediately – it was a spinal cord reflex.”  
(Datagon manager) 
“After all, it is in Teknico MNC I have my roots (…) We are 
entering a culture now that is known as a little more backward 
and old fashioned, whether that is right or not, remains to be seen, 
but they have been very focused towards less customer oriented 
(business). And that, initially, isn’t very exciting. Multifirm has a 
boring image. In Teknico we’ve been allowed to be forefront in 
terms of technology and localization, you know, nice modern 
buildings and offices – that’s not the most important of course, but 
what is important is that many people have their roots in Teknico, 
they have a history that goes way back in Teknico MNC.  (Teknico 
employee) 
Acquisitions are a common means for firms to grow and diversify their 
activity base, exploit opportunities for capitalizing on scale and scope 
economies (Vermeulen and Barkema 2001), expand product lines and reduce 
competition (Zollo and Singh 2004), get access to technology and 
knowledge (Graebner 2004), and to achieve global expansion and 
internationalization (Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Vermeulen and Barkema 
2001; Harzing 2002). Acquisitions can lead to revitalization (Vermeulen 
2005) and learning and knowledge transfer (Birkinshaw 1999; Bresman et al. 
1999; Puranam and Srikanth 2007; Fosfuri and Tribo 2008). Although a 
large number of acquisitions are successful, research shows that the intended 
benefits of acquisitions on average are not realized, both related to financial 
performance and strategic benefits (Pablo 1994; Capron and Pistre 2002; 
Andre et al. 2004). The objective of acquisitions is, generally speaking, to 
create value. However, knowledge is still lacking about the contingencies for 
such value creation in post-acquisition integration.  
External pressures to the organization have been suggested to lead to 
organizational members questioning the sustainability of organizational 
identity (Elsbach and Kramer 1996; Ravasi and Schultz 2006). Acquisitions 
represent such an external pressure on the target organization. Acquisitions, 
by definition, broaden and transform organizational boundaries, and as such 
may challenge the very concept of “who we are” as an organization. The 
announcement of an acquisition will likely heighten the salience of 
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organizational identity, induce organizational members to question their 
beliefs about central and distinctive features of the organization (Albert and 
Whetten 1985), trigger sensemaking and shape the integration process and 
the outcomes of the acquisition. Confronted with unexpected events or 
actions, organizational members need to make sense of these and determine 
how to respond (Weick 1995). In times of stability, there is some level of 
shared understanding about central and relatively distinctive features of the 
organization (Balogun and Johnson 2004; Ravasi and Schultz 2006). In the 
event of an acquisition, there is a need to renegotiate these interpretations. 
Responding to the identity threats posed by an acquisition requires 
organizational members to reconstruct shared interpretations and 
understandings of organizational identity in order to coordinate collective 
action towards new organizational goals. In this perspective, identity is 
viewed as a dynamic and relational concept (Hatch et al. 2000; Hatch and 
Schultz 2002). Identity is dynamic, in the sense that it is continuously being 
constructed and reconstructed, and relational in the sense that it is 
constructed in relationship to relevant others.   
This thesis begins by asking the same general question posed by Haspeslagh 
and Jemison (1991): How do acquisitions contribute to value creation in 
firms? The focus is on value creation in a broad sense. Value creation refers 
to both expected value, the expected benefits that motivated the deal, and 
serendipitous value, unexpected benefits from the acquisition (Graebner 
2004). The firm is considered a collection of capabilities, and a trigger for 
leveraging these is suggested to be identity. Haspeslagh and Jemison state 
that “The only real distinctive competence is in the ability to mobilize an 
organization to form new combinations of capabilities continually and to 
renew them” (1991:23), arguing that acquisitions are vehicles for such 
renewal of the firm and their capabilities. My study will complement and 
extend this research by examining how acquisitions may lead to this renewal 
of the firm, suggesting organizational identity as an important influencing 
factor that may mobilize the organization in this process. 
This study employs the idea that organizational identity influences members’ 
sensemaking and actions towards issues and events in post-acquisition 
integration. I argue that perceptions of organizational identity induce sense 
making processes and actions that affect the development of the post-
acquisition integration process and outcomes of the acquisition. How an 
acquired target responds to the event of an acquisition is assumed to 
subsequently impact the outcomes of the acquisition. The study integrates 
theoretical perspectives from strategic management, organizational theory 
and sociology to explore these issues.  
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Prior literature suggests a link between identity and post-acquisition 
integration (Empson 2004; Chreim 2007), between post-acquisition 
integration and acquisition outcomes (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; 
Birkinshaw et al. 2000; Paruchuri et al. 2006) and between identity and 
acquisition outcomes (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh 1988; Marks and Mirvis 
1992; Terry and O'Brien 2001; Terry 2003; Van Leeuwen and Van 
Knippenberg 2003; Ullrich et al. 2005; Van Dick et al. 2006). Earlier 
research on identity in acquisitions has to a great extent focused on change in 
organizational identity, and provided valuable knowledge of individual level 
consequences of identity issues in post-acquisition integration. However, 
knowledge of how organizational level identity is related to the integration 
process and the subsequent outcomes of the acquisition is lacking.  
The contribution of this study will be to the growing body of knowledge on 
the implications of identity in acquisitions; particularly on the role identity 
plays in post-acquisition integration, and the expected and serendipitous 
organizational outcomes of acquisitions. I will focus on the following 
research questions: 
• How does organizational identity influence post-acquisition 
integration processes? 
• How does post-acquisition integration process influence expected 
and serendipitous value creation? 
The post-acquisition integration process follows the announcement of the 
deal, and is the combining of the target and acquirer’s capabilities, resources 
and organizations. Process will in this thesis refer to the series of actions and 
events that unfold in the organizations leading up to some outcome. I define 
value creation broadly as the creation of benefits to the acquiring or target 
firms through the acquisition. Expected value creation is the benefits from 
the acquisition that motivated the deal, and that are explicit in the business 
case. Serendipitous value creation is the unexpected benefits that either 
accrues to the acquirer or target through the acquisition.    
I explore how organizational identity influences the post-acquisition 
integration process, and in turn expected and serendipitous value creation in 
a multiple case study of 5 acquisition integration processes. The same 
acquirer, a Norwegian IT-solutions and IT-operations provider, acquired all 
5 targets. The study is longitudinal as the post-acquisition integration 
processes are followed over a 3-year period after the announcement of the 
acquisition. The research approach applied is iterative and tightly linked to 
data, in line with an inductive, theory building research approach. Even 
though this approach ideally starts off with a “clean theoretical slate” 
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(Eisenhardt 1989:536), prior research on organizational identity and 
acquisitions points to concepts and possible relationships between these that 
guide my research.  
The study aims at contributing to our understanding of post-acquisition 
integration processes through expanding and developing the concept of 
organizational identity, specifically the link between identity and 
organizational action, subsequently examining how identity is related to 
organizational post-acquisition outcomes. I propose that a sensemaking 
perspective may both 1) shed light on the post-acquisition process, where 
individuals are making sense of their new organization, and 2) link 
organizational level identity to organizational action, process and outcomes.  
The outline of this study is as follows. Chapter 2 provides review of the 
literature on identity, both social identity theory and literature on 
organizational identity. Chapter 3 reviews the research on acquisitions, 
focusing on post-acquisition integration. Chapter 4 presents the theoretical 
framework that guides the research, and presents and discusses the way in 
which identity and post-acquisition integration is addressed in this study. 
Chapter 5 presents the methods and methodology of the study, how the study 
was conducted and why it was conducted in that manner. As the study 
applies a process-data approach, strategies for dealing with process data are 
specifically discussed. The five cases are presented and analyzed in chapters 
6 through 10. Chapter 11 introduces the emergent themes and concepts, 
discusses them across the cases and links them to prior theory. The themes 
and concepts were developed through iterating back and forth between data 
and the literature. True to the process and emergent nature of the research, 
further theory is brought in and linked to my emergent findings. In referring 
to emerging in this thesis, I mean that certain patterns and concepts gradually 
came to my attention while analyzing the data. Chapter 12 presents the 
emergent model that was developed through the cross-case analysis, and 
discusses the findings in relationship to the two research questions posed. 
Finally, chapter 13 concludes with the theoretical contributions, managerial 
implications and limitations of the study, including implications for further 
research.  
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2 Identity in organizations 
“Friendship is indispensable to man for the proper functioning 
of his memory. Remembering our past, carrying it with us 
always, may be the necessary requirement for maintaining, as 
they say, the wholeness of self. To ensure that the self doesn’t 
shrink, to see what it holds to its volume, memories have to be 
watered like pottet flowers, and the watering calls for regular 
contact with the witnesses of the past, that is to say, with 
friends. They are our mirror; our memory; we ask nothing of 
them but that they polish the mirror from time to time so we can 
look at ourselves in it.”     
 Milan Kundera, Identity 
Identity in organizations has been studied from several perspectives and at 
different levels of analysis, with different epistemological and ontological 
starting points. There are many views on what identity is, and what identity 
is not (Corley et al. 2006). The concept of identity has its origins in 
psychology, anthropology (Geertz 1983) and sociology (Cooley 1902; Mead 
1934; Goffman 1959). These early theorists were concerned with individual 
level identity, while acknowledging the importance of society in the 
development of identity. Identity is thus seen as a dynamic, reflexive 
process, involving a dialogue between the individual and society.  
I have chosen to construct this study within the frames of organizational 
identity and sensemaking. Organizational identity and sensemaking emerged 
as themes in the initial conversations with the acquiring firm and the first 
target as they told the stories of the acquisition. Acquisitions represent an 
organizational phenomenon where members of the organization need to 
make sense of who they are, and who they will become. In addition, prior 
research on acquisitions pointed me in the direction of these themes. Prior 
research on identity in acquisitions has addressed individual level identity 
and organizational identification. This strand of research has focused on how 
the individual’s identification with the organization changes and is 
challenged following an acquisition and the consequences for the individuals 
of acquisitions. The social identity approach considers identity as 
internalized knowledge structures, whereas the organizational identity 
approach sees identity as a system of shared meaning (Cornelissen et al. 
2007). The social identity approach has addressed the phenomenon of 
identity as a “social reality”. Organizational identity as I view it, however, 
refers to shared meaning, some common understanding constructed between 
the members of the organization through interaction (Hatch and Schultz 
2002).   
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From my data, identity emerges as a collective level concept, as a flow of 
conversation about who the organization is, as well as expressions of 
individual identification with the organizations. I will not address 
organizational identity change or development per se, but rather how this 
flow of conversation that is organizational identity influences organizational 
members’ actions and sensemaking, subsequently influencing the post-
acquisition integration process. I follow Alvesson and Empson (2008) in 
their view of organizational identity as the common perception constructed 
among the individuals in the organization about some characteristics of the 
organization, and as being distinct from other organizations. 
In this chapter prior, relevant literature on identity in organizations is 
reviewed. First social identity theory and its implications for organizational 
phenomena are discussed, then the concept of organizational identity is 
presented. 
2.1 Organizational Identification: The Social Identity Approach  
Social identity theory developed in the field of social psychology. Social 
identity theory addresses group identification and refers to the individual’s 
knowledge that they belong to a group (Tajfel 1972; Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and 
Turner 1985; Cornelissen et al. 2007). In an organizational context social 
identity theory can shed light upon how individual identity is partly derived 
from the organizations to which the individual belongs, and how the 
individual identifies with the organization. Organizational identification is 
defined as “the perception of oneness with or belongingness to an 
organization, where the individual defines him or herself in terms of the 
organization(s) in which he or she is a member (Mael and Ashforth 
1992:104). As such it is a type of social identification referring to the 
bonding an individual has to the organization in which he or she works. 
Organizational researchers using social identity theory have traditionally 
focused on two issues: The first is explaining how the individual relates to 
the collective, expressed through the concept of organizational identification. 
The second is explaining intergroup relations, often in the form of conflict 
and diversity management (Pratt 2001). Researchers taking the social 
identity approach have studied the link between identity and various 
organizational outcomes. Identity has been shown to be related to 
socialization (Beyer and Hannah 2002), socialization and  role-conflict 
(Ashforth and Mael 1989), managerial roles (Berson et al. 2004) turnover 
and commitment (Mael and Ashforth 1995; Van Dick et al. 2004; Cole and 
Bruch 2006), and learning (Brown and Starkey 2000).  
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Social identity theory suggests that the individual’s self-perception and 
identity are partly derived from the organization or work group to which he 
or she belongs. An individual will define himself or herself in relation to the 
groups in which they classify themselves. The work organization to which 
the individual belongs provides one such category. This classification 
provides a partial answer to the question: “who am I?” (Ashforth and Mael 
1989). Individuals also perceive others in terms of work groups, educational 
background, gender, race and former work experience (Tajfel 1972; Tajfel 
1982; Tajfel and Turner 1985; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Brickson 2000; 
Haslam 2004). Through stereotypical perception of others, we attribute 
characteristics that are not observable or maybe even true of the particular 
person (Hogg and Terry 2000).  
The social identity approach is an integrated theoretical perspective and one 
of the grand theories in social psychology, focusing on the relationship 
between individual self concept and group behavior (Hogg and Terry 2001). 
The social identity theory evolved from minimal group studies (Tajfel 1972; 
Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1985) that used experiments on small groups 
as their empirical basis. Social identity theory developed to explain the 
unexpected finding that people tend to show ingroup bias in experimental 
situations, even if they were randomly assigned to a group.   
Studies of the conditions that would elicit ingroup favoritism have found that 
just the fact that people categorize themselves as members of the same group 
would lead to ingroup favoritism (Haslam 2004). Even so, organizational 
identity issues do not necessarily lead to negative ingroup/outgroup 
behavior. However, it may lead to discrimination and bias if the inter-group 
relations are insecure and the definition of social reality can be negotiated 
(Hamel 1991). In the event of an acquisition stereotypical perceptions of 
others and ingroup favoritism are likely to influence how individuals 
respond to the acquisition and their new colleagues. Subsequently, these are 
important issues in understanding how sensemaking and identity issues 
influence the post-acquisition integration process.  
The social psychology literature in general is largely founded on the 
experimental perspective. The basic assumptions of this tradition is that 
human behavior is objectively describable and measurable, behavior is 
caused by a range of factors internal and external to the individual, and the 
relationship between these factors is to a large extent governed by laws 
(Smith 1998). Social identity theory provides the contingencies in social 
processes causing individuals to adapt their perceptions and actions to the 
situation, rather than simple truths about social action. It is complex, 
multifaceted and dynamic and has been applied to a variety of problems, 
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focusing on interethnic conflicts, political activism and work place behavior 
(Ellemers et al. 2003).  
Identity links multiple levels of analysis (Godfrey and Whetten 1998). Social 
identity theory implies that there are processes where individuals define 
themselves on a group level, and act on behalf of their group membership. 
There is a distinction between social behavior that is interpersonal, the 
interaction between one or more individuals determined by interpersonal 
relationships and individual characteristics and, on the other hand, social 
behavior that is intergroup, determined by group membership (Tajfel and 
Turner 1985).  Implicit in the concept of identification is the blurring of the 
distinction between self and the group, and thus, turning the group 
psychologically into a part of the self (Van Knippenberg and Ellemers 
2003).  
Social identity theory hypothesizes the consequences of ingroup behavior. It 
is well suited to understanding the process of post-acquisition integration, 
which involves the meeting and interaction of different social groups. 
Acquisitions involving two formerly independent units provide the 
organizations with salient “us” and “them” categories. This will be discussed 
further in chapter 4.  
2.2 Organizational Identity:  Identity at a Collective Level 
The concept of organizational identity is concerned with collective level 
identity (Albert and Whetten 1985). Some researchers focus on how 
organizations have identities that can be experienced by members and 
stakeholders. The concept of organizational identity is understood as 
developing in a reflexive dialogue between the organization and the social 
context (Hatch and Schultz 2002). 
Mead (1934) portrayed individual identity formation, development of self 
and communicative abilities as a social process. The development of the self 
is a reflexive process involving the “I”, which is the response to the “me”, 
which is the view of oneself one assumes others have. Organizational 
identity can be conceptualized as having applied these processes to the 
organizational level, being a reflexive concept involving the organizational 
“I” and the organizational “me”. The “I” referring to the question of who we 
are, and the “me” referring to how we think others perceive us (Hatch and 
Schultz 2002). As such, both individual and organizational level identities 
can in this view be argued to be formed through a reflexive dialogue 
between the actor (individual or organization), and the social context the 
actor is embedded in.  
 9
The concept of organizational identity first appeared in the field of 
organizational studies through Albert and Whetten’s (1985) article 
“organizational identity” and it has been theorized through their criteria of 
“central character”, “distinctiveness”, and “temporal continuity”. Following 
this definition of organizational identity, it appears as a phenomenon that can 
be experienced by organizational members, be perceived by outsiders, and is 
the antecedent and cause of other organizational phenomena. They argued 
that organizational identity is developed through inter-organizational 
reflections and comparisons of them over time, continuing the view from 
Mead of identity as constructed in a reflexive dialogue. They argue that 
organizational identity refers to the questions posed by organizational 
members, such as “who are we” and “what is it that we do”. Subsequently, in 
this view organizational identity is seen as a motivator and product of 
organizations (Corley et al. 2006). It is a motivator in that it influences the 
actions of people in the organization, and a product in that it is developed in 
the setting of the organization.  
Organizational identity can be thought of as a metaphor for describing 
organizations or a real, lived, actual phenomenon (Corley et al. 2006). If one 
assumes that organizational identity is a phenomenon, the question remains, 
does it exist as a social reality or essence, or does it exist as an ongoing 
social construction, and not separate from how individuals or collectivities 
represent and construct it through symbols and language (Corley et al. 2006). 
Ravasi & Schultz (2006) distinguish between the social actor and the social 
constructivist approach to organizational identity. The social actor 
perspective is rooted in institutional theory, defining identity as residing in 
identity claims that are available to members of the central, enduring and 
distinctive properties of their organization. There seems to be a discrepancy 
in the literature on organizational identity implicitly or explicitly claiming to 
be social constructivist. Even though Albert and Whetten (1985) state that 
they view organizational identity as socially constructed, their definition of 
identity assumes that organizational identity actually exists as a relatively 
stable object that can be defined and agreed upon by the organizational 
members. They assert that there is “something” that is central, distinctive, 
and enduring; as such they seem to believe that there is an objective 
organizational identity, and that the content of this identity can be 
discovered. Being concerned with attributes and measuring the content of 
identity assumes objectivist ontology and a positivistic epistemology. The 
essentialist, positivist approach assumes that organizational identity has 
some kind of core that is central to the organization, and exists as a feature 
or property that somehow resides in the organization. In this view the 
organization is seen as a social actor and its identity as something that exists 
and that can be experienced, measured and managed. 
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In this study I approach identity claims not as facts about some objective 
properties of the organization; rather, identity claims are the explicit 
narratives in the construction of organizational identity. Identity claims are 
the statements about what characterizes the organization or the people in the 
organization. Specifically in the context of acquisitions, these claims are 
juxtaposed with statements about who the acquirer is. Identity claims are as 
such statements of how the members of the organization perceive and make 
sense of their organization, and not necessarily “objective facts” about 
central, distinctive and enduring traits of the organization.  
Assuming organizations as actors implies viewing them as “superpersons” 
(Czarniawska-Joerges 2004). This view saturates a large literature on 
organizations, dealing with organizational learning, how organizations 
produce strategies, and have identities. I argue that organizations do not exist 
as “things”; they exist only as far as people consider them organizations. 
Correspondingly, an organization as such cannot think, act or have an 
identity. The people in the organization may have beliefs about who the 
organization is, and their assumptions of the organization’s identity may be 
something more than the sum of their individual assumptions. My view is 
that perceptions, interpretations and emotions towards the organization are 
constructed and reconstructed in an organizational dialogue, generating a 
collective understanding of “who we are”. This will be elaborated further in 
chapter 4 when I address my theoretical and empirical approach to 
organizational identity in this study.  
Culture and identity are closely related concepts (Albert and Whetten 1985). 
Culture denotes the goals, values, and norms in the organization. Identity, at 
the individual level, however, denotes to what extent the individuals are 
committed to the culture by internalizing the goals and values as a part of 
their self-concept (Ellemers 2003). Organizational identity is the more 
explicit part of culture. The organizational culture is the context in which 
organizational identity is developed (Hatch and Schultz 1997). Whereas 
exploring an organization’s culture gives the answer to the question “how do 
we do things?” organizational identity is the answer to the question “who are 
we?” Organizational culture is thus more contextual, tacit and emergent 
while organizational identity is textual, explicit and instrumental (Hatch and 
Schultz 2002; Alvesson and Empson 2008). Therefore I argue that 
empirically, the stories that informants conveyed of how they were 
experiencing the acquisition integration, defined their identity, more than 
they were stories of the internalized norms and values of the organization.  
In terms of consequences of culture and identity on organizational behavior, 
I argue that both organizational culture and organizational identity can be 
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assumed to shape organizational action, as people strive to act according to 
the norms and values of the organization, as well as in ways that preserve 
their identity. On the other hand, norms for behavior are made from patterns 
of action in an organization that feed into the organizational culture and 
organizational identity. I argue that whereas organizational culture is 
constructed as rules for behavior in the organization, organizational identity 
both shapes those rules through people striving to act in coherence with their 
individual and their organization’s identity, and at the same time identity is 
developed in the context of this organizational culture. Organizational 
identity is dynamic, constructed and reconstructed in the context of the 
organization in an ongoing dialogue in the organization, and relational; the 
dialogue is both within the organization as members question who we are, 
but in the event of an acquisition the dialogue is extended to “the other”.   
Though there is a growing body of research on organizational identity, 
scholars have called for a need to operationalize the concept of 
organizational identity, and promoting dialogue between the different 
perspectives on identity (Corley et al. 2006). Acquisitions provide a useful 
setting for this endeavor. Identity is constructed in the relationship with 
others, in the event of an acquisition that “other” becomes very salient. 
Acquisition integration processes involve the sudden appearance of a second 
set of identity considerations and possibly a conflicting set of identity 
claims. In the coming together of the acquirer and the target, these may 
contribute to threats to organizational identity. Acquisition integration 
processes provide a setting for understanding and examining the antecedents 
and consequences of identity issues.  
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3 The phenomenon of Acquisitions 
The outline of this chapter is as follows; first I present the acquisitions 
literature in general. Then I review the literature concerning value creation in 
post-acquisition integration. I discuss the balancing of integration and 
autonomy, which is a major theme in the acquisition literature. The post-
acquisition integration process has to a large extent been portrayed as a 
management-led process, where managers can plan and control the outcomes 
of the acquisition. I present and subsequently challenge this view. I discuss 
prior literature on acquisitions and cultural fit, and on identity in 
acquisitions. Finally, I tie the acquisition literature to the concept of 
sensemaking and learning.  
3.1 Overview acquisitions literature 
According to Schweiger et al. (1993) three factors are critical to success in 
any merger or acquisition. First, the transaction must be undertaken for 
strategic reasons, as opposed to solely financial or tax reasons. Second, the 
final purchase price must not exceed the inherent or combinational value. 
Third, the acquisition must be effectively implemented by combining the 
organizations to realize the strategic benefits. Both the strategic factors that 
indicate the potential for value creation as reflected in market expectations, 
as well as the processes through which the synergies can be realized, need to 
be considered. This includes how the target and acquiring firms are to be 
integrated after the deal is signed (Pablo 1994).  
Acquisitions have been studied extensively from several perspectives, and to 
a large extent along disciplinary lines (Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006). 
Even though research on acquisitions has provided detailed insights into a 
number of aspects of acquisitions from different perspectives, the 
specialization of the insight provided and the lack of cross-fertilization of 
research has resulted in a fragmented field with a lack of coherent 
understanding of the contingencies for acquisition performance. 
Acquisition performance has been examined through different lenses and 
with different measures of performance. Finance scholars have focused 
primarily on whether or not acquisitions create value for shareholders. They 
have been concerned with value creation on a societal level, by arguing that 
the entire economy benefits from the asset relocation resulting from 
acquisitions (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991) Financial economics research 
has consistently shown that the value accrues to the shareholders of the 
target, but not of the acquiring firm (Weston and Chung 1990; Sudarsanam 
and Mahate 2003).  
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Strategy research on acquisitions has focused mainly on identifying the 
strategic and process factors that contribute to explaining acquisition 
performance and variance in performance (King et al. 2004; Cartwright and 
Schoenberg 2006). As such, the interest has been in value creation at the 
level of the firm. In this perspective, value creation is assumed to be 
achieved through acquisitions on the basis of economies of scale, scope, 
market power and cost savings (Chatterjee et al. 1992; Birkinshaw et al. 
2000). Others have examined the value creationmechanisms based on 
resource sharing, to understand the conditions under which acquirers earn 
abnormal returns (Capron and Pistre 2002).  
The strategic fit perspective in the field of strategic management has to a 
large extent been concerned with the link between performance and strategic 
characteristics of the acquirer and target (Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006). 
This view emphasizes the ways in which the target can contribute to the 
acquiring firm’s strategy, depending on characteristics of the firms prior to 
the integration (Jemison and Sitkin 1986; Greenwood et al. 1994). The main 
argument of this research strand has been that related acquisitions should 
exhibit superior performance compared to unrelated acquisitions (Lubatkin 
1983), the findings of this research, however, are inconclusive. Another 
strand of research has explored how organizational fit is related to 
acquisition performance (Datta 1991). Organizational fit refers to the 
compatibility of the acquirer’s and target’s organizations. Differences in 
management styles and organizational systems have been the focus of this 
research (Datta 1991).  
Even though these studies have provided valuable insight on acquisitions, 
they have not yielded consistent results as to contingencies for acquisition 
performance. A metastudy of the four most commonly examined variables: 
whether the acquiring firm was a conglomerate, relatedness, mode of 
payment and prior acquisition experience, shows that unidentified variables 
may explain the varying performance of acquisitions (King et al. 2004). 
Subsequently, there is a need for theory development in the field of 
acquisitions. (King et al. 2004:187): 
“We find robust results indicating that, on average and across 
the most commonly studied variables, acquiring firms’ 
performance does not positively change as a function of their 
acquisition activity, and is negatively affected to a modest 
extent. More importantly, our results indicate that unidentified 
variables may explain significant variance in post-acquisition 
performance, suggesting the need for additional theory 
development and changes to M&A research methods.”  
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This suggests that strategic fit or other commonly studied variables cannot 
fully account for acquisition performance. The strategic fit and 
organizational fit research both focus on matching of organizational 
characteristics of the target and acquiring firm, assuming that similarities in 
strategy, organization and scope of business leads to better performance. I 
argue that it is not the differences in these characteristics per se that 
determine whether there is strategic or organizational fit, and subsequently 
the performance of the acquisitions. Rather, it is the ways in which the 
organizations are different, and how these differences are perceived and 
dealt with that influence outcomes of the acquisition. For example, 
differences in organization and strategy could be beneficial for performance 
and learning in the new unit. The need for theory development warrants an 
approach that takes both the process and context into consideration. The 
strategic and organizational fit perspectives have been challenged by a 
process perspective promoting the idea that even though the potential for 
synergies lies in the strategic and organizational fit, it is the integration 
process in which this potential is realized (Jemison and Sitkin 1986; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991).  
For my purposes acquisition performance in terms of stockmarket and 
accounting based measures provide one of many indicators of acquisition 
performance. However, these measures are influenced by many factors 
unrelated to the acquisitions; in addition it is complicated to assess how the 
firm would have performed without the acquisition, as isolating the effect of 
the acquisition is difficult. Further complicating the measurements of 
performance in integrated acquisitions is the fact that, after the units have 
been combined, following the target and isolating the target performance, or 
value generated from the target, is difficult as people, processes, structures 
and customers are most often integrated. In this thesis I focus on 
performance and value creationin a broad sense. I consider performance in 
terms of the perceptions of the managers and members of the organizations 
related to how profitable the acquisition is, customer and employee 
satisfaction, generation of new business, new technologies and new 
competencies gained through the acquisitions. This study employs the 
distinction between expected and serendipitous value (Graebner 2004). 
Expected value is part of the acquisition motivation, the expected benefits 
that motivated the deal, such as access to customers and market, technology 
and synergies explicit in the business case. The business case refers to the 
reasoning and rationale behind the acquisitions presented in a document, 
arguing for the acquisitions value, importance, and benefits. Serendipitous 
value is the unexpected benefits that actually accrued to the buyer, but that 
were not anticipated prior to the deal. Serendipitous value includes new 
strategic ideas, access to unknown, yet valuable product development 
techniques, technologies, knowledge, products and work processes or a more 
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general revitalization of the organization (Vermeulen and Barkema 2001; 
Vermeulen 2005).  
3.2 Post – Acquisition integration as a source of value creation 
Post-acquisition integration is considered the most important determinant of 
acquisition synergy realization (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). The 
integration process is the adaptive process where the target and acquiring 
firms meet to transfer capabilities and work towards the goal of the 
acquisition (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Morosini 1998). The integration 
process consists of interactions constituting the environment for transferring 
capabilities and creating knowledge to achieve the acquisition’s purpose. It 
refers both to a temporal phenomenon, a series of implementation activities 
(Cooper and Finkelstein 2006) and the result of a socialization scheme 
(Nahavandi and Malekzadeh 1988). Post-acquisition integration processes 
are usually seen as long-lasting open-ended processes, beginning at the 
signing of the deal, the announcement of the acquisition or earlier, when a 
firm starts searching for a target (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991), and lasting 
several years post-acquisition.  
Strategy scholars have focused on post-acquisition integration as imperative 
for value creation(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Morosini 1998; Singh and 
Zollo 1998; Graebner 2004; Zollo and Singh 2004; Colombo et al. 2007).  
Pablo (1994:906) defines integration as: “making of changes in the 
functional activities arrangements, organizational structures and systems, 
and cultures of combining organizations to facilitate their consolidation into 
a functional whole.” The level of integration depends upon the degree to 
which these changes are made. The distinctions between the levels of 
integration are important for my study. Level of integration determines to 
what extent the different units need to interact. 
Integration of the acquisition is a means to manage the interdependencies, 
and securing efficient and effective use of resources to achieve some 
common organizational goal (Pablo 1994). Combining the acquirer and the 
target firms legally, structurally and culturally, has been claimed to be the 
most important factor for value creation and acquisition success (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison 1991). In line with this distinction between legal, structural and 
cultural integration, Shrivastava (1986) distinguishes between levels of 
integration depending on the motives of the merger.  Procedural integration 
is the combining of the organizations into one legal unit. This implies 
combining accounting systems and procedures to rationalize systems and 
eliminate contradicting rules. Physical integration is the combination of 
resources; this entails integration of physical assets, product lines, 
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production systems, and technologies. Cultural integration involves the 
merging of cultures and managerial viewpoints. Cultural integration is 
defined as the most critical type of integration, and also suggested to be the 
type of integration needing further studies.  
The integration consists of interactions constituting the environment for 
transferring capabilities and creating knowledge. The transfer and 
application of strategic capabilities produces value for the firm in an 
acquisition to achieve the acquisition’s purpose. Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991) distinguish between different types of capability transfer; resource 
sharing, functional skills transfer and general management skills transfer, 
which lead to improved competitive advantage. Several studies have focused 
on knowledge and capability transfers to ensure value creation in acquisition 
integration processes (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Birkinshaw 1999; 
Bresman et al. 1999). These studies have shown that communication and 
interaction between acquirer and target is beneficial for knowledge transfer.  
Several levels and modes of post-acquisition integration can be pursued. The 
target and the acquiring firms may blend into one new organization, the 
acquirer may assimilate the target, or the target may become a stand-alone 
after the acquisition (Chakrabarti and Mitchell 2005). Haspeslagh and 
Jemison (1991) distinguish between four different types of integration, based 
on the concept of capability transfer between the target and acquiring firms. 
The distinction between the four is linked to the need for strategic 
interdependence and the need for organizational autonomy. This leads to 
four types of integration: 1) Absorption: acquisitions with high need for 
strategic interdependence, and a low need for organizational autonomy.  2) 
Preservation: low need for strategic interdependence, combined with a high 
need for organizational autonomy. 3) Symbiosis: high need for strategic 
interdependence and high need for organizational autonomy. 4) Holding: 
low need for strategic interdependence and low need for organizational 
autonomy. Haspeslagh and Jemison view each acquisition as representing 
one type of integration.  
The level of integration and the degree of autonomy granted the target firm 
is contingent on the objectives of the acquisition. Objectives of the merger, 
size and form of merging firms determine the need for integration and 
integration strategies. Different acquisition objectives require conflicting 
levels of integration or needed autonomy. “When the goal is primarily to 
leverage the existing knowledge of the target firm by transferring it to the 
acquirer’s personnel, then the need for coordination dominated the need for 
autonomy. In contrast, when the primary goal is to keep the acquired 
employees capable of producing ongoing innovation, then the need to 
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preserve autonomy dominates the need for coordination between acquirer 
and target firm.” (Puranam and Srikanth 2007:808). They argue that 
acquisitions may have conflicting goals, and as such they extend Haspeslagh 
and Jemison’s work (1991), which has not addressed the issue of more than 
a single objective to an acquisition.  
Integration processes can be divided into sub-processes or levels. 
Birkinshaw et al distinguish between the sub-processes of human integration 
and task integration (Birkinshaw et al. 2000).  Human integration refers to 
the activities aimed at socializing and fostering the participation of the 
employees of the acquired firm. Human integration is referred to as being 
concerned primarily with ensuring employee satisfaction and a shared 
identity after the acquisition among the employees from target and acquiring 
firms. Task integration, on the other hand, is activities aimed at facilitating 
effective functioning of the operations of the combined firms. Task 
integration is the process of transferring and sharing of capabilities and 
resources to create value from the acquisition. Managers can take different 
routes to integration, focusing on either human or task integration, however, 
research suggests that integration on both dimensions is needed for 
successful integration (Birkinshaw et al. 2000). The distinction between task 
and human integration, both as processes and as outcomes, is important in 
this thesis. Human and task integration can refer to different phenomena, and 
specifying these is important to understanding post-acquisition integration. 
They can refer to planned integration activities, for example when managers 
initiate interaction between target and acquirer. They can refer to outcomes, 
as in having achieved either integration of activities (task integration) or 
having developed a new organizational identity and organizational culture 
(human integration). This distinction is, as far as I can see, not explicit in the 
literature dealing with task and human integration (Birkinshaw et al. 2000). 
In focusing on the unfolding of the acquisition integration process, the 
distinction between the planned integration efforts and how the integration 
process is experienced by the managers and employees may be illuminated.  
Few studies have taken the perspective of the target firm and focused on the 
actions of the target managers in post-acquisition integration. One notable 
exception is Graebner’s (2004) study on target firm managers, emphasizing 
their roles for value creation in post-acquisition integration. She 
distinguishes between expected and serendipitous value creation, finding that 
target managers are imperative in achieving both expected and serendipitous 
value. Through management of employees’ emotions (mitigating actions) 
and pacing of change (mobilizing actions), expected value is created.  
Serendipitous value is gained through managers taking on cross-
organizational roles in the new organization. When target managers take on 
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cross-organizational roles they are in a position to discover new possibilities 
for value creation, and have the status and authority needed to pursue them. 
The distinction between mitigating and mobilizing actions can be related to 
human and task integration. Mitigating actions, as the managers of the target 
or acquirer take initiatives to shield the employees from the disruptive 
effects of the acquisition can be assumed to be related to human integration. 
Correspondingly, the mobilizing actions aimed at linking activities between 
the target and acquirer is related to task integration. I will discuss this further 
in the next section on planned management initiatives.  
Whereas researchers have emphasized the importance of integrating the 
firms to achieve synergies (Pablo 1994), Shaver (2006) proposes that the 
integration makes the firms more susceptible to negative outcomes through 
two mechanisms, the contagion effect and capacity effect. The contagion 
effect implies that threats to the organization are amplified through 
integration. As the organizations through integration become interdependent, 
threats to one organization also affect the other. Capacity effects, on the 
other hand, refer to effects that inhibit the firm from capitalizing on 
opportunities because of capacity utilization of resources, leaving the 
organization with less slack from the integration efforts. These mechanisms 
are relevant for my study. The post-acquisition integration process is fraught 
with issues that managers need to deal with, disrupting business-as usual. 
The capacity and contagion effects illustrate that synergies and benefits of 
the acquisitions are impeded by disruptions and negative effects of 
integration. As the literature has shown, these disruptions are an inevitable 
part of post-acquisition integration processes, and therefore also important 
concepts in this thesis (Buono and Bowditch 1989; Epstein 2004; Paruchuri 
et al. 2006).  
Post-acquisition integration has been shown to have disruptive effects 
leading to lower performance, as post-acquisition integration can be fraught 
with conflicting goals and ambiguity, creating integration problems. 
Integration may lead to disruption in the task environment and the social 
context, and subsequently impact the performance of the acquisition.  
Paruchuri et al. (2006) explored the idea that acquisition integration does not 
have the same disruptive effect on all individuals in an organization. 
Studying post-acquisition innovations, they found that if the target’s 
competency and expertise is different from the acquirer’s, the more 
disturbing and detrimental to performance is organizational integration. They 
focused on knowledge workers, whose work routines are to a large extent 
socially embedded, relying on the intricate, path dependent context for 
performing their work, and found that loss of status and centrality by 
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disruption in the social context may be detrimental to their work 
performance, supporting prior research on status and acquisitions.  
Structural integration is assumed to lead to lower task autonomy (Puranam et 
al. 2006). In terms of autonomy for the target as a unit this intuitively makes 
sense. However, depending on the level of perceived individual autonomy 
the target experienced prior to the deal, they may, despite structural 
integration perceive of a large degree of task autonomy in the new 
organization. Granting the target autonomy means minimizing the 
disruptions of the acquisition, leaving the target to carry on their business as 
usual. On the other hand, integrating the units and coordinating across prior 
unit boundaries, aligning incentives, communication channels etc promotes 
exploitation of the targets. Acquisition experience may make acquirers better 
at mitigating disruptive consequences of loss of autonomy by integration; 
however there is no evidence that experience leads an acquirer to achieve 
greater coordination benefits. If the target is to provide the acquirer with an 
independent source of ongoing innovation, they are primarily concerned 
with what the firm does. If they on the other hand, use the target’s 
knowledge as an input to their own innovation processes, then they are 
leveraging what the target knows. Differentiated integration (Puranam and 
Srikanth 2007) is another way to get beyond the integration autonomy 
dilemma. Autonomy is argued to promote exploration, whereas coordination 
promotes exploitation (Puranam et al. 2006). On the other hand, one could 
argue that through integrating organizations with different knowledge bases, 
the organizations are exposed to inputs that contribute to exploration of new 
opportunities, through questioning old ways of doing things.  
In post-acquisition integration, where the initial combination of the acquired 
and acquiring units takes place, organizational instability increases.  A 
growing number of questions about structural, cultural, and role-related 
changes and concerns need to be answered. In the early stages of an 
acquisition, only a small part of the organizations is affected by the 
acquisition. In the post-acquisition integration, however, there is added 
complexity by the involvement of the entire organization (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991). Depending on the mode and level of integration, not only are 
more people involved, but also, whereas mostly managers are active in the 
early phases of an acquisition, people from all parts of the organization are 
engaged in the integration phase. This implies interest groups with focus on 
different issues. Many issues that seemed to be resolved in the momentum of 
pre-acquisition are revealed as more complex in the later phases. The 
organizations may have different experiences, perspectives and 
organizational cultures; they may also have conflicting expectations and 
implicit assumptions about how to create a unified organization, the 
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organizations goals and strategies. They may lack a common understanding 
of the goals and motives behind the acquisition. Combined, these issues 
make decision-making processes suffer and learning complicated.  
In this thesis post-acquisition integration refers to the process of uniting two 
firms into one; as such it is a socialization process of aligning, adapting and 
forming the new organization. Acquisitions can be defined as hybrid 
organizations; including two formerly sovereign firms combining under one 
legal unit. Subsequently the units transform and merge gradually, implying 
that issues that pre-acquisition involve inter-firm levels, gradually become 
intra-firm issues. For example the issue of learning in acquisitions imposes a 
hybrid of inter- and intrafirm learning.  
3.3 Integration: planned management initiatives or emergent 
process 
Research on post-acquisition integration has had three main agendas 
(Birkinshaw et al. 2000): first to describe the integration actions performed 
by managers, secondly, to understand the impact of these actions on the 
target and acquiring organizations, and thirdly to explain how this process 
leads to value creation. The literature examining post-acquisition integration 
traditionally adopted a choice perspective focusing on the actions of 
managers (Jemison and Sitkin 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Pablo 
1994). Both ontologically and epistemologically, the bulk of this research is 
rooted in a rationalistic paradigm. To a large extent this research has taken a 
management perspective, and limited the studies to the upper echelons of the 
acquiring organizations, exploring acquiring managers’ actions and formal 
management initiated integration schemes. Issues regarding autonomy, 
learning and involvement, communications, incentive structures and speed 
of integration are a focus of research on the management of the integration 
process and its impact on the success of the integration (Schweiger and 
Goulet 2000). Studies indicate that how managers handle the integration 
process influences acquisition outcomes (Jemison and Sitkin 1986; Jisun et 
al. 2005). Lack of managerial attention to integration issues, on the other 
hand, is argued to lead to detrimental consequences for the acquisition 
(Larsson and Finkelstein 1999).  
To a large extent, the bulk of the acquisitions literature has assumed a linear 
and rational process of integration, where managers can and should direct 
the integration process, while employees implicitly are relatively passive 
targets of managerial action. Much of the research presented here has 
explored a direct effects model of how integration process variables affect 
some measure of acquisition performance, implying that the integration 
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process itself creates or destroys value. Implicitly this view assumes that the 
actions of management and the process of integration determine the 
realization of benefits of the acquisition. Some research has emerged as a 
counter pressure, examining decision-making in post-acquisition integration 
through a sensemaking perspective, suggesting that the event of an 
acquisition has unintended consequences and processes that by and large are 
beyond management control (Vaara 2003). Thus, focusing on how the 
process actually evolves may lead us to a better understanding of the post-
acquisition process than the prior research focusing solely on the actions of 
managers. 
The view of rational and linear integration processes, where managers 
analyze available data, establish targets and manage the process, is also 
challenged by Empson (2000). In her study of professional service firms she 
identifies an undirected model of evolving organizational integration. In this 
model managerial action is highly constrained and change processes are not 
top-down. She proposes that professional staff throughout the combining 
firms determine the extent of integration, as dissatisfied key resources may 
leave the firm. This view of the integration process includes the informal 
features of the integration process. Following this discussion the integration 
process can be viewed both as a process evolving in the organization; of 
integrating and combining the organizations, and as a series of management 
initiatives and planned activities, addressing issues like level of integration, 
autonomy granted to the target firm, formally aligning work-processes and 
speed of integration. I argue that it is necessary to focus on the relationship 
between perceptions, actions and the process to understand the intricacies of 
the post-acquisition integration process.  
I argue that the concepts of task and human integration should be developed 
to include a distinction between planned management initiatives, as a means 
to an integration aim, and how these initiatives are perceived and acted upon 
in the organization and their subsequent results. For example a planned 
initiative like a kick-off gathering for target employees, initiated to foster 
enthusiasm and positive attitudes to the acquisition, can have the opposite 
effect. As the employees come together for one evening with expectation of 
having fun, they may realize how different they are, this resulting in new 
employees feeling even more alienated from the acquiring firm. Both 
intended and unintended consequences are brought on by integration 
initiatives. Subsequently these outcomes are interpreted and evaluated and 
acted upon by organizational members. Many studies investigating post-
acquisition integration processes focus on the perception of acquiring firm 
managers of how they have managed the integration process. However, the 
managers’ perceptions of how the acquisition has been managed may differ 
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from how the rest of the organization perceives the initiatives, and the 
consequences of those initiatives. Even more importantly, by focusing on 
these initiatives, from the perspective of the managers, the most important 
task and human integration mechanisms may be lost, which may be the 
emergent mitigating and mobilizing actions performed by managers. By 
including the distinction between intended and unintended actions and 
outcomes, and including the organizational members’ interpretations, a 
sensemaking dimension is added that can help shed light upon some of the 
unintended consequences and “irrational features” of post-acquisition 
integration, and in turn help explain how value is created or destroyed in 
integration processes.  
3.4 The human side: culture in post-acquisition integration 
A stream of research in the field of organizational behavior developed as a 
response to the assumed neglect of “the human side” of acquisitions. This 
research has concentrated on managing the integration process (Birkinshaw 
et al. 2000), asserting that communication and sensitivity to employee 
concerns is necessary for long-term success (Birkinshaw et al. 2000). Human 
resource scholars have focused on human resource issues such as turnover, 
commitment, anxiety, and other issues of human resource management 
(Schweiger and Weber 1989; Empson 1994; Aguilera and Dencker 2004; 
Buono 2005; Bjørkman and Søderberg 2006; Kiessling and Harvey 2006). 
Employees’ responses to the changes following acquisitions and how these 
should be addressed have been examined. The common theme in this 
research is the need to address human resource issues to secure acquisition 
success. An underlying assumption is that human resource issues have not 
been given the necessary focus, both in prior literature, but also by managers 
in acquisition implementation. 
This research is concerned with how acquisitions impact individuals and 
organizational culture, and also how organizational culture impacts 
acquisition outcomes (Buono and Bowditch 1989; Cartwright and Cooper 
1993; Buono 2005), suggesting that the outcomes of acquisitions can be 
explained not only by structural fit and organizational fit, but also by cultural 
fit (Datta 1991; Schweiger and Goulet 2002; Schweiger and Goulet 2005). 
Cultural fit is the extent to which the target and the acquirer’s organizations 
are culturally compatible, and the extent to which the target and acquirer can 
be integrated into a new organization (Terry 2003).  
An underlying assumption is that if there is cultural fit, employee 
satisfaction and effective integration will facilitate acquisition success 
(Weber 1996). Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) draw on anthropology in 
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their study of acculturation processes in post-acquisition integration. They 
focus on cultural change following an acquisition in both target and 
acquiring firms, or in one of them. Their approach as such represents a 
socialization perspective on integration. Socialization refers to a learning 
process where the individual learns the norms and values of a given social 
unit. Organizational socialization, thus, refers to the individual becoming an 
integrated part of an organization.  
Post-acquisition integration has been studied as a context for culture clashes, 
cultural learning and culture change (Buono and Bowditch 1989; Larsson 
and Lubatkin 2001). Several models of integration have been developed in 
the M&A literature to address the cultural issues of acquisition integration. 
They can mainly be divided into two categories. First, those that encourage a 
“careful” integration process, with minimal intervention, that aims at 
preserving the existing values and cultures of the joining firm. On the other 
hand, the “controlling” integration that aims at implementing the acquirers 
values and way of operating, crushing any resistance and cultural clashes 
immediately (Larsson 2005). Even though these studies have provided 
valuable insights into cultural aspects of acquisitions, they have yielded 
inconclusive results as to how cultural issues affect acquisition integration. 
Underpinning some of the research on culture in the acquisition literature is 
an essentialist view of culture, assuming culture to be homogenous in an 
organization; as such it masks the complexity that is organizational culture. 
Further, the process and dynamic perspectives of organizational culture are 
neglected. Also by separating and measuring the different “dimensions” of 
culture, its complexity is not captured. I aim to inductively discover how 
identity unfolds in the post-acquisition integration process, not measuring on 
predetermined identity dimensions. However, a challenge will be to embrace 
the complexity of organizational identity, whilst at the same time addressing 
it as an organizational phenomenon, that is, by definition implying that it to a 
certain degree is homogenous.  
Studies have focused on national culture (Larsson and Lubatkin 2001; Brock 
2005; Slangen 2006), organizational culture (Buono and Bowditch 1989; 
Cartwright and Cooper 1993), and critical theoretical perspectives on culture 
(Riad 2005). Even though a large stream of research has examined the 
impact of the “human side”, identity and culture on acquisition outcomes, 
there is little knowledge of the mechanisms in these processes. A recent 
review of the literature on culture and acquisition performance (Teerikangas 
and Very 2006) concludes that even though the link between culture and 
performance has been studied thoroughly, there is still no conclusive 
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evidence towards how culture impacts performance, from neither research 
on organizational culture nor on national culture.  
Culture is closely linked to identity, and as such represents an important 
concept. I will not explicitly study the concept of culture as a variable. I 
view organizational culture as the context in which social interaction occur, 
not as a variable either affecting interactions or as a variable that is a product 
of that interaction. Rather organizational culture in my view is the context 
this interaction is embedded in, and the social context the development of 
identity is embedded in. 
3.5 Research on acquisitions and identity 
There is a growing interest in using social identity theory to analyze 
organizational phenomena in general (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Rousseau 
1998; Albert et al. 2000; Hogg and Terry 2001; Pratt 2001; van Dick 2001; 
Haslam 2003; Haslam 2004), and specifically to examine acquisitions 
(Melewar and Harrold 2000; Reade 2001; Van Knippenberg and Van 
Leeuwen 2001; Terry 2003; Van Leeuwen and Van Knippenberg 2003; 
Vaara et al. 2003; Empson 2004; Ullrich et al. 2005; Bartels et al. 2006; Van 
Dick et al. 2006). Closer attention to identity issues in integration processes 
is assumed to improve chances of successful integration (Melewar and 
Harrold 2000).  
Organizational identity has been suggested to be important for understanding 
mergers and acquisitions (Empson 2004; Alvesson and Empson 2008). In a 
post-acquisition integration process, expanding and transforming group 
boundaries may challenge or threaten identity on an organizational level, and 
individuals’ feelings of belonging and identification with the organization on 
the individual level. An acquisition represents a threat to the distinctiveness 
of the organization and challenges the organizational members’ perceptions 
of “who we are”. Integration processes following an acquisition are likely to 
threaten and heighten the salience of group boundaries, and subsequently 
make people question their organizational identity.  By integrating two 
formerly separate units in a post-acquisition integration, new organizational 
identities are imposed on the employees of both target and acquiring firms. 
According to social identity theory, people will resist such threats to 
preserve the distinctiveness of their group (Van Leeuwen and Van 
Knippenberg 2003; Haslam 2004).  
Studies have focused on identification with a new organization, and the 
creation of a new organizational identity in post-acquisition integration (Van 
Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen 2001; Van Leeuwen and Van Knippenberg 
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2003; Van Dick et al. 2006). In addition to the expected negative effects of 
acquisitions, for example fear of job loss, research suggests that acquisitions 
create a threat to the employees’ identification with the organization, 
resulting in negative consequences for collective identity and self-esteem 
(Dick et al. 2006). Other authors, focusing on identity, have taken an 
intergroup perspective, showing how reducing intergroup conflict and 
managing diversity is beneficial for employee well-being and morale, and as 
such for the success of the merger (Terry 2003). 
Social identity theory provides an analytical framework for understanding 
socialization processes and perceptions of others and self in an 
organizational setting. When a newcomer enters an organization, making 
sense of the social structure and interpreting organizational phenomena is 
necessary. In new social settings, individuals need not only to portray to 
others who they are, but also to develop a sense of self in a new environment 
(Brickson 2000; Hogg and Terry 2000).  Based on social identity theory, 
researchers suggest that when the acquired partner perceives the acquirer to 
have higher status (Haslam 2003), or help in their survival (Rousseau 1998), 
and the boundaries between the companies are seen as permeable, they will 
respond more favorably to the acquisition (Hogg and Terry 2000). As long 
as the new organization is perceived as continuing with tasks from the 
acquired unit, identification with the old unit is positively connected with 
integration success (van Dick et al. 2004; 2005) 
The concept of status has been developed in, and applied to, many studies in 
the field of psychology, anthropology, and sociology throughout the last 
century. Applying it to the field of business, Podolny (2005) examines how 
concerns about status affect market competition. He defined status as a 
construct involving past performance and product quality, but even more 
significantly, the ability to portray this performance and quality to others. 
Through the concept of status and that status leaks through relationships, 
price mechanisms, and exchange conditions can be explained. In acquisition 
integration the status of an acquirer can leak through the relationship that the 
target has with the acquirer and the target may be contaminated with the 
acquirer’s status (Empson 2001). In the case that the target is integrated in 
the acquirer and loses its distinctiveness, the contamination is complete. 
Identity and status are interlinked. The question of “who we are” is usually 
relational, and in reference to “who they are”. Firms perceive themselves, 
and others perceive them as having some status on a variety of different 
dimensions.  
When a firm acquires a target firm, there is an assumption that the target is 
in possession of some resources to which the acquirer would like access. 
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However, determining these resources in advance can be difficult. Most 
acquisitions take place in a certain amount of secrecy, and the momentum 
towards closing the deal may inhibit information processing and decision 
making in the pre-acquisition phase (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). 
Judging potential targets can be parallel to the determination of quality in 
relationships between exchange partners. When the quality of the actors is 
hard to determine potential targets are measured on account of their status. 
Status represents an implicit measurement of whether or not the target is a 
good buy. Assuming that the status of the actor influences the likelihood of 
other actors wanting to have an exchange with that actor (Podolny 2005), a 
firm may be more eager to acquire a high status target than a low status 
target. This for two reasons, first the status is a signal of other inherent 
features of the firm, and second, a firm may be “contaminated” by acquiring 
a low status target, and achieve higher status by acquiring a higher status 
target through leaking status.  
The literature on identity in acquisitions has emphasized how a prolonged 
attachment to the pre-acquisition organization is detrimental to post-
acquisition identification. Studies suggest that the high failure rate of 
acquisitions is due to the discontinuous way change is designed in these 
processes, leading to loss of identification (Ullrich et al. 2005). Supporting 
the importance of prior identity, studies have shown that both identification 
with the pre-acquisition subunit and the post-acquisition organization is 
positively correlated with satisfaction, and negatively correlated with 
turnover intentions and negative emotions (van Dick et al. 2004).  
Merging units with different identities have in previous studies been proven 
to resist knowledge sharing (Empson 2001; 2004). This would lead to the 
assumption that target companies with the more salient pre-acquisition 
identity tied to former owner would resist integration initiatives more than 
the target with less salient pre-acquisition identity. By resisting integration 
initiatives, the opportunities for both expected and serendipitous beneficial 
organizational outcomes are limited. 
Loss of an understanding of what are the central and distinctive 
characteristics of an organization may lead to identity ambiguity (Corley and 
Gioia 2004). Identity ambiguity refers to multiple understandings and 
interpretations of the organization’s identity. In the event of an acquisition, 
where two formerly separate firms are to be merged into one, I will argue 
that identity ambiguity may arise. First, different firms may have different 
assumptions of what are central and distinctive features of their own 
organization. Secondly, the image the members of the organizations have of 
“the other firm” may differ from the “other firms” self-concepts. Thirdly, the 
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identity ambiguity can refer to the multiple understandings and 
interpretations of what are the combined firm’s central and distinctive 
features. People are strongly motivated and committed to take actions to 
restore their organizational image (Dutton and Dukerich 1991), and also to 
preserve their identities. Studies have shown that identity threats elicit 
actions to preserve identity that inhibit strategic change (Fiol and O'Connor 
2002) and restrict learning and change (Gagliardi 1986). 
Organizations respond to identity threats in different ways. The level of 
integration, assumptions of entitativity and perceived status of the 
organizations, will impact the perceived threat to identity. Research shows 
that in the integration processes, members of the organizations tend to act on 
the basis of their pre-merger identities (Van Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen 
2001).  Social identity research in acquisitions has focused on the effects on 
“us” (the target) versus “them” (the acquirer), and situations where these 
categorizations have effects on acquisition outcomes. When a group’s 
identity is threatened it may elicit both group behavior and group bias.  
Studies have shown that the relative status of the target and the acquiring 
company impact the degree to which they display ingroup favoritism and 
their attitude to the acquisition (Terry 2003; Haslam 2004).  
The literature on integration issues in acquisitions has to a large degree been 
concerned with how to create on overarching organizational culture and 
organizational identity to facilitate value creation and a smooth integration 
process. When the acquirer is seen as legitimate, attractive, with higher 
status, and that it is possible for members of the acquired unit to continue 
with their tasks in the new organizations, chances are higher that the post-
integration process will be successful (Buono and Bowditch 1989; Hogg and 
Terry 2000).  However, a few studies have claimed that preserving original 
identity can prevent resistance to the merger or acquisition (Van Leeuwen 
and Van Knippenberg 2003; van Dick et al. 2004). 
Social identity theory predicts how individuals act when their individual 
identities are threatened. The bulk of empirical research focusing on identity 
in M&As has done so from a social identity perspective, exploring identity 
on an individual level, focusing on the intergroup dimensions of acquisitions 
and how they affect acquisition integration (Terry 2003). This research has 
aimed to explain how intergroup bias affects the employee’s responses to the 
merger. Research on organizational identity, emerges from a different 
perspective and reflects the identity of the organization as the explicit part of 
organizational culture, the inside part of organizational image, how the 
external audiences see the organization (Hatch and Schultz 1997). There is 
less knowledge of how organizations act when their identity is threatened, 
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even though some scholars have addressed events that challenge 
organizational identity, like corporate spin-offs (Corley and Gioia 2004) and 
external influences that threaten organizational identity (Dutton and 
Dukerich 1991; Ravasi and Schultz 2006). Acquisitions specifically, 
however, have received little attention as settings for studies of 
organizational identity, with some exceptions (Risberg et al. 2003; Empson 
2004). This study will build on both theoretical perspectives.  
3.6 Acquisitions: sensemaking, learning and renewal 
Learning and acquisitions has been studied from two perspectives. Firstly, 
studies have examined how firms learn from a focal acquisition and use this 
learning in subsequent acquisition, more specifically examining whether 
acquisition experience leads to better performance. Secondly, how firm’s 
learn through acquisitions and the contingencies for such learning, in other 
words, if firms manage to take advantage of the knowledge embedded in the 
target firm. I will first briefly discuss acquisition experience and then 
explore the literature on learning through acquisitions.  
The empirical work on the impact of acquisition experience and acquisition 
performance shows mixed results (Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999; King et 
al. 2004). Studies have shown that there are both positive and negative 
effects of experience on performance. Studies show that experience can 
predict success (Bruton et al. 1994) and others that experience has no impact 
on performance (Hayward 2002).  
Research on learning curves has shown fairly consistent results in 
operational settings, however in strategic contexts, such as learning how to 
successfully acquire another firm, the findings are mixed (Barkema and 
Schijven 2008). Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) studied the impact of 
previous acquisition experience on performance, drawing on behavioral 
learning theory to explain the U-shaped relationship between acquisition 
experience and acquisition performance. Firms do inappropriately 
discriminate from prior acquisition experience, inexperienced acquirers, after 
making their initial acquisition generalized inappropriately to subsequent 
dissimilar acquisitions, thereby leading to poor performance, while 
experienced acquirers, however, appropriately discriminate between their 
acquisitions, leading to better performance.  
Organizations learn through changing routines and beliefs in response to 
experience through two major mechanisms trial and error experimentation 
and organizational search (Levitt and March 1988). The second of these is 
particularly important in relation to acquisitions. The pool of alternative 
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routines and beliefs is extended through acquisitions. In any social group, 
certain things are taken for granted, and as a new person enters, he or she 
may challenge these ideas. This in itself can represent a source of new 
knowledge to the organization. The existing norms, rules that make up the 
code, may only learn from individuals who deviate from it. Acquisitions 
involve socialization processes and change both for the members of the 
acquiring, and the acquired, organization. Routines, assumptions and values 
are challenged, resulting in ambiguities in the combined organization 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). Formerly taken for granted, norms, 
assumptions and beliefs need to be negotiated, thereby slowing interpretation 
and decision-making processes. On the other hand, the performance of 
decision making in heterogeneous surroundings, with multiple perspectives 
causing dialectic inquiry can facilitate better decisions. Dialectic inquiry is 
claimed to produce better decisions than consensus methods (Dean Jr and 
Sharfman 1993). The diversity offered by an acquisition, in this view, 
provides an organization with multiple perspectives to contribute in 
processing and interpreting information, decision-making and development 
of new knowledge, both providing an opportunity for better decisions. Thus, 
combining formerly separate firms represents both a challenge and an 
opportunity for the quality of decisions and for learning.  
The post-acquisition integration process represents a meeting of potentially 
different work processes, routines, norms and rules. Learning occurs when 
something taken for granted is questioned, or when new light is shed on a 
topic. As such, acquisitions represent a potential for new perspectives 
through which to reevaluate assumptions that were previously taken for 
granted, thereby contributing to change and organizational learning. On the 
other hand, through socialization, which is a social learning process, 
variability and the exploratory deviation may be reduced, thus a potential for 
learning may be unused. 
The organizational learning and adaptation perspective assumes that 
organizations need to balance exploration and exploitation of knowledge 
resources (March 1991; Levinthal and March 1993). Exploration enables a 
firm to renew its knowledge base through search for new knowledge. 
Exploitation on the other hand, describes a firm focusing on the knowledge 
and routines that contribute most to its success, limiting search for new 
information and hampering the creation of new knowledge, and thereby 
reducing variety in the firm’s knowledge base. Vermeulen and Barkema 
(2001) claim that acquisitions: “…may broaden the firm’s knowledge base, 
break inertia, and foster the development of new knowledge through 
combinations of existing forms of knowledge.” Acquisitions provide 
organizations with a unique opportunity in terms of learning and knowledge 
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creation. In addition, they provide organizations with new perspectives and 
insights through different knowledge bases, cultures and routines. This can 
not only contribute to the exploring of new knowledge, but also contribute to 
the existing competencies (exploitation). However, there is a lack of research 
on the contingencies for knowledge development in post-acquisition 
integration, and the processes lead to the breaking of inertia. By focusing on 
organizational identity and identity dynamics, this study aims to explore 
these contingencies.  
Conformity with a group varies with regard to how much is invested by the 
actor in that group (Emerson 1962). Regarding post-acquisition integration 
processes, the socialization into, and the conformity of the acquired unit, 
may depend on social identity and perceived status relations between the 
two. A socialization process and human integration process is important for 
facilitating knowledge transfer, but at the same time that very socialization 
process threatens the unique capabilities and knowledge of the units. The 
paradox remains that, whereas the autonomy of each unit, which is keeping 
boundaries impermeable and protecting the unique capabilities and 
knowledge of that unit, can facilitate knowledge creation and learning if 
there is creative dialogue between the two parties, the creative dialogue itself 
may be enhanced by permeable boundaries, allowing communication 
between the parties. In other words, the dialogue necessary for knowledge 
transfer and learning may destroy the unique capabilities by contamination. 
Autonomy may protect the strategic capabilities, but hinder knowledge 
transfer and learning.  
Being the high status part of an acquisition on status relevant dimensions 
related to important knowledge, for instance being perceived as cutting edge 
in technology provides the high status part models on the area of technology. 
On the other hand, the part low on status in terms of technology may, on 
other status relevant dimensions, such as economy or being the acquiring 
part, have a status that provides them with models and power to define 
knowledge. The definition of what is valuable and valid knowledge within a 
domain is important for the status of the group, but correspondingly the 
status of a group is affected by what is determined as valuable knowledge. 
Also, the perception of status relevant and status irrelevant dimensions may 
vary according to group belonging.  
Organizations learn through changing routines and beliefs in response to 
experience through two major mechanisms (Levitt and March 1988); trial 
and error experimentation and organizational search. The second of these is 
particularly important in relation to acquisitions. The pool of alternative 
routines and beliefs is extended through acquisitions. In any social group, 
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certain things are taken for granted, and as a new person enters, he or she 
may challenge these ideas. This in itself can represent a source of new 
knowledge to the organization. The existing norms, rules that make up the 
code, may only learn from individuals who deviate from it. Identity is a 
motivator of action and closely linked to a firm’s organizational culture and 
norms. Learning occurs when something taken for granted is questioned, or 
when new light is shed on a topic. As such, acquisitions represent a potential 
for new perspectives through which to reevaluate assumptions that were 
previously taken for granted, thereby contributing to change and 
organizational learning. On the other hand, if the target firm “loses” its 
identity through an integration process, variability and the exploratory 
deviation may be reduced, thus a potential for learning may be unused.  
A post-acquisition integration process represents an organizational 
transition, merging of cultures, construction of meaning, and a potential for 
learning and value creation based on diversity, new capabilities and 
competencies. I argue that, viewing post-acquisition integration as a meeting 
of perspectives that can learn from one another and be a source for renewal, 
the organization needs to sustain disorganization, changes in the status quo, 
and allow for a variety of perspectives for value creation. 
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4 Theoretical framing of the study: organizational 
identity and post-acquisition integration 
In a post-acquisition integration process, individuals need to make sense of 
and interpret information, events and actions. These sensemaking processes 
are impacted by who the sense maker is and his or her former experiences. 
The concept of sensemaking is in this thesis used to link the individual and 
organizational level, and social identity theory and the concept of 
organizational identity. Sensemaking is required to answer the question 
“who are we as an organization”. This question refers to the collective 
sensemaking that makes up organizational identity. Acquisitions prompt the 
question “who am I, and how am I a part of this organization”, which is the 
individual sensemaking and construction of individual identity.  In addition, 
the acquisition prompts the individual’s perception of who the new 
organization is, and whether the individual evaluates the assumed 
characteristics of the organization as attractive, and can identify with these. 
It can be assumed that if the sensemaking processes individuals engage in 
results in the “who are we” and “who do we want to be” ending up being 
equivalent to “who the acquirer is”, would facilitate the integration process. 
The social identity approach is based on the assumption that the individual 
derives part of their identity and feelings of self from the groups in which 
they belong, and how this elicits ingroup bias and intergroup behaviors. 
Organizational identity as used here, refers to a socially constructed idea of 
“who we are” constructed in the interaction between the members of the 
organizations. Organizations are not assumed to have an identity, in the same 
manner that individuals have an identity; rather identity is a collective 
understanding of what are the characteristics of the organization. This 
organizational identity is distinct from the accumulated identities of the 
members of the organization. Organizational identity is constructed through 
sensemaking processes in the organization. Sensemaking is per definition an 
individual level concept. Individuals make sense of who they are as 
individuals and who their organization is. They construct this organizational 
identity through reflexive dialogue with other members of the organization, 
and with the external environment (Hatch and Schultz 2002).  
Organizational identity does not develop detached from the individuals in 
the organization. I will argue that in the same manner that a reflexive 
dialogue creates individual identity, sensemaking processes extend this 
dialogue to the construction of organizational identity. As such, individual 
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sensemaking, asking “who am I “, “does this organization reflect who I am”, 
“how do I fit in here”, extends to the interaction between the members of the 
organization, and between the members of the organization and outsiders. 
Viewing identity in organizations through this lens, it is possible to bridge 
the gap between the levels of analysis, and add to our understanding both of 
identity issues in post-acquisitions, but also of how social identity issues are 
related to the phenomenon of organizational identity.  
I will take a social constructivist approach (Berger and Luckmann 1967); 
defining organizational identity as residing in collective beliefs and 
understandings about relatively central and distinctive features of the 
organization. However, I do not assume that some central, distinctive and 
enduring identity exists, or that this identity is objectively available for 
examination. Rather, organizational identity resides in the identity claims of 
organizational members, and the interpretation and sensemaking related to 
the development of these claims. These interpretations are to a certain extent 
“shared”, through identity claims of “who we are”. The social constructivist 
approach focuses on how identity is a result of sensemaking processes 
carried out by members of the organization, and further how organizational 
changes seem to engage the organization in just this process of making new 
sense of what is central and distinctive about their organization (Ravasi and 
Schultz 2006). The social actor view, and the constructivist view of identity, 
focus on different cognitive processes in the development of organizational 
identity. Whereas the first focuses identity as developed based on 
sensegiving of managers, the second focuses on the sensemaking processes 
of the members of the organization (Ravasi and Schultz 2006). I will focus 
on identity as constructed through sensemaking by the members and 
managers of the organization.  
Post-acquisition integration is a large organizational change. According to 
Vaara (2003) organizational changes create the need to make sense of the 
new situation, both individually and collectively. This involves 
understanding one’s role in the new organization, the expectations tied to 
that role, and what it means to be part of the new organization. Sensemaking 
in organizations is closely linked to the construction of organizational 
identity (Weick 1995; Weick 2001). Identity-building processes in 
acquisition integration involve two issues (Vaara 2003): First, constructing 
images of “us” and “them”, individuals identify themselves as belonging to 
the acquired or acquiring organization. In the meeting between the two, they 
are likely to construct their identity in relation to the other. This means 
focusing on similarities and differences, often in a stereotypic fashion, and 
constructing images of a common future and a common identity for the 
combined organizations.  
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I focus specifically on the informal processes evolving in the organization 
after the announcement of the acquisition, in seeking to understand what 
mechanisms influence how acquisition processes evolve. In doing so, I aim 
to contribute to our understanding of the contingencies for acquisition 
outcomes. I argue that it is vital to gain a better understanding of the 
complexities that shape the progress of the integration process. There is 
limited empirical research on organizational level identity in post-acquisition 
integration processes. Scholars have addressed identity issues related to 
acquisitions on an individual level. However, there is limited knowledge of 
the relationship between identity as an organizational level phenomenon in 
post-acquisition integration, and specifically related to the organizational 
outcomes of acquisitions.  
Post-acquisition integration will in my study be defined temporally as the 
period following the acquisition announcement. Post-acquisition integration 
involves both acquiring firm and target. It is the phase where the parties 
meet to combine legally, financially, organizationally and culturally. In 
acquisition integration, building the new organization balances two 
perspectives; creating a common organizational identity and culture on the 
one hand, and on the other, protecting the unique strategic capabilities of the 
acquiring and acquired organization through autonomy. From a management 
perspective the process is fraught with questions of level of integration, 
autonomy, what to integrate and how, who to include in the process, what to 
communicate, the speed of integration etc. In this perspective the integration 
is the set of activities that take place after the announcement of an 
acquisition. Acquisition integration is complex; there are many variables that 
need to be effectively managed. Distinguishing between specific integration 
activities and other change activities in the organization is difficult.  
Setting up two straw-men, the post-acquisition integration process can be 
understood through different lenses, with different consequences for how it 
can be studied and the findings one may expect. The management view of 
post-acquisition integration assumes acquisition integration as planned 
development and “intelligent design”. Managers plan and execute, assuming 
that if they have a good strategy and execute this, the acquisition will be a 
success. This includes making decisions about level of integration, autonomy 
granted the target firm, speed of integration, and various integration 
initiatives aimed at socializing and assimilating the new employees. The 
integration initiatives are often explicitly available in the organization. In all 
the cases in this study these were available, both in written plans and 
documents, press releases and intranet articles and information to the 
employees of the target and acquiring firms. On the other hand, acquisition 
integration processes can be viewed through an evolutionary perspective, 
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assuming that it evolves through adaptation, as if by default, and where 
managers have little influence on the outcomes. This last perspective makes 
the management sciences superfluous, and leaves no room for rational 
action. The first perspective has proven disappointing in that the success 
rates of acquisitions have been low, despite a vast amount of research on the 
antecedents to success. 
I argue that the heart of the issue is not whether managers plan and execute, 
but rather that there is a discrepancy between the intended actions, how these 
are carried out, and how these actions are interpreted and reacted to. As 
such, there is a long way from the intended actions to the unintended 
consequences of those actions. Subsequently predicting or even 
understanding acquisition success is very complex. Approaching the post-
acquisition integration process through examining the plans and executions 
of them is necessary. However, I argue that to understand this intricate and 
multifaceted process, these examinations need to be juxtaposed with how 
these plans and actions are perceived, interpreted and reacted to. This means 
capturing the unintended actions and the unintended consequences of 
actions. This implies viewing the post-acquisition process as something that 
evolves largely outside managers’ control.  
The integration process will here refer to the actual unfolding of events after 
the announcement of the acquisitions. This process can mainly be accessed 
by the researcher through the accounts of the members of the organization. It 
is available to the researcher not in some objective account, but rather 
through the narratives and stories of the members of the organization as they 
make sense of events. I will argue that to contribute to our knowledge of 
post-acquisition integration processes, we need to study the integration 
initiatives, and the formalized parts of the integration process. Even more 
importantly, how these formalized initiatives are perceived and interpreted in 
the organization, and how they contribute to the unfolding of events and 
actions in the post-acquisition process. Organizational identity represents an 
understudied contingency that can contribute to our understanding of post-
acquisition integration processes and acquisition outcomes. We can gain an 
understanding of this undirected process through studying how the people in 
the organization perceive, interpret, judge and explain chains of events. How 
they assume causality, how they describe themselves and “the others”, and 
map these accounts to the more formalized initiatives and prior literature on 
post-acquisition integration processes. The challenges involved in studying 
processes will be discussed in the methods section. 
In conclusion, this research aims to develop a framework for conceptualizing 
the process through which identity influences post-acquisition integration 
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processes and the outcomes of the acquisition. The study takes as its starting 
point that organizations respond to their environments by interpreting and 
acting on issues. Acquisitions can be viewed as an issue that the organization 
needs to make sense of (Dutton and Dukerich 1991). Organizational 
ambiguity of post-acquisition integration makes sensemaking complicated 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). Drawing inferences from experiences in 
such a setting, by individuals from different organizations, with different 
routines, codes and experiences challenge the rational view of decision-
making. Organizational identity impacts how the issues in the acquisition are 
interpreted and made sense of.  
This research employs the idea that organizations do have an idea of who 
they are that influence how they make sense of and behave towards issues 
and events, how an acquired target responds to the event of an acquisition, 
and how this in turn impacts the outcomes of acquisitions. Social identity 
theory can explain individual level action in post-acquisition integration, 
such as turn-over intentions, commitment and ingroup bias. The literature on 
organizational level identity has explored identity and change in post-
acquisition integration. I aim to expand our understanding of identity 
dynamics in post-acquisition integration processes, and how this in turn is 
connected to broadly defined acquisition performance and outcomes of the 
acquisition. The goals of the research are both to contribute to theory, but 
also to provide managerial insight into the factors that impede and contribute 
to the post-acquisition integration process, and the subsequent outcomes of 
the acquisition.  
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5 Research Methodology  
This chapter discusses the research strategy used to answer the research 
questions, given the aim of the study and the philosophical underpinnings 
guiding the research. This includes how the study was conducted, and why it 
was conducted in such a manner. The choice of qualitative case studies is 
legitimized. Issues of epistemology and ontology, and the implications of 
these on the research strategy applied, are discussed. The research setting is 
presented. This includes a short overview of the acquiring firm and the 5 
targets, and why these were chosen for study. The approach for data 
gathering and analysis is presented. Finally, the strengths and limitations of 
the proposed study are discussed, including issues of validity and reliability. 
5.1 An explorative study 
The theoretical goal of this research is to develop theory about the nature of 
the post-acquisition integration process reflecting the complex individual, 
group and organizational level processes issues. Another, and practical goal, 
is to provide managerial insights into the factors that contribute to 
acquisition integration processes and acquisition outcomes. These goals call 
for a method that can capture dynamic processes and allow for multiple 
levels of analysis (Leonard-Barton 1990). To effectively investigate complex 
phenomena with causal ambiguity, which is the focus of this study, a 
longitudinal approach with fine-grained data is called for. An exploratory, 
qualitative case study approach is therefore appropriate. Qualitative methods 
are well suited to study dynamic processes (Maitlis 2005), such as post-
acquisition integration processes. I use an exploratory design aiming to 
inductively discover possible relations rather than test them (Ghauri and 
Grønhaug 2005). 
For the field of management in general, the challenge is not that there is a 
backlog of theories to be tested, rather: “the challenge seems to be one of 
constructing, adapting, extending and refining theories, tasks for which the 
case study is particularly well-suited” (Dubois and Araujo 2007:177). My 
research fits this by aiming to extend and build on both theories of 
organizational identity and post-acquisition integration. I will create 
theoretical constructs and propositions from case-based empirical evidence 
from multiple cases. To deal with the complexity of the post-acquisition 
processes we do not need to reduce complexity, but to condense, by making 
each concept, model, and theory denser with knowledge. Through 
continuously getting more data in these series of acquisitions, it becomes an 
iterative process of developing and testing theory. The study focuses on 
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multiple layers of analysis; individual actions, group processes and 
organizational outcome.  
Qualitative process studies are a way of finding out how something happens, 
and the emphasis is as much on how the participants perceive and interpret 
what is happening, as on the outcomes of the process (Patton 1990). An 
implicit assumption is that how issues are perceived and made sense of 
influences how they are acted upon, subsequently, people’s perceptions and 
sensemaking influence the outcomes. Access to knowledge on outcomes of 
the acquisitions is through the individual informant’s accounts of how a 
process evolved, and what they perceived happened when and how. Even 
though the interpretive approach applied emphasizes the informants’ 
interpretations and voices, the researcher further interprets and structures 
these interpretations in light of contextual factors and theory (Nag et al. 
2007). The aim is to create an interpretation that is neither solely the 
description of how the members of the organization understand the 
acquisitions, nor simply an application of existing theory (Feldman and 
Pentland 2003). Rather, I want to develop my own interpretation, emerging 
from the data and situated in the context of the study that at the same time 
can shed light upon post-acquisition integration processes more generally. 
My motivation for doing this study and my interest in organizational identity 
and post-acquisition integration is (1) empirical and opportunistic, I was 
granted access to an organization that has grown and continues to grow 
through acquisitions (2) theoretical; there is neither sufficient knowledge, 
nor extensive empirical research regarding the contingencies of post-
acquisition integration processes and the subsequent outcomes, not for the 
consequences of identity in organizations (3) personal; I had prior 
experience both working with post-merger integration as a consultant, and 
also being part of an acquisition at my prior employer, leading me to see the 
intricacies and complexities of acquisitions, and more specifically how 
organizational identity is a large part of these processes, and subsequently 
motivating me to examine these processes thoroughly.   
5.2 Philosophical underpinnings of the study 
Choice of methods embodies assumptions about social reality and about how 
we can gain knowledge about this reality. These are concerns of 
epistemology and ontology. In my study this implies for example beliefs 
about what organizational identity is and subsequently, how we can come to 
know something about organizational identity. My starting point is 
constructivist, that is, the ontological assumption guiding my research is that 
reality is subjective and socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1967). I 
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view organizational identity not as an objective phenomenon that can be 
observed and measured as a fixed and robust object by the researcher 
(Alvesson and Empson 2008), but rather as a socially constructed perception 
of some characteristics and distinguishing features of the organization. 
Organizational identity, as I have approached it, is difficult to measure 
quantitatively in an acceptable, reliable and valid way. Identity is 
conceptualized as a socially constructed phenomenon, constructed through 
the collective sensemaking of the members of the organization. I assume that 
organizational identity resides in the respondents’ accounts and negotiations, 
materializing through identity claims. These are available to the researcher 
through the stories of the informants about the organizations, and events and 
actions in post-acquisition integration.  I argue that it is not critical for the 
purpose of this study to decipher whether or not these identity claims are 
rooted in “objective” assessments of the organization. To understand how 
organizational identity influences how the integration process evolves, I will 
argue that it is necessary to consider reality as relative and subjective. 
Furthermore, derived from my ontological point of departure is an 
epistemological assumption in that the findings from my research will be 
created and subjectivist. The data gathered is constructed in a dialogue 
between the members of the organizations being studied, and myself (Guba 
and Lincoln 1998). This will be elaborated later in reference to quality 
criteria. 
The concept of identity is intrinsically mixed level and needs to be studied at 
multiple levels of analysis. For example, individual identity is derived in 
interaction with the external world, including the organizations the 
individual works for. On the other hand, the organizational identity is made 
up of the individual’s sensemaking processes and ideas of “who we are”. It 
bridges conceptually micro and macro processes and structures (Godfrey and 
Whetten 1998). A fundamental question when dealing with several layers of 
analysis, and organizational issues, is how micro level individual interests 
and behaviors interact to generate macro level organizational outcomes 
(Rousseau 1985). To address this issue, it is necessary to include the context 
and embrace complexity. This implies that the nature of reality is seen not as 
single, tangible and fragmental, but rather as multiple, constructed and 
related, and cannot be separated from each other or the context (Collins 
1992). Methodological holism implies the theoretical principle that groups 
often have traits, behaviors and outcomes that cannot be understood by 
reducing them to their individual parts. That is, groups consist not only of 
individuals, but also of relationships between individuals. The concept of 
organizational identity, as I view it, is made up of the sensemaking of each 
individual in the organization. As it is constructed in a dialogue between 
these individuals as they interact and make sense of who they are, it is more 
than the sum of the individual perceptions of identity. This implies that 
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gaining access to how people make sense of who they are and how the others 
are, and their reflections about this is key to understanding organizational 
identity. I am interested both in the individual’s interpretations of their 
organization and how it is changing, and the ramifications for the 
individual’s self concept. However, I am interested in studying how this “us” 
informs how the post-acquisition integration process unfolds.  
5.3 Case studies as a research strategy 
According to Yin case studies are an appropriate research approach when the 
question under scrutiny is a “how” or a “why” question. The study focuses 
on explaining the “how” of an organizational process, and a case study 
methodology using several sources of evidence is logical (Yin 1984). The 
questions require an approach that can deal with tracing events over time and 
a longitudinal case study is therefore appropriate.  
Case studies may be the most appropriate tool for appreciating the 
complexities of organizational phenomena. Yin (1984:13) defines the case 
study as: 
“An empirical inquiry that: Investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident.” 
He distinguishes between exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case 
studies. Case studies focus on understanding the dynamics within a specific 
setting (Eisenhardt 1989). This study focuses on exploring post-acquisition 
integration processes and understanding how organizational identity 
dynamics influence the development of this process. The concept of 
organizational identity and the development of acquisition integration 
processes are embedded in a social context, and are not universal, objective 
phenomena. Therefore, the social context itself is an important factor in 
studying post-acquisition integration. 
An organizational case study as defined by Lee (1989) refers to the study of 
an organization, where the case consists of the entire configuration of 
individuals, groups and social structure in the setting of the organization. 
The researcher passively observes the rich details of events in the way that 
they unfold in their natural, organizational setting. This view implies that 
there is an objective world there for the researcher to passively observe. 
However, the way the individuals in the organization tell their story to the 
researcher, and the way the researcher perceives the groups and social 
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structure in the organization, is shaped by who the researcher is. Even 
though I was a relatively passive observer, my influence on the “natural, 
organizational setting” cannot be ignored.  
This study is a multiple case study (Stake 2006). The phenomenon under 
scrutiny is identity in post-acquisition integration. Even though the acquiring 
firm is the same in all the acquisitions, the targets are different. The separate 
integration processes each represent a case of post-acquisition integration 
processes. The integration processes overlap in time, and impact the same 
acquirer, however, they are examined as separate processes. Mapping the 
process as a linear chain of events is challenging. Through the individual’s 
accounts of the events, several stories of the acquisition process can be 
condensed and analyzed, contributing to an understanding of how 
organizational identity issues influence post-acquisition integration and 
acquisition outcomes. 
By having several different cases, the study has a replication logic and the 
study can compare and contrast across cases, which is a powerful tool to 
develop theory (Gummesson 2006; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Multiple 
case studies provide me with more varied data and a stronger base for theory 
building than single cases would. I can compare and contrast emergent 
findings to discover whether they are replicated in the other cases, or simply 
specific to one case (Yin 1984; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) However, as 
I am examining 5 cases in the same organization, the findings may be 
idiosyncratic to that organization. I will discuss this later under research 
quality. There has been some criticism against this way of conducting 
research, as a qualitative case study with quantitative validation logic. 
Dubois and Araujo (2007:175) state: “The case research logic relies on 
finding causal relationships within each case rather than by selecting, 
measuring and comparing a number of attributes on each case.” However, I 
aim not only to discover these relationships within each case, but also to 
compare them across each case.  
5.4 Research Setting – the firms involved 
The firms involved in the study are the acquirer Multifirm and 5 targets 
acquired by them over the last 4 years. Multifirm is a leading IT group in the 
Nordic region. Its services includes IT Operations and Solutions. The firm 
employs about 3900 people, and has grown mainly through mergers and 
acquisitions.  
Since 2003 Multifirm has been through a consolidation phase, focusing on 
core business areas and regaining profitability. This included cost cutting, 
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divesting non-core and unprofitable business. Multifirm has since the start of 
the study period been a growth strategy, including both organic growth and 
growth through acquisitions. As they have made about 20 acquisitions since 
2004, they provide an appropriate setting for studying post-acquisition 
integration processes. The acquisitions that comprise the cases in this study 
are named Teknico, Datagon, Comco, Vizcom and Source. Figure 1 shows 
the timeline of the study and the acquisitions studied. 
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline: the cases and the study observation period  
They were made during a 2-year period, starting May 2004. The cases in the 
study vary in terms of strategic rationale behind the acquisition, number of 
employees transferred, level of integration, announced downsizing, and time 
of acquisition. As Multifirm embarked on their expansion and growth phase, 
they first focused on establishment of critical mass in IT-operations 
(including acquiring Teknico, Datagon and Comco), and building a solutions 
portfolio (including acquiring Datagon) and application services (including 
acquiring Vizcom and Source). The variations in strategic goals, integration 
strategy and expected benefits will be described and discussed in detail in 
the case descriptions in chapters 6 through 10. However, below is an 
overview of the cases (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Overview of the acquisitions 
In the field of IT-operations, creating value through acquisitions demands 
the realization of synergies. Subsequently the integration processes may be 
fraught with downsizing, reorganizations, and organizational changes. At the 
same time, the technology bought needs to be integrated carefully, as 
disruptions can be detrimental to operations. Operating the technology is a 
complex and knowledge intensive process, where the resources tied to the 
technology are critical to performing the tasks. Such a complex integration 
process requires careful handling, recognizing the importance of the local 
context of the technology and resources (Schweizer 2005). 
5.4.1 Case sampling 
In a multiple case study like this there is a replication logic, which makes the 
research strategy well suited for theory development (Eisenhardt 1989; 
Eisenhardt 1991; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007:27) explain theoretical sampling: 
“Theoretical sampling simply means that cases are selected because 
they are particularly suitable for illuminating and extending 
relationships and logic among constructs. (…) cases are sampled for 
theoretical reasons, such as revelation of an unusual phenomenon, 
replication of findings from other cases, contrary replication, 
elimination of alternative explanations, and elaboration of the 
emergent theory” 
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Each acquisition integration process is a case in this study, and as such the 
acquisition processes are the unit of analysis.  
In qualitative research sampling is purposeful and not random, a logic 
implying the selection of information-rich cases for study in-depth (Patton 
1990). The cases in this study were sampled based on opportunity. I gained 
access to Multifirm as they acquired Teknico. However, even though it was 
based on opportunity, the sampling follows the criteria for theoretical 
sampling by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). Multifirm was an appropriate 
context for studying post-acquisition integration, because the firm had an 
explicit strategy of growth through acquisitions. As they continued to 
acquire new targets I added the new acquisition processes as cases in the 
study. The targets were chosen based on replication logic (Yin 1984). The 
first three, Teknico, Datagon and Comco, were picked because they were 
thought to predict the same results. They were similar in strategic rationale, 
type of business, and mode of integration. After these three had been 
included in the study, time and resources impeded the inclusion of the next 
acquisitions Multifirm performed. However about 18 months later, when 
Vizcom and Source were acquired, they were included because they 
represented different types of acquisitions. As they were consulting firms, it 
could be predicted that they would produce contrasting results, because they 
were very different businesses, acquired for different strategic purposes, and 
with a different integration strategy. Following this, I also sampled on 
variation in terms of target characteristics, motivation behind the deal, and 
mode and level of integration. 
5.5 Purpose and type of data needed 
The overall purpose of this study is to examine how acquisitions create value 
through post-acquisition integration, and how organizational identity shapes 
this process. The primary aim is not to generate generalizable knowledge 
about post-acquisition integration, but rather to produce increased 
understanding of the phenomenon. I aim to conceptualize and integrate 
existing theories of organizational identity, and build on existing research on 
value creation in post-acquisition integration. I aim to build theory, not test 
existing theories. I have specified some potentially important concepts, and 
formulated research questions. I follow Eisenhardt in her suggestion to 
(1989: 536): “…avoid thinking about specific relationships between the 
variables and theories as much as possible, especially at the outset of the 
process.”  
To understand the complexities of antecedents of post-acquisition 
performance, it is necessary to let the integration process reveal itself in a 
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temporal and contextual manner (Pettigrew 1990). I will argue that an 
exploratory, qualitative, longitudinal and in-depth approach is needed to 
understand how identity shapes both the integration process and acquisition 
outcomes. In this study I focus on how organizational identity is related to 
post-acquisition integration to discover the mechanisms through which the 
post-acquisition outcomes are generated. Even though the literature has dealt 
with several outcomes of acquisitions and potential contingencies, as 
mentioned, focusing on some or one them would limit the study. The 
explorative design of this study allows for flexibility (Beugelsdijk et al. 
2006) with regard to the type of outcomes that emerge as important. 
Outcomes will be defined empirically, that is, the outcomes that are 
important in the five post-acquisition integration processes studied, will be 
described and conceptualized as they evolve empirically. 
I need fine-grained and rich data that will give me insight into the post-
acquisition integration process over time. Organizational identity is a 
concept that is socially constructed in the interaction intraorganizationally in 
the target and acquirer, and interorganizationally between the target and 
acquirer. Gaining insight into sensemaking processes like these in the 
organization requires an emic approach, attempting to understand the 
organization from the perspective of the people within the organizations. For 
this purpose data need to be contextual and specific. That is, I need accounts 
of episodes and examples, rather than generalized narratives from the 
respondents. To understand a process that involves the entire organization, I 
need accounts of both managers and employees, in both the target and 
acquiring firms.  
Longitudinal data-gathering is suitable for revealing patterned complexities, 
activities and interpretations. But even more importantly, because of the 
sustained manner of exploration, the indicators of those patterns that are 
uncovered are more likely to be meaningful (Barley 1990). In order to 
understand how the post-acquisition integration process develops, I need to 
follow the process over time. I aim to capture how people make sense of 
events and actions in a post-acquisition integration process, and how they 
subsequently act and behave towards these events. Since I need access to 
their perceptions and interpretations, and these are not easily observable, I 
need to use in-depth interviews. By doing fieldwork and spending time both 
observing and interacting with the people of the organizations, I can 
compare and validate what they say with what I observe them doing, and 
what they have written in documents that they do. As a qualitative research 
design is used, this gives the study needed flexibility and agility (Maxwell 
2005).  
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5.6 Data Collection  
The study includes several sources of data. (1) In-depth interviews with 
managers and employees of both acquiring firm and target firms. (2) 
Observations in meetings, this includes project meetings, company 
presentations, and information meetings for the employees held by the CEO 
or vice-presidents. (3) Informal conversations and observations. (4) Archival 
data including published and unpublished material and documents of various 
kinds (annual reports, newspaper articles, intranet articles, internal 
documents and memos made available to the researcher). All interviews and 
electronically available documents were recorded in Atlas.ti. to facilitate 
retrieval and organization of the material.  
The most important sources of data, however, are the formal interviews. 
Interviews in all cases were conducted as soon as possible after the 
announcement of the acquisition (within 1-2 months). The interviews were 
conducted either at the target company offices (initial interviews with target 
employees), or at the acquiring company’s offices (acquiring company 
employees and follow-up interviews with former target company 
employees). Interviews lasted between 1-2 hours. Follow-up interviews were 
made after a period of 1-2 years. However, as the acquisitions were made 
over a long time period, this implied that fieldwork was conducted almost 
continuously over 3 years, and that some of the interview phases overlapped. 
Some respondents were interviewed more than once, and a total of 102 
interviews were conducted in the study period (Table 2). Interviews were 
made until the point of saturation, when new interviews added little new 
information.  
 
Table 2: Number of interviews per target and year. 
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I tried to get variety in viewpoints in the material by choosing respondents 
from different units, functional areas and organizational levels. Respondents 
included both top-level and middle managers and employees from different 
parts of the organizations and from both sides of the dyad (both target and 
acquirer). Key informants were chosen because they had access to specific 
information, given their position in the organizations. This included the top 
management team, HR personnel, and people with specific integration 
responsibilities. In the acquiring firm I interviewed people who either 
worked with the integration process, or worked in parts of the acquiring 
organization that would be affected by the acquisition, or other key 
personnel, for instance upper-level managers and corporate staff. I tried to 
identify persons who worked closely either with the integration process or 
with the targets from the acquiring firm (or with the acquirer from the target 
firm), to ensure that they had some experience with either the integration 
process or the acquisition. Other respondents were picked by snow-ball 
sampling technique. I usually gained access through a key informant in 
either the acquiring or target firm. By asking all the people I interviewed 
who else I should talk to, and who knew a lot about the acquisition 
integration, I obtained the names of other respondents.  
The informants’ knowledge of the research projects was varied. I had 
encountered some of the informants in meetings prior to the interviews. 
However, they were all informed about the project through an e-mail in 
connection with scheduling an interview. This e-mail contained contact 
information, information of financing of the research project, how the data 
was to be used, and also guaranteed the informants anonymity. 
The interview guide consisted of open-ended questions, encouraging the 
respondent to account of his or her experience of the acquisition. Follow-up 
questions and probing for examples produced more explicit information. 
Informants were probed to exemplify to avoid general statements. As they 
told stories they were also encouraged to give their assessment and feelings 
towards the events and actions they described. 
The early interviews focused on target/acquiring company background, 
including structure and organizational culture, the history of their firm 
(either target or acquirer), knowledge of the target or acquiring firm, and 
their perceptions of the initial phase of the acquisition announcement. The 
informants were asked to tell their own story, the story of their organization 
and to describe the acquisition process from when they first encountered the 
acquisition, up until the time of the interview. In later interviews they were 
asked to account for events that had happened since the last interview. These 
interviews focused on how the integration process was perceived, and 
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experiences with the target and acquiring firms. Informants were asked how 
they perceived the overall success of the acquisition, what the target firm had 
contributed to the acquiring firm, and vice versa.  
The interviews consisted of accounts of current events as respondents told 
the story of what was happening at the time of the interview, and 
retrospective, as they recounted what their organization had been like prior 
to the announcement of the acquisition. Later interviews were also both real-
time and retrospective. Episodes and incidents that were real-time the first 
round of interviews, were retrospective the second round. The interviews 
covering each acquisition were spread out in time, and the acquisition 
integration processes overlapped in time, subsequently fieldwork connected 
to one acquisition overlapped with other acquisitions. Even though the 
interviews were carried out in phases, the intertwining of the waves of 
interviews, combined with the observation in meetings, following media and 
intranet publications throughout the duration of the study, secured 
continuity.  
The interviews were recorded and transcribed in verbatim, producing about 
2500 pages of double-spaced text recorded in ATLAS.ti. Recording involved 
a trade-off between the interruptions and constraints the recorder represents 
in the interview situation and the accurate documentation of the interview. 
Each informant was asked if the tape recorder could be used, and informed 
that the researcher was the only person with access to the interviews and 
tapes. All informants agreed to the recording of the interview, even though 
in some instances a couple of respondents asked the researcher to turn off the 
recorder for a part of the interview. As such, the recording may have 
represented a constraint on the openness of the informants. However, the 
benefits gained by having the interviews in text, not dependent on the 
researcher’s memory or ability to take accurate notes during the interview 
were assumed to be larger than the constraints.  
Through initial interviews and informal conversations with managers and 
employees of both the acquiring firm and the five target firms, identity 
emerged as an important concept early in the study. The informants’ stories 
often included their perceptions of how the acquisition had been handled by 
the management of the firms, their attitude towards the acquisition, the 
rationale behind it, descriptions of employees responses to the acquisition 
initiatives, how they felt about the acquiring firm and target firm 
(competency, possibilities for employees, status) and perceptions of “who 
we are” and “who they are” (organizational identity). The informants were 
not asked specifically about identity, but through their accounts of their 
organization and the acquisition most respondents described both the target 
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and acquirer, in addition they were probed to describe themselves in relation 
to the other. There were some variations in the individual’s experiences with 
the acquisition, but overall I found a general consistency within each case 
related to expressions of identity, perceptions of the target/acquirer, the 
integration process and the outcomes of the acquisitions.  
As the informants knew that I was studying the acquisition integration, the 
distinction between target and acquirer was salient in the interviews both 
early in the process and later. Especially in the interviews that were 
conducted after several years, when the target was integrated in the acquirer 
organization, the mention of “the acquisition” may have triggered this 
distinction to be more salient than it was outside of the interview situation.  
5.7 Data Analysis 
There is an overlap in time of data collection and data analysis, which is 
characteristic of case study research motivated by theory building 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Even though most of the transcribing and coding of 
interviews took place during the periods that were not very active interview 
periods, taking field notes, writing memos, and developing constructs and 
categories took place continuously.  
Initially, the interview transcripts were read and reread. In this process, key 
themes and patterns were identified within each case. The interviews were 
sorted by content, referring to pre-acquisition integration, integration phase 
and acquisition outcomes.  Case stories were written up based on the 
organization of the data (Graebner 2004) (Figure 2). Developing these case 
descriptions is generally the first task in qualitative analysis (Patton 1990).  
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Figure 2: Overview of the data after initial organization 
Each interview was then coded separately based on first order codes (Van 
Maanen 1979). These were words, phrases and labels used by the 
informants. I reread all the interviews within each case several times, 
looking for similarities and contrasts within each case. I went back and forth 
between the interviews, and condensed the raw data from the interviews into 
analyzable units, by creating categories with and from the interviews (Coffey 
and Atkinson 1996). The categories represent my interpretation of the 
sensemaking of the individuals accounting the stories of the acquisitions. 
Through this process, key themes were identified, these observations were 
labeled first order themes (Nag et al. 2007).  
The first order themes were developed through a constant comparison of the 
data. First I compared within each case, and then across cases. I then 
compiled and abstracted the first order themes into 11 cross-case second 
order categories. These second order categories were furthermore abstracted 
into the cross-case overarching concepts of “absorptive capacity”, 
“contributive capacity”, “identity threats” and “acquisition performance”.  
The approach taken was inductive in nature; I started with observations of 
the cases and built towards more general patterns.  I did not employ 
predetermined categories of analysis, but rather allowed the empirical reality 
define the analytical categories in interaction with the theoretical framework. 
Categories and dimensions of analysis emerged through the reading and 
rereading of the interview transcripts, and juxtaposing this with existing 
theory. This contributes to the depth, openness and detail that are the 
benefits of qualitative inquiry (Patton 1990:13).  
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There was a moving back and forth between within- and cross case analysis. 
Looking at data from different angles is a way to counteract premature 
conclusions (Eisenhardt 1989). Throughout the first rounds of data analysis 
the emergent themes and constructs were evolving. Identity and perceptions 
of others emerged as a central theme and concept from the initial interviews. 
It emerged as a theme through descriptions of both the acquiring company 
and the targets, from both employees at the acquiring company and the 
targets, in the accounts of the integration process. Identity issues were vivid 
in that they framed the analysis from prior literature on acquisition 
integration and identity theory, and also the cases varied along them. By 
reviewing the data and tacking back and forth between the literature, the 
concepts and the data, the relationships between the second order categories 
and the overarching concepts were sketched out to an emergent model. 
These will be discussed and presented in-depth in Chapter 11.  
Process data involve multiple levels of analysis with indistinguishable 
boundaries. The temporal embeddedness varies and the data are eclectic in 
that even though the researcher focuses on events, they draw on phenomena 
such as relationships, feelings, interpretations and thoughts (Langley 1999).  
In other words, even if actual events are the focus, the recording of events is 
embedded in the participant’s sense making processes and how they interpret 
relationships and events. Changes in organizations are complex events that 
are difficult to isolate, both temporally and spatially and have an ambiguous 
character that spreads out in space and time.  
Langley (2007) elaborates two angles for implementing process thinking that 
complement one another. The first involves “following forward” to capture 
the process dimensions as they evolve. The ramifications of actions and 
events are followed into the future.  “Tracing back”, however, implies 
rewinding and trying to understand how certain patterns in the present can be 
explained by actions and events in the past,  as such an outcome is traced 
back to see how it developed processually.  In this study, I employ both 
angles. I study both histories of the targets to see how it works as 
contingencies for their approach to post-acquisition integration. In addition, 
the study is longitudinal, which implies that I follow the processes over time, 
and try to capture the process dimensions as they evolve. The interviews 
have both retrospective and real-time dimensions.  
Following Langley (1999), there are several strategies for theorizing from 
process data, the key anchor points being incidents, as in units of text and the 
categories that arise from that text. The incidents are systematically 
compared, and a system of categories is gradually constructed, partly from 
what existing theory suggests, and partly arising from the empirical material. 
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The coding process (simplification, reduction and data complication) is an 
important step in organizing the data, important analytical work lies in the 
identification of relevant concepts (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). Another 
possible strategy is narrative contextualist strategy, constructing a detailed 
story from the raw data (Pettigrew 1990). In this strategy, time plays a 
central role. In process theory, patterns of events are core theoretical 
constructs. Focusing on the informant’s stories of events in the post-
acquisition integration phase, gives insight into how these events enfolded 
and how they were interpreted (Pentland 1999). As such, even though 
elements of a narrative strategy are present in this study, it is more of a 
preliminary step towards preparing the data for subsequent analysis (Langley 
1999).  
Langley (1999) proposes some characteristics of process data that make 
them difficult to analyze. They deal with sequences of events. As the aim of 
this study is to understand how the acquisition integration process evolved, 
the data consists largely of narratives of events, activities and accounts of 
attitudes towards the integration process, the management initiatives and the 
organizations involved. Analyzing process data involves conceptualizing 
events and finding patterns between them. Process data often involve 
multiple units of analysis and multiple level of analysis, with ambiguous 
boundaries. For instance, the boundaries of what constitutes an integration 
process are not always clear, and distinguishing between events that deal 
with the acquisition from other organizational events is difficult. Also, the 
rationale behind taking a qualitative, case study, and process approach is to 
take the context into consideration. This results in multiple layers of analysis 
that may be difficult to separate. In addition, process data are temporally 
embedded. This entails that even though the study aims at describing the 
integration process as it unfolds, some things may be background events that 
influence the integration process, whereas some events only take place in 
people’s heads and are challenging to place temporally. In this study the 
individuals interviewed describe events that happened as background events, 
for example events that draw out in time both before and after the 
acquisition, but that are still relevant to the acquisition, and they describe 
their feelings and perceptions at other points in time. As such, their accounts 
may provide descriptions of causality, without the researcher being able to 
verify what happened, and when.  
5.8 Research quality criteria  
5.8.1 Internal and external validity 
A fundamental question to answer in conducting any kind of research is: 
“how may I be wrong?” This refers to validity, or the “correctness or 
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credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other 
sort of account”(Maxwell 2005:106). In quantitative research validity refers 
to the degree to which the researcher has constructed instruments that 
measure what they are supposed to measure. However, in qualitative 
research the researcher is the instrument, and validity thus refers to the skills, 
competence and rigor of the person doing the fieldwork.  
Two important threats to validity in qualitative research are to researcher 
bias and reactivity.  Researcher bias refers to the threat to the validity of the 
findings based on the researcher selecting the data that fit with his or her 
preconceptions, or the selection of data that are how the individuals studied 
are affected by the researcher. To deal with this I assured the respondents 
that I was allowed by the management in both the target and acquiring firm 
to interview employees, encouraging them to answer as openly as possible. 
On the other hand, I emphasized at the start of the interviews that I was an 
independent researcher and that I would not report findings back to 
Multifirm that would disclose the identity of the respondents. Still, a 
legitimate concern is whether or not the respondents felt they could disclose 
information to me. The incidents when respondents asked me to turn off the 
recorder, or explicitly stated that they did not want to be quoted, insinuate 
that they were open about their concerns. I asked open questions so as not to 
impose my conceptual framework on the respondents.  
Qualitative researchers must make use of the material gathered to deal with 
validity threats, in terms of making alternative hypothesis implausible 
(Maxwell 2005). In my study I have applied some of the procedures 
suggested by Maxwell (2005) to ensure validity of my findings. Being 
involved with the cases for a long period of time, with repeated observation 
and interviewing, increases the chances of uncovering spurious associations, 
and provides the opportunity to develop alternative hypotheses during the 
study. This also allows for the collection of “rich data”, which provide thick 
descriptions and a revealing picture of what is happening in the post-
acquisition integration process. As the interviews are transcribed in 
verbatim, they are not dependent on my opinion or interpretation and 
memory of what was significant in the interview at the time they were 
carried out.  
I employed triangulation of data sources by including interviews, 
observations, and analysis of documents in my research. As such I could 
compare what people said in interviews with what they said off-record, and I 
could compare what was written in documents with what was said and done. 
I interviewed over time, and people with different perspectives on the post-
acquisition integration process, HR-managers, top management, employees 
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of both acquirer and target firms, and could compare what informants with 
different perspectives said about the process to get a variety of viewpoints. 
The triangulation of data sources provides a substantiation of the constructs 
developed in the study (Eisenhardt 1989). Further, involving other 
researchers in the analysis, by reading and reviewing some of the interviews, 
coding structure and analyses, may resolve some validity threats as this 
involved triangulation of analysts. Another approach that was employed was 
the systematic feed-back of the findings at several points in time, 
representing another validation of the findings in the study through “face 
validity” (Patton 1990). Several presentations were held for contact 
managers in Multifirm over the course of the study where preliminary results 
were presented and commented upon. This process was very useful for 
establishing whether my interpretations reflected the firm’s own experiences. 
Several measures have been taken in this study to deal with validity and 
reliability issues, during framing of the study, data gathering and data 
analysis. An overview of validity, what validity threats they address and how 
I took action to deal with them are summarized in table 3: 
 
Table 3: Validity tests, objective of test and actions taken (based on 
Maxwell, 2005) 
External validity in case studies refers to whether or not the findings in the 
study can be generalized beyond the case. The generalization beyond the 
cases studied is in developing a testable and generalizable theory, which 
multiple case studies are well suited to do (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). 
Case studies rely on analytical generalizations (Yin 1984). These are the 
theoretical generalizations that evolve from development of concepts and 
theories that can be extended to other cases (Maxwell 2005). The 
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development of concepts and terms is the means by which case studies can 
contribute to generalizable knowledge 
In qualitative studies, with a single or a small number of individuals or cases, 
the generalizability of the findings is rarely claimed (Maxwell 2005). 
Generalizing to other settings is usually not the goal of qualitative studies, 
even though one might find “face generalizability”, that there is no reason 
why one could not generalize beyond the studied setting. That there is no 
reason to believe the conclusions could not be applied more generally. In my 
study there is no reason to believe that the findings from the acquisition 
integration processes in Multifirm cannot be applied to other settings, other 
acquisitions in Multifirm, or to acquisitions made by other multiple 
acquiring IT-firms. The concept of organizational identity is not specific to 
Multifirm, and there is no reason to believe that similar processes would not 
evolve in other acquisition integration processes. 
I chose respondents from different parts of the organization and from both 
target and acquirer organizations, trying to get a variety of input and to avoid 
biasing my data. By interviewing until I heard the same things being 
repeated and getting no new information I achieved theoretical saturation 
(Maxwell 2005). I triangulated the data to avoid threats to validity, by 
including interviews, observations and analysis of documents.  
The validity of my research is dependent upon the degree to which the 
parameters and the context of the study are explicitly accounted for. 
Marshall and Rossman (1999:192) describe: 
“The strength of a qualitative study that aims to explore a problem or 
describe a setting, a process, a social group, or a pattern of 
interaction will rest with its validity. An in-depth description showing 
the complexities of processes and interactions will be so embedded 
with data derived from the setting that it cannot help but be valid. 
Within the parameters of that setting, population, and theoretical 
framework, the research will be valid. A qualitative researcher should 
therefore adequately state those parameters, thereby placing 
boundaries around the study.” 
I have provided a detailed description of how I performed my study, how the 
data were analyzed and in subsequent chapters I will provide rich case 
descriptions that take into account the context of the study.  
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5.8.2 Reliability- trustworthiness 
The reliability issues concern whether “the process of the study is consistent, 
reasonably stable over time and across researchers and methods”(Miles and 
Huberman 1994 p. 278). This refers to the question of replicability: if the 
research had been carried out by a different researcher, would the findings 
have been the same? Reliability is problematic in qualitative research.  
One type of reliability refers to whether the same method continually yields 
unvarying measurement. An example can illustrate this: “Americans, for 
example, reliably respond to the question “how are you?” with the knee-jerk 
“Fine”. The reliability of this answer does not make it useful data about how 
Americans are.”(Kirk and Miller 1986:41). Parallel to this, asking explicit 
questions about the organizational identity may have produced these types of 
knee-jerk responses from the respondents. To avoid this I did not ask the 
respondents explicit questions about their organizational identity, but rather 
it permeated the stories the respondents told about their organization and the 
acquisitions. In recounting the events of the post-acquisition integration 
process, the respondents told stories of who they were, and who their 
acquisition partner was, in other words, stories of organizational identity. 
This also goes to the heart of the problem of researcher bias. By asking open 
questions and trying not to influence the respondents, their view of what is 
important in the post-acquisition integration process would be presented, and 
not my pre-conceived notions of important issues.  
As such, reliability in qualitative studies depends on the process of how the 
data were gathered, for example, how the interviews were performed, and 
how the researcher probed for answers. The context bound nature of the 
interview makes reliability problematic, as contextual factors are unlikely to 
remain constant, the strict replication of the study is difficult (Welch and 
Marschan-Piekkari 2004). Dealing with this implies that I need to consider 
the contextual factors in reporting the findings of the study. Also the 
researcher’s role in the field needs to be explicit. I cannot assume that any 
other researcher will arrive at the same findings as I do. If I were of a 
different gender, nationality, background and age, this might influence the 
way in which the respondents related to me, and as such the findings of my 
study.  
Measurement problems are rarely dealt with in the literature on qualitative 
research. Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005: 89) emphasize that even though 
measurement had received little attention in the qualitative research 
literature, it is important and must be dealt with, but that measurements take 
a different form than in quantitative research: “Thus, the mapping, 
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inferences, and validity claims have much in common with the 
measurement.” Measurement in qualitative research refers to the 
sensemaking and tacking back and forth between the conceptual and the 
empirical levels. This takes the form of mapping the data to the existing 
knowledge base. This can be exemplified from my study. The concept of 
organizational identity from existing literature framed the study. Prior 
research suggested that organizational identity is important in post-
acquisition integration processes. In the in-depth interviews, I did not 
specifically ask the informants about organizational identity. However, the 
stories they told were stories of organizational identity, about who they were. 
I categorized these as “identity issues”, and then went back to the data to see 
what I could derive from these issues. Through analyzing the data again, the 
second order categories were constructed. These could be tied to existing 
theory. In order to demonstrate the validity of the findings, the researcher 
must present evidence. This includes the questions posed, the responses and 
the inferences made. 
5.9 Data presentation 
The challenge of organizing and handling a large amount of data also refers 
to how to present it. The first order data are presented in the case stories in 
the next chapters. The structure of the case descriptions follows the logic of 
the way the data were organized initially; pre-integration context, post-
acquisition integration and acquisition performance. Each case is 
summarized in a within-case analysis. Even though the following chapters 
are characterized as case descriptions, there are elements of analyses and 
interpretation permeating the text. Pure description, free of analysis and 
interpretation is following the philosophical underpinnings of this study, not 
feasible, as reality is perceived as socially constructed. My view is that the 
organization and the post-acquisition integration processes are not “out 
there” as objective realities. Rather the descriptions of the post-acquisition 
integration processes provided here are constructed by the people of the 
organization making sense of their surroundings, and retold and 
reconstructed in dialogue with me, as the researcher. The informants’ 
perspectives are represented by direct quotes and themes arrived from the 
analyses (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). Following each case presentation is a 
table summarizing the first order themes from each case, and the second 
order categories and overarching concepts derived from these. 
Even though these case stories are to a large part in the words of the 
informants, the structuring and the analysis of the quotes permeating the 
stories represent the researcher’s abstraction developed through a tacking 
back and forth between the data and the literature. The themes are emergent 
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and inductive, however they emerged through my analyzing and 
sensemaking of the informants’ stories. The presentation of the data focuses 
on the acquisition, and characteristics of the target and the acquirer that are 
related to this, leaving out some issues, to reduce noise in a very complex 
and multifaceted large amount of data. However, in line with the 
methodological approach, the rich data is presented. 
In the analysis chapters I make propositions based on the cases referring to 
aspects that influence value creation. I can speculate about the relationship 
between the emergent constructs; however I cannot make causal inferences 
(Patton 1990).   
 59
6 Teknico 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The Teknico acquisition involved Teknico MNC transferring the operations 
of Teknico MNC’s IT systems, 26 customer contracts and 470 employees to 
Multifirm. Teknico’s external customers included in the deal were mainly in 
trade and industry and the public sector. The acquisition was communicated 
externally and internally as a means for Multifirm to both strengthen its 
market position, and contribute to growth in the Nordic market. The 
acquisition was to provide Multifirm with capacity and expertise, contribute 
to economies of scale, and facilitate competing for large operating contracts. 
In addition, the deal included Multifirm being Teknico’s preferred partner 
for all its Nordic IT-operating services. Teknico was to be fully integrated 
into the Multifirm organization. The acquisition also included a substantial 
downsizing (about 150 man-years), as there were some overlap in the two 
businesses.   
6.2 Pre-integration context 
Teknico employees expressed experienced threats to their identity, 
immediately following the announcement of the acquisition. Teknico’s 
existing organizational structure was appended in its entirety as a unit to the 
Multifirm organization. They remained located at their former headquarters 
8 months after the announcement of the acquisition, isolated from their prior 
owner, Teknico MNC. The Teknico organization and their organizational 
identity became very salient. In their accounts of the acquisition, the group’s 
distinction as separate from both Teknico MNC and Multifirm MNC was 
explicit and ubiquitous, and organizational identity issues were salient. 
“Who are we as Teknico” and “who will we become in Multifirm” were 
typical concerns voiced by the employees.  After the initial phase of about 8 
months, they were fully integrated organizationally in Multifirm and co-
located at the Multifirm headquarters. 
Teknico employees described their perceived status as higher than 
Multifirm’s on several dimensions. They described the acquisition as a move 
from a former owner, characterized as “young and cutting edge” to an owner 
assumed to be more “old-fashioned and sturdy”. It was emphasized that 
Teknico had a younger work force, more modern locations, more cutting 
edge technology, better management competencies and streamlined work-
processes. These status dimensions were emphasized by Teknico as the basis 
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for “who they were” as an organization. Furthermore, the fact that the unit 
was established around a cutting-edge technological platform and had a 
modern location in their former host company was described as the basis for 
their feeling of pride. This assertion of superiority is manifest both in 
accounts of events and in descriptions of themselves as a group compared to 
their acquirer:  
“One has been part of something big (In Teknico MNC). It was 
hyped up to being something big – and it was big. It was a big 
building, a large migration, a big move (…) It got attention 
abroad. It was the best technological platform in Norway. And I 
think…the feeling of pride isn’t as great any more. But the 
feeling of duty towards delivering is still high.” 
When probed about their feeling of superiority and the basis for this in the 
interviews, most respondents modified their statements. They accentuated 
that they were probably not that much younger, and that Multifirm also 
possessed technological competencies and well-developed technologies and 
products. Even so, Multifirm seemed to be judged and evaluated 
stereotypically as “Old-fashioned and slow”: 
“ We are entering a culture that is (…) known as a little more 
backward and old fashioned, whether that is right or not, remains to 
be seen, but they have been very focused (…) towards less customer 
oriented (business). And that, initially, isn’t very exciting.  
Teknico employees’ assertion of superiority may be seen as a compensation 
for the loss of status experienced as a result of the acquisition. Their 
assertion of superiority on dimensions such as age, location and technology, 
dimensions that may be argued to not really being status relevant, 
compensates for their inferiority on other dimensions. Teknico was much 
smaller than Multifirm, felt a loss of autonomy, and being the target 
company, defined themselves implicitly as the underdog. In addition, they 
were economically inferior; their performance was evaluated as poor and 
their external customers were small and judged as “insignificant” by 
Multifirm. The explicit status dimensions of size, profitability and being 
“taken over” were very salient in conversations and communication within 
the organization.  
Their identities seemed tied to the genesis of Teknico, the development of 
their technological platform and their location. Being an employee of 
Teknico MNC was emphasized in many of the interviews. Many Teknico 
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employees had worked in Teknico MNC for decades, and some of them had 
worked there for their entire career.  
Teknico had developed through several earlier mergers as an internal IT-
operations unit within Teknico MNC. Their activities were not the core 
activities of Teknico MNC. This produced a general feeling within Teknico 
that their activities lacked sufficient focus from Teknico MNC. Some 
informants expressed that entering Multifirm represented a new emphasis 
and opportunity for Teknico to focus and expand on their expertise. They 
also hoped that the acquisition would provide them with more challenges 
and complexity in their deliveries. Below, two Teknico employees describe 
their expectations regarding entering Multifirm: 
“First of all, I am entering an organization that was interested 
in the same areas as me. Here (in Multifirm) they talk about 
solutions, customer-specific solutions. Here it is a matter of 
developing more complexity in the deliveries, Teknico MNC 
who we are leaving is simplifying and standardizing – selling 
standard products and volume.” 
“…what is exciting, is that they are a company that on their 
(company presentation) slide number one have what we do ( in 
Teknico), and on slide number two and three, as well.” 
The Teknico employees recognized that their competency and products had 
not represented Teknico MNC’s core activities. Nevertheless, they expressed 
the feeling that Teknico MNC had provided a nice harbor for Teknico. They 
had been provided with ample opportunities to develop their products and 
competencies in Teknico.  
The Teknico employees appreciated the strategic rationale behind the 
acquisition, and they considered the acquisition as beneficial to both Teknico 
and Multifirm. Even though they acknowledged the benefits the acquisition 
provided for Teknico, some questioned whether selling off Teknico had been 
the right decision for Teknico MNC. This illustrates their loyalty and 
concern for Teknico MNC: 
 “It is strategically logical (the acquisition), and from a 
technical professional perspective it makes sense. At least if 
Teknico MNC has no intentions of developing that business 
(Teknico business). To be a player in that market it’s necessary 
as an owner to be committed to seek scale-advantage. You need 
scale-advantage, and we would have never achieved that in 
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Teknico MNC (…). With regard to Teknico MNC, which, no matter 
what, is where I come from and where I have my roots, I’m not certain 
that this is the best move. I think there is a lot of convergence, 
technology convergence (between Teknico’s and Teknico MNC’s 
activities). I’m not at all certain that it was the right thing to do for 
Teknico MNC.” 
There was a general feeling in both Teknico and Multifirm that there were 
cultural and administrative differences between the firms. Multifirm 
employees and managers emphasized that Teknico MNC had allowed 
Teknico to have large costs, and had not focused sufficiently on their 
profitability level. Here a Multifirm employee described how Teknico had 
been managed in Teknico MNC, and the challenges this represented for 
Multifirm: 
“There are cultural differences – that’s for sure. Teknico MNC has 
always had a much larger wallet than us. They’ve been allowed to 
spend money without making money. And we have to turn this into a 
profitable business fast. It’s obvious that we have to do things 
different, be better at exploiting resources (…) but it will be difficult to 
turn …they lost millions every year on their external customers, and 
we need to turn that into a profitable business.” 
That Teknico had been managed as an unprofitable business in Teknico 
MNC, was linked to the need for cost-cutting and redundancies of personnel 
incorporated in the business case. Initially it seemed as though the 
employees of Multifirm did not quite see that the down-sizing could affect 
them as well.  However, the Multifirm middle management was well aware 
of this: 
“And, of course, there is going to be a bunch of people left over from 
Teknico, and some of our people will be left over. Because…we do 
need to be more efficient. We’ve identified that we need to increase 
efficiency by terminating 270 (people), the business case is based on 
that.” 
The Teknico acquisition was expected to bring complementary competence 
to Multifirm. The main contribution was to be the major outsourcing 
contract of Teknico MNC. But apart from this, the employees of Multifirm 
did not expect Teknico to contribute with much: 
“Well, Teknico probably have many good qualities, but they are more 
of an internal IT-unit. I am cynical now. They bring a few small 
customers. But Datagon on the other hand, they have worked actively 
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in the market in a totally different way – they really have a 
contribution. They have some new contracts that are really good.” 
This assertion that Teknico was an internal unit with smaller customers, that 
they had been unprofitable, and as an internal unit not been subjected to the 
demands of “difficult” external customers, contributed to the attitude 
expressed in much of Multifirm that Teknico’s business did not represent 
substantial value to Multifirm, except for the customer contract with Teknico 
MNC.  
Contrary to how some Multifirm employees perceived Teknico employees 
attitudes, Teknico employees emphasized their customer-orientation, both 
explicitly and implicitly when raising concerns about how Multifirm 
conducted its business. Teknico employees emphasized their own customer 
orientation in contrast to Multifirm’s lack of customer focus. They asserted 
that they were quick to respond to customer demands, whereas Multifirm 
was slow, unduly thorough and involved an excessive number of people and 
resources. One Teknico employee expressed his frustration and fear of losing 
a customer contract because of the work processes in Multifirm: 
“I had an important Nordic customer here on Monday. They want an 
offer on a service worth 10 mill a year, a contract that is large enough 
to require a stock exchange notice and they wanted an offer by next 
Friday – that is two weeks after talking to us.(…) With my experience 
with this service, I could have sown this offer together in two days. 
But here you need to involve such a large number of resources in the 
process, that we won’t make the dead-line. The consequence, of 
course, is that they choose someone else.” 
Identity threats to the Teknico unit were explicitly stated, and underpinned 
the employees’ accounts. There was an explicit identification with Teknico 
that had been allowed to be nurtured and developed early in the post-
acquisition phase. Teknico as a group was a salient social category both as 
distinctive from Teknico MNC, and even more importantly as distinctive 
from the characteristic features of Multifirm. There were serious concerns 
about reduced status as a consequence of the acquisition. These were both 
for individuals, as in being employed by a more “boring” organization, but 
also the concern that the Teknico competencies would be lost in the 
integration process. Together these issues triggered a strong threat to 
Teknico’s identity.  
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6.3 Post-acquisition integration 
The Teknico acquisition implied a full procedural, task and organizational 
integration, even though the target was temporarily “added-on” as a separate 
organization unit to Multifirm’s existing structure. The Teknico manager 
remained as head of the unit, reporting directly to the Business Unit manager 
in Multifirm. The Teknico employees were not co-located in Multifirm 
facilities until 8 months after the closing of the deal. However, they were 
partly integrated into the Multifirm organization prior to this. The reported 
“long” integration period and the “too slow” integration were argued to be 
important reasons for the conflicts and dissatisfaction experienced by the 
Teknico employees.  
The Teknico employees experienced decreased individual autonomy and 
decision making power in Multifirm. Related to this was also a perception of 
lacking information, hidden agendas and even deliberate deception from 
Multifirm. To a large extent Teknico employees expressed mistrust in 
Multifirm. They explained how Multifirm seemed to have ulterior motives 
that were hidden in the communication with the employees, and that they 
used “stock-market sensitivity” as an excuse for withholding information. 
Teknico MNC was remembered as more open and straightforward in their 
communication with their employees:  
”They (Multifirm) try to hide the reasons for why they are choosing a 
different direction or why they have to lay people off, instead of 
actually telling the truth, and I think that is kind of sad (…) They keep 
hiding… because: we can’t tell you about this because it is stock-
market sensitive. But that was never a problem at Teknico MNC (…) 
the management at Teknico MNC wanted their employees to know 
what the world was actually like, they didn’t feel they needed to make 
up a reason not to tell” 
The feeling of not being trusted, and not being given enough decision 
making power and information added to the loss of autonomy that had been 
experienced in the acquisition. Teknico employees expected to be granted 
less individual autonomy and decision making power in Multifirm. A couple 
of years into the integration process, they reported that they actually had 
experienced less decision making power. However, despite their expressed 
lack of decision making power, the Teknico employees appeared to work 
hard to counter balance this by performing mobilizing actions. Their 
mobilizing actions were made to facilitate integration by coordinating and 
linking their existing competencies and resources to the Multifirm structure. 
Several Teknico managers described how they worked to preserve and 
promote their competencies and solutions in the early integration process: 
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“We have worked a lot to make known the competency and the 
solutions, call it the asset that was in Teknico. It has been very 
important for us. Not to emphasize Teknico for their own sake. (…) 
But to make sure that we don’t throw the baby out with the bath water. 
A large system, per definition, thinks that it can overtake the smaller 
system – and in doing so making us worse. (…) and then our 
resources and competency wouldn’t be visible” 
These mobilizing actions included promoting Teknico’s competence, 
products and services in Multifirm. Employees made an effort to preserve 
and advance the important distinguishing features of Teknico. Some 
described this process of forwarding and cultivating their resources and 
competencies as a struggle against Multifirm’s existing structures:  
“(We) have worked hard to emphasize Teknico (in the organization). 
Not that that has been a long-term goal. But there have been so many 
anti-forces, anyways. …But you have been bought, and you get an 
under-dog feeling no matter what in the organization. And if there is 
such a thing as an over-dog, they get that feeling from being the part 
that takes over. It is in the nature of the game. And I was terrified that 
(our competence would be lost) … I know how much competency we 
bring with us into Multifirm that they do not have” 
Teknico had a strong and visible leader that made efforts to mitigate, to 
encourage and shield the Teknico employees from disruptions as a result of 
the acquisition. This was described by a Teknico employee thus: 
“We have Peter as a leader, and he definitely wants us to reach our 
goals and believes we’ll be able to do it…he gives a lot of himself, and 
brings a lot of energy.” 
Teknico employees described a resistance in Multifirm towards their 
competencies, technologies and “ways of doing things”. This materialized in 
what they perceived as defensive and protective behavior from the Multifirm 
employees and management. It was reported as inertia and unwillingness to 
change in the Multifirm organization. Multifirm was described as “slow and 
sturdy”, and lacking in change readiness. They were described as an 
“inflexible organization”. This is delineated by a Teknico respondent: 
”A phenomenon I sense in Multifirm – the “not invented here” 
syndrome. We do as we’ve always done, because we know it 
works…what we’ve seen is that after 8 no, 9 month, Multifirm has not 
chosen any of our tools or processes.” 
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The Teknico employees also described the lack of structural incentives that 
could promote individual initiative and change:  
“That is something Multifirm needs to work on – to motivate people to 
take on challenges and responsibilities for self-development. That’s 
the only way to survive. Here it’s like – well this is the way we’ve 
always done it. (…) But Multifirm needs to get better at thinking 
change and motivating people to think in terms of change if we are to 
survive.” 
As such, the perception of less maneuvering space, the experienced “anti-
forces” and attitudes of “not-invented-here” seemed to add further incentive 
to their mobilizing actions.  As an antecedent to the performance of 
mitigating actions by Teknico employees and managers, it was reported that 
a large number of Teknico staff assumed cross-organizational roles as 
managers. This can be interpreted as a result of them being proactive and 
conspicuous. On the other hand, performing cross-organizational roles can 
be argued to facilitate mobilizing actions. HR personnel in Multifirm 
reported that several competent managers had emerged from the Teknico 
acquisition: 
“We’ve done evaluations…and didn’t find any managers who were 
good enough to push the Multifirm managers out (from Datagon and 
Comco). But many of the Teknico managers were… and there’s been a 
struggle for positions. The Teknico managers were more concerned 
about positions (than the other target managers).”  
The Teknico acquisition involved the explicit announcement of down-sizing. 
The integration process included re-organizing the Multifirm organization. 
The managers from Teknico were prepared to lose their positions, but 
several employees described that for the Multifirm managers, the fact that 
the organization and management positions were changed was surprising:  
“(For the middle managers in Multifirm), it came as a shock – when 
Teknico entered the organization. There are large changes, at least at 
the management level.” 
In addition to changes in leadership and organization, the integration of 
Teknico and of prior acquisitions had generated a substantial fragmentation 
of the organization. This resulted in “silos” and expressed duplications of 
roles and responsibilities. The complicated organization was described by 
the Teknico employees as both frustrating and time consuming. In addition, 
the fragmentation had led to an informal governance structure dependent on 
individual managers, which was said to be replacing the authority of formal 
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functions in the organization. Several Teknico managers described informal 
structures and informal decision making processes that were independent on 
the formal organization, but dependent on the long tenure of the decision 
makers at Multifirm. Some Teknico managers mentioned “the foursome 
crew” referring to a group of Multifirm managers who appeared to make 
decisions despite not holding formal decision making power in the particular 
area the decision was to be made in.  
The changes implied by the acquisition were described as frustrating by 
some of the Multifirm employees as well. The continually changing 
organization, resulting from a number of acquisition integration processes, 
created ambiguity in terms of how things were to be done and more 
importantly the expectation of new changes: 
“So it’s a little frustrating all the changes we need to handle (…) and 
how many times do you have to …ok fine, now we’re doing it this way, 
but you end up with an attitude like – I don’t bother because in a little 
while things will be different, anyway.” 
A Multifirm employee describes how his unit was to be reorganized, and the 
ambiguities related to the new leadership: 
“We don’t know who our leader will be after New-year. Then new 
people are arriving from Teknico. And as far as I understand, I 
haven’t got any information about it, but I have heard talk of it…and 
then there’s supposed to be one common manager, and I guess that 
Tom is one of two possible candidates. But they arrive with a bunch of 
people to be fitted in here. And if we are to have one common 
manager – that might not be Tom. I hope it is – I am very happy with 
him. But if he disappears I might end up with a Teknico manager and 
he won’t know our stuff, our customers, you know.”   
These voices from Multifirm employees can be interpreted in light of the 
Teknico employees’ assertion that Multifirm employees and managers were 
protective of their existing ways of doing things and the reported change 
resistant behavior. The Multifirm organization consisted of many prior 
mergers and acquisitions, some integrated fully, while others were still not 
integrated culturally. As such Multifirm acquisitions existed with their 
“native” norms, values and “ways of doing things”, making the organization 
difficult to understand for newcomers, and subsequently reflecting the image 
of an organization that was not agile and “change ready”.  
Despite the “pushing” and promoting on behalf of the Teknico managers, 
they felt that their contribution to Multifirm was difficult. Nevertheless, the 
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combination and dynamics of perceived loss of individual decision power, 
the mitigating and mobilizing actions performed by the Teknico managers 
and the cross-organizational roles Teknico employees assumed, resulted in 
the Teknico employees contributing to the Multifirm organization in several 
ways.  
6.4 Acquisition performance 
The Teknico acquisition was described as having delivered better than the 
business case. Multifirm managers reported that it was “a star buy”. Teknico 
employees, identifying with their former owner, went through a rough 
integration process, and employee satisfaction with the acquisition was 
mediocre. The business case was however, a success, and the learning from 
Teknico employees was reported to be significant. Multifirm managers 
expressed that the acquisition had delivered in accordance with the business 
case. Teknico had brought the technologies and customers expected, and in 
addition contributed to growth in the Nordic region: 
“Teknico has been integrated according to plan, it went pretty fast 
and we did the downsizing and everything – it went pretty well, and 
Teknico is now 100 % integrated in Multifirm. They brought with them 
customers, they brought Teknico MNC, and they brought concepts 
that were important to us. The distributed platform and that was for us 
an important platform. Teknico MNC had invested heavily in it, it was 
a very up-to-date platform. And it has contributed to Multifirm getting 
the operating contract for Teknico MNC in the Nordic countries.” 
 “This desktop platform, which by now isn’t what we got from 
Teknico, but which has been developed in cooperation with other 
customers as well, and now we are delivering a new platform to 
Teknico MNC, much more modern and cost-efficient. and we’ve done 
a large transition on that platform. And this is possible because 1. we 
got the platform and 2 we got Teknico MNC as a customer, and 3 we 
got employees with competence that could further develop it, and now 
we bring it out to other customers as well. And go back to Teknico 
MNC and sell more.” 
In the business case, they had taken into consideration that the organization 
was not “well run” and efficient. However, as a Multifirm manager explains, 
this did not pose a problem for the business case and for financial 
performance of the acquisition. However, it made the integration phase more 
difficult: 
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“Teknico was in at least as bad a state as we thought, but we got the 
means to deal with it, so it had nothing to do with the bottom line in 
the business case – it was more that it was operationally difficult.”  
The acquisition gave Multifirm a better than expected leverage in the 
Swedish market. In addition to these benefits, the acquisition was reported to 
have contributed to organizational renewal and learning. The acquisition of 
Teknico was reported by both Teknico and Multifirm employees to have 
challenged Multifirm’s culture. As a Multifirm manager describes: 
“We’ve got a broader understanding and a broader culture through 
the acquisition. There’s been a lot of technological warfaring here. 
But it has been exaggerated by others coming in to the organization 
that represent totally different view about what platforms to use, what 
technology, how you combine things etc. Teknico especially, they are 
the most important ones. A few “petty kings” have had their kingdoms 
challenged by the entrance of new views…some heroes in the 
Multifirm system have been challenged.” 
The Teknico employees impacted upon Multifirm in terms of being 
demanding and questioning existing norms, work-processes and “how we do 
things around here”. In doing so, the integration of Teknico was fraught with 
conflict and polarized views, which contributed to shaking up the 
organization: 
“Teknico employees are more proactive, they argue more, Datagon 
employees were just happy to be acquired, but they haven’t 
contributed to the same extent. Teknico employees continuously ask 
questions as to how we do things here, clever questions, they are very 
development oriented.” 
Both Teknico and Multifirm employees questioned whether this “Teknico-
way-of-doing-things” would be allowed to remain in Multifirm in the long 
run. A Multifirm middle manager explains: 
“But I don’t know if it will be allowed to survive here. They’ve worked 
differently from us. They’ve had a more modern way of working. 
(…)Teknico didn’t make money … but they were on to something, but 
they haven’t been able to prove that it was profitable. So they haven’t 
been listened to or gotten to further develop it (this way of working).”  
Many employees in Teknico were explicit about their contribution to 
Multifirm. They seemed to be explicit both in terms of describing how their 
mobilizing actions made an impact on the organization, but also in terms of 
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the nature of the actual contribution. Some of them focused on their ways of 
working, the work processes and routines: 
“I’ll be as bold as to claim that what we bring to Multifirm is a 
different way of working, a different culture.  We have relevant things 
that are important for Multifirm. And if they are to get their speed up 
and sell …Teknico was organized differently – our value chains were 
streamlined and worked well…we see Multifirm as, in our 
terminology, old-fashioned – a lot of paper and book-shelves and 
things like that…I think Multifirm has been given value through what 
we represent and our ways.” 
Even though Teknico contributed by asking questions and being proactive, 
they described obstacles to them contributing to Multifirm. These were 
described as unwillingness to change, conserving and protective behavior. 
These obstacles were also described as organizational level issues, in the 
sense that the organization had decision structures, authority structures and a 
culture that inhibited change. Here two Multifirm managers describe how 
Multifirm was challenged by Teknico: 
 “At the end of the day, it is the large and slow Multifirm that decides. 
At the end of the day, we control the resources. The new and creative 
things are to a large extent driven by Teknico resources – they have 
the cutting edge and sought after competency in the market. (…) there 
is a power struggle between the Teknico environments, who are 
creative and fast-paced, and the old, slow…and it’s the old and slow 
that is obstructing the creative in the end.” 
“The most important issue in that acquisition – it was that we got a lot 
of good, creative people. You can say… they challenged the slow and 
a little backwards culture. I think that was really good, the 
competence, and younger more creative people.” 
6.5 Conclusion and case analysis 
The Teknico acquisition was characterized as successful, from both 
acquiring and target firm perspectives. The explicit goals of the acquisition 
were met. In addition Multifirm and Teknico employees reported learning 
and the renewal of the Multifirm organization as an outcome of the 
acquisition.  
Even though the Teknico employees experienced the acquisition as 
strategically beneficial for Teknico, the acquisition challenged their identity. 
This was in relation to the content of the identity, but also related to status 
dimensions of their identity. They expressed a strong identification with 
 71
Teknico, and they perceived their relative status to be superior to that of 
Multifirm. As the firms were to be fully integrated, the boundaries of 
Teknico were perceived as permeable. Thus Multifirm’s perceived lower 
status could spill over and “contaminate” Teknico’s identity and image in the 
tight integration, and subsequently decrease their status.  I argue that the 
acquisition threatened Teknico’s organizational identity, and responding to 
these threats drove self-enhancing and group-related behavior in the form of 
mobilizing and mitigating actions by the Teknico managers and employees. 
The integration process itself evolved with some discord and friction. This 
was in retrospect blamed on the fact that it took too long for Teknico 
employees to be included in Multifirm structures, co-localized and integrated 
in the Multifirm organization. Having a prolonged integration period was 
perceived by Multifirm and Teknico managers as detrimental to the 
integration process. However, I will argue that this prolonged integration 
phase contributed to the establishment of common goals, a sense of “we”, 
and retaining a sense of continuity for the Teknico employees. By keeping 
Teknico as a distinguishable unit for some time, group dynamics and 
collective action were facilitated as Teknico was integrated in the Multifirm 
structure.  
In the reorganization and organizational integration period, several managers 
from Teknico assumed management positions. This again provided potential 
for further cross-organizational roles. Even though the target was by this 
time fully integrated, there were “pockets” of target employees that, I will 
argue, facilitated the continuity of Teknico capabilities. To a varying extent 
Teknico employees experienced that their knowledge and competencies 
were appreciated in Multifirm. Some Teknico employees expressed that they 
felt they had made a large impact and substantial contribution to the 
Multifirm organization. Others expressed a disappointment in the 
opportunities they had been given to contribute, and the ramifications to 
Multifirm from their entrance into the organization. However, I will argue 
that the stories by Multifirm managers and employees concerning the 
contribution they felt Teknico made show that Teknico’s input was 
appreciated. 
At the outset of the acquisition Multifirm did not expect great gains from the 
Teknico acquisition. The exception to this was the main contract with 
Teknico MNC. In other words, they perceived a low need for interaction 
with Teknico unrelated to the Teknico MNC contract. They subsequently 
lacked the motivation to seek new knowledge, competencies and capabilities 
in the target. They performed formalized mitigating and mobilizing actions 
through their integration initiatives. Other mobilizing actions were limited to 
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the main customer contract with Teknico MNC. However, the data shows 
that the Teknico acquisition is reported to have had a strong impact on 
Multifirm. The data further show that both expected value and serendipitous 
value was created in the acquisition integration about three years into the 
integration process. However, the data only demonstrate the short term effect 
of reported organizational renewal.  
Teknico employees’ status was initially threatened by the acquisition. They 
had a strong feeling of identity towards both the target and their former 
owner, and perceived Multifirm’s status to be lower on status relevant 
dimensions. According to identity theory, this should have led to conflicts 
and lower value-creation.  However, as the target had a visible leader in the 
initial integration process, that both promoted their competencies 
(mobilizing actions), protected the employees from Multifirm and 
acquisition integration disruption (mitigating actions) and worked as a bridge 
in the management team. In taking on cross-organizational roles the threat to 
their identity seemed to push the target towards contributing to value 
creation in the acquisition.  
Based on the Teknico case, I argue that in acquisitions that pose a threat to 
the target firm’s organizational identity, the integration process may be more 
fraught with conflicts and disruption, when compared to acquisitions that do 
not pose such a threat. However, these identity threats may trigger actions in 
the target firm, resulting in a “push” of their competencies and knowledge in 
an effort to protect and enhance their identity. In addition, the extent to 
which the acquirer expects the target to have valuable knowledge, and their 
organization’s ability to organize and utilize this knowledge is important. As 
such, both the characteristics of the target and characteristics of the acquirer, 
as well as the processes between them generated outcomes of the 
acquisition.  
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7 Datagon 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Datagon was acquired by Multifirm from Datagon MNC, a large US firm. 
The Datagon acquisition was to provide Multifirm with 45 new customers in 
the trade and industry segment, along with a strong foothold in the public 
sector market segment (delivering services to approximately 300 local 
government units). Datagon consisted of operations and application services 
for Norwegian customers in the Local Government Sector, Distribution and 
Industry. The transaction involved the transfer of approximately 265 
employees from Datagon MNC to Multifirm. The Datagon target was to be 
integrated into Multifirm’s existing organization, both procedurally and 
organizationally. The acquisition was expected to triple Multifirm’s revenues 
within the local government sector, and strengthen their position in trade and 
industry. No reduction in employees was expected as a consequence of this 
acquisition.  
7.2 Pre-integration context 
The Datagon target was mainly made up of a unit acquired by Datagon MNC 
approximately 10 years previously. The Datagon employees described this 
prior acquisition as fairly detrimental to Datagon. Datagon’s business was 
argued to not have received sufficient focus and resources in Datagon MNC, 
resulting in their products and services being in need of investment. Datagon 
employees depicted the Datagon MNC’s organizational culture as not 
compatible or aligned with how they perceived themselves. The locus of 
their identity was not Datagon MNC, which they felt alienated from, but 
rather the target unit, Datagon.  
The majority of the employees of Datagon had been through several 
divestment and acquisition processes, and they expressed nostalgic sympathy 
with other prior owners. They expressed ambiguous feeling towards Datagon 
MNC as system, and initially many employees expressed nostalgic sympathy 
with former host companies and also sympathy with what they perceived as 
the Multifirm culture: 
”Clearly, Multifirm has a…I feel bad saying it, but a more humane 
culture (than Datagon MNC)…so far all former Datagon MNC’ers 
agree on that. We experience being treated well…we are listened to. 
We are treated with respect and understanding. I think the culture 
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reminds me of what I experienced in Another Company. And many of 
us feel that.” 
As such their identity orientation was not towards Datagon MNC. Instead 
they argued that Multifirm was better aligned with “who they were” as an 
organization. Very few concerns about Multifirm’s status or reputation were 
raised. As such, in the early interviews Datagon employees expressed a 
positive attitude to being acquired by Multifirm. They believed their 
products would be invested in and developed in Multifirm. As a unit and as 
individuals, they also felt a lack of individual and group autonomy and 
authority in Datagon MNC, which they perceived would improve in 
Multifirm. Datagon MNC was a US firm, and followed a decision-structure, 
reporting lines and management philosophy that seemed alien to Datagon 
employees in Norway. These feelings of alienation further materialized 
through descriptions of language barriers. In Datagon MNC, most 
information had been in English, and thus not always easily accessible to the 
employees, as one Datagon employee explains: 
“It was very frustrating, even if my English is ok – I say ok because 
I’m not an expert, but I can read fine. But to read a business-brick 
thick as this…cause you got a lot of information. You read and read, 
and when you’ve been reading for 20 minutes, you realize that this 
isn’t for me. Get the same information in Norwegian, and you realize 
after 7,5 lines and 15 seconds…” 
Datagon’s employees mostly felt that being acquired by Multifirm meant 
“coming home”. They would be part of a Norwegian system, information 
would be in Norwegian and more readily available to them, and they would 
be able to make decisions and their products would be invested in. Very few 
concerns about Multifirm’s image or status were raised. Several of 
Multifirm’s key employees, including the CEO and other members of the 
top-management team, originally had at some point worked in Datagon 
MNC. However, when probed about this, Datagon employees denied that 
this contributed to the feeling of “coming home”. The feeling of “coming 
home” was attributed to the perceived company culture, Norwegian 
headquarter control and the similarities they saw between former host 
companies and Multifirm. The feeling of belonging and identifying refers to 
Multifirm as an organization.  
Early in the integration process, before the co-location of the units, 
Multifirm management and HR personnel held an information meeting at a 
hotel near Datagon MNC headquarters. This meeting was described by many 
of the employees of both Datagon and Multifirm, in addition to the 
researcher observing the meeting. After Multifirm representatives provided 
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information about practicalities of the acquisition, some Datagon employees 
raised the question of why they and a group of about 20 other Datagon 
employees were to be transferred to Multifirm, as they did not work in the 
same areas as the rest of the target. This was described by a Multifirm 
employee: 
“So they raised their hand, and asked why they were being transferred 
to Multifirm, and we didn’t know… Datagon MNC had hid this from 
us. (…) they had put a lot of people that were on long time sick leave, 
and that is horrible. It was incredibly uncomfortable and created a lot 
of noise.”  
This led to Multifirm rejecting 23 employees that initially were on the 
transfer list. Both Datagon and Multifirm employees described this incident 
as Datagon MNC trying to “get rid of” unproductive personnel. Datagon 
employees described how Multifirm had acted professionally and “tidily” in 
this incident, which only added to the perception of Multifirm as a solid 
firm, and Datagon MNC as appearing in a far from positive light. Multifirm 
employees and managers focused on Datagon’s competency and industry 
knowledge as the important issues in the acquisition: 
“The most important thing they bring is their competency. We need 
that to keep going, the point is to take us into new markets, for 
example local government – we have very little experience, so we are 
totally dependent on the people – it’s not just a product …we need the 
operations resource, the development resources, sales resources…so 
it is critical if people leave.” 
The data shows that the Datagon target perceived few threats to their 
identity. Instead they perceived that the new organization was aligned better 
with “who they were” when compared to Datagon MNC. The acquisition 
represented maintenance and a continuation of their target organizational 
identity. With few exceptions, the image and status of Multifirm was 
perceived as better than Datagon MNC. There were few concerns raised 
regarding working for an organization with lower status than their prior 
owner. As the target was to be integrated procedurally, processually and 
culturally in Multifirm, they would to a large degree lose their 
distinctiveness as Datagon. However, this was not perceived as detrimental 
to their image, self-perception or business.  
7.3 Post-acquisition integration  
As opposed to Teknico, the Datagon target did not have one obvious and 
visible head of the acquired unit. Senior managers were assigned to head the 
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largest target units in the transition phase; however they did not remain 
managers in the integrated organization. After the firms had been physically 
co-located and the Datagon unit had been organizationally integrated in 
Multifirm, there were generally positive attitudes in Datagon towards the 
acquisition, Multifirm and expectations about the future:  
”I do feel that I have more interesting work now …it’s more pleasant 
to work here than it was working for Datagon. Now we are a unit in 
Norway, as I mentioned earlier. Decisions can be made. You feel you 
are heard. In Datagon MNC that wasn’t easy.” 
Datagon described their ambiguous feelings towards Datagon MNC and new 
feeling of belonging and identifying with Multifirm:  
“I have to emphasize, to compare with Datagon MNC, I won’t dwell 
on that, but in Datagon MNC I would never have wanted to be a 
leader (…) I felt it conflicted with my integrity. When I was asked to 
become a leader here (in Multifirm) in November, I already had that 
feeling that made me say yes immediately – it was a knee-jerk 
reaction.”  
This agreement to take on the responsibilities of a manager in Multifirm 
signals sympathy with, and willingness to represent the distinguishing 
features, management style, and authority structures of Multifirm. 
Specifically, the decision-making processes and the way authority had been 
delegated in Datagon MNC was an important comparative feature. The 
Datagon employees emphasized individual decision-making power and 
authority structures as a positive feature of Multifirm. Another Datagon 
employee described the increased decision-making power they experienced 
in Multifirm: 
“Decisions, for example, they look different in Multifirm. They have a 
more informal way of making decisions. Decisions are made 
throughout the country. They can be made way down in some 
department. We had no such opportunities in Datagon MNC. We 
could make suggestions, but the decision was very often made abroad. 
Now I can make almost all the decisions I couldn’t make in Datagon 
MNC” 
A year into the integration process, many Datagon employees reported that 
their expectations had been met and that “things were just getting better and 
better”. However, as the Datagon employees’ expectations had been high, 
there was some concern among Multifirm HR staff that the prolonged 
integration phase would contribute to the accepting and complying Datagon 
becoming impatient. A HR employee in Multifirm explained: 
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“When I talk to the Datagon employees that they are really positive. 
But it won’t take long before this is turned to something really 
negative, unless their expectations are met.”  
After the initial integration some feelings of unmet expectations did emerge 
among the middle managers from prior Datagon. This appeared in some of 
the interviews as a disappointment with the support and attention they 
received in Multifirm. One of the lower level managers from Datagon 
divulges: 
“I think I had a pretty positive attitude the last time I talked to you. 
Because… for our business unit it was great to be acquired by 
Multifirm. They were a company we thought would invest in our 
solutions and actively communicate to the market that our solutions 
were prioritized.” 
“We went around…we went to meetings, sales meetings and 
introduced ourselves. We tried to show that we were decent people 
interested in the large whole and not just our little part. That was the 
philosophy we had when we came in. That we should try to be ... 
learning from others. We noticed that some departments were really 
nice and shared our philosophy. But in others we felt downright 
obstruction, where information was withheld from us. Letters were 
sent addressed to our customers without us being consulted.” 
As the integration process developed, some Datagon managers reported 
difficulties with obtaining information and resources necessary to perform 
the tasks required to develop their business. As in the Teknico interviews the 
fragmentation and ambiguity of decision making structures and distribution 
of information in Multifirm emerged as important issues. This caused 
disruption and impeded managers from being able to perform mitigating and 
mobilizing actions. A  Datagon employee describing frustration with lacking 
information: 
“We really need to plough our way into Multifirm to get hold of 
information. Information doesn’t flow automatically, to put it that 
way. You can’t find it here. You have to seek out the environment. You 
have to take the initiative yourself.” 
To attain information Datagon employees argue that one needs to be pro-
active, as information is not available unless actively searched for. In 
addition, it was claimed that Multifirm does not provide systems for easy 
access to necessary information. Instead this is dependent on links to 
individuals. Subsequently access to information and knowledge is contingent 
on an in-depth knowledge of “who-knows-what” in the organization. Some 
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Datagon managers described that Multifirm did not systematically facilitate 
coordination, task integration and information flows to the target employees. 
This contributed to the feelings of being neglected by Multifirm among some 
of the Datagon employees: 
”We kept on doing what we’d always done. We didn’t really get any 
help from the organization, any leverage, not from management or 
processes or anything like that. We had our customers and our 
processes, but for us it was important to be integrated in Multifirm 
family.”  
On the one hand Datagon employees described lacking information to make 
the necessary contacts in Multifirm. On the other hand, they felt that 
Multifirm did not facilitate or allocate sufficient management resources and 
attention to them, which made Datagon’s efforts to integrate their business 
difficult.  
 “To be allowed time with the managers (in Multifirm) – that was the 
hardest part. They were so busy (…) that we were left to our own 
devices. (…) I actually experienced meetings that I had invited my 
managers to being cancelled because they had more important things 
to do. And I had to chase them down the hallways to get some words 
with them. Sometimes to get a decision I had to stand in the corridor 
and grab them as they came out of meetings. I guess…but maybe 
that’s the way it had to be.” 
Connected to the implementation of several acquisitions simultaneously are 
the reorganizations that seem to follow them. This contributes to the 
ambiguity surrounding the decision structures, roles and responsibilities: 
“Another problem is all the reorganizations. We were used to them in 
Datagon MNC, we usually had 2 every year, but they weren’t as large 
as the ones here (…). Here they are announced either through a 
rumor, or through an employee meeting that refers to one unit and all 
of the sudden you’re in a different organization” 
Initially Datagon employees expressed their expectations that there would be 
synergies between the Datagon and Multifirm businesses. This was based on 
the logic of Datagon delivering the same type of products as Multifirm to 
different markets. A year into the integration they reported not being able to 
achieve the cooperation they had hoped for. They blamed lack of 
coordinated incentives and silo thinking for the difficulties they were having: 
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“We are suboptimalizing here. There are no incentives …when 
application A is to be condemned there are no incentives to sell 
application B in the entire firm.” 
“There are large cultural differences in this firm. (…) some units with 
a very tough and strong sales culture. They are very self-involved, 
while others are open and inclusive. (…) some places we’ve been 
invited and received standing ovations - welcome, and other places 
they slammed the door in our faces.” 
Another theme raised by the respondents was the way in which the Datagon 
solutions were to be developed. Datagon managers expressed that some of 
their expectations about Multifirm’s provision of resources, both funds and 
employees, for the development of Datagon solutions had been delayed 
longer than insinuated during the due-diligence process. As described by a 
Datagon manager below, the process also seemed fraught with more 
difficulties than anticipated: 
“In the due-diligence process we emphasized two important issues. 
First, the number of employees: we were too few employees when we 
were transferred. By hiring more people we could make more money, 
because there was demand for these services, from that perspective 
hiring should pose no problems. In Datagon we were not allowed to 
hire. Datagon is a multinational firm and a lot of things happen 
globally. We had hoped that at Multifirm things would be seen in a 
local perspective and that the good arguments…but we were not 
allowed to hire. I just walked out of one meeting, saying that they 
were about to ruin a good business if we weren’t allowed to hire. We 
are wearing people out. We worked a lot. So that was the first issue. 
The second was to invest in our portfolio, it was evident from the due-
diligence that the portfolio we brought over was…in terms of 
applications it was good, but it needed maintenance. (…) so if we 
were to survive x number of million needed to be invested. The guy 
from Multifirm that was an expert on this saw this in the due-diligence 
process, as well. Still it took way too long before we were allowed to 
do it. And when we were allowed, it was after a lot of struggles.” 
Another Datagon employee describes how Multifirm, in the effort to develop 
the Datagon solutions, had taken the path of least resistance first: 
“They wanted to get a position in the solutions marked for this 
segment. We didn’t have any large operations contracts, general 
contracts towards this market. So they bought industry knowledge and 
a market share, the solutions were old and they knew that. It was in 
the business case that they needed investing in. So we’ve spent some 
time making that decision. (…) First they thought they could just patch 
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up the old solutions. Of course that didn’t work – I could have told 
them that right away.” 
An explanation for why this happened is suggested by a Datagon manager. 
He described how their own actions in relation to the development of their 
services were shaped by their prior experiences in Datagon. The company 
had lacked resources to develop their solutions. In addition, Datagon had 
little clout in Datagon MNC as a unit. This resulted in their business not 
gaining the necessary resources and focus, and as individual managers and 
employees the Datagon people were used to little decision making power. In 
Multifirm Datagon had continued acting as if they were still operating under 
these contingencies. As a result they begged for resources to “repair” their 
old solutions, instead of demanding the fundamental change that was 
required:  
“We were so used to nagging for money in Datagon MNC. We did 
patchwork on old solutions. We kept on nagging here as well…and 
here we got money. But that was stupid; we should have drastically 
changed our strategy right away. (…) But we were used to having a 
lot of responsibilities, but little power, the large strategic changes 
were initiated top-down. (…)Had we been conscious of this, we would 
have seen that we were on the wrong track – we would have started 
the strategy process right away – instead of spending millions by 
trying to patch up our old stuff.” 
One of the managers in Datagon explained both how they tried to deal with 
the frustration in the new organization, and how that frustration was not 
communicated further in the organization or to other stakeholders. This 
displays the mitigating efforts undertaken by the Datagon managers in an 
effort to keep up morale: 
“But I think we managed to stop that frustration here. We had good 
employee satisfaction scores. So that … the organization was positive. 
And we agreed that that was our story, and to the customers of course, 
but also to the employees. But that we weren’t allowed to do the things 
we’d agreed upon in the due-diligence, both with hiring and investing. 
Finally now we are getting an opening for hiring people, one and half 
years later.” 
Datagon managers felt that their industry knowledge had been appreciated. 
They described how the upper echelons of the Multifirm organization saw 
and appreciated the need for this knowledge. This market competence was 
one of the main arguments behind the acquisition. A Datagon manager 
described how he felt both trusted and appreciated: 
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“We’ve gotten to use our industry experience; the top management at 
Multifirm has a lot of trust in our industry experience.” 
On the other hand, Datagon employees described difficulties with the 
established “systems” in Multifirm. The latter had a large and important 
customer base in the financial industry. As a result, their employees mostly 
had experience from this industry, and systems were developed in 
accordance with financial customer requirement. As such, the Datagon 
employees described that gaining understanding for the way Datagon did 
business, or how their customers were different and needed to be approached 
differently, was difficult: 
”The banking industry sets the norm, even though we’re in a different 
industry, whatever they have done - that is what Multifirm is. Even 
though the CEO and others come from the outside and influences, its 
still all marked by banking.  You can tell by the system, the way of 
thought and the control mechanisms that they haven’t worked outside 
the banking industry, and they don’t understand other industries, and 
they feel that everyone has to adapt to whatever banking has done. “ 
This suggests that the objective of the acquisition, gaining industry 
knowledge is understood and communicated, but that in the day-to-day 
operations in the firms, doing business is shaped by the existing industry 
knowledge and that the frames for operating are developed through these.  
7.4 Acquisition performance 
What emerges from the interviews with Multifirm is a perception of the 
Datagon acquisition as not contributing significantly, except for the expected 
benefits and in accordance with the business case. It was noted that Datagon 
employees were competent people and that the acquisition brought both a 
market and solutions to Multifirm.  But the employees were described as 
“laid back” and “unnoticed” in the organization. Part of this can be explained 
by the different competencies and the way the targets were integrated in 
Multifirm. One salient issue was the difference in number of individuals in 
management positions. An employee from Multifirm describes: 
“Their main contribution is opening the market for local government. 
Culturally I can’t see that they’ve made a contribution. At least not 
anything that is noticeable. They have… they sort of just came in, 
didn’t object to anything, didn’t make an imprint, they sort of just slid 
in, quietly and nicely (…) they have contributed with what they were 
bought to contribute with. The managers in Datagon had already 
resigned in the Datagon MNC system – so they just wanted to come 
home”  
 82
” Not many individuals from Datagon are in management positions, 
however, from Teknico there are many.” 
The Datagon managers were described as eager to contractually secure their 
personal benefits. A Multifirm employee reported that it seemed like the 
Datagon employees had experience from a system they could not trust, 
resulting in insecurities and wanting to “get everything in writing”. A 
Multifirm employee explained:  
“They were just happy to be acquired. We’ve seen that more of the 
managers (from Datagon) made sure…they positioned themselves 
from the start, to get their benefits. But then they’ve sort of let go. 
Now they are stuck way down in the organization, but have the same 
salary…they haven’t had the same need to stake a claim.” 
Multifirm had expected Datagon to proactively take charge of their business, 
but experienced that they were not very proactive: 
“Datagon is a little slack. Their response time is sometimes very long. 
It can take a long time before they answer e-mail or a phone call. 
They seem to be working from home an awful lot. They come from a 
culture where you are not “on your toes”. They are used to reacting 
on command; they are very well trained, which means they do not do 
anything until they’re told to do it.”  
 “I think some people…it’s difficult to see what their contribution was 
or is today. If they were just a head or a function to make the business 
case adds up. You get this and we get this…and they don’t really 
contribute as such or add anything (…) that we have some people who 
are going on idle. I think so.” 
A Multifirm manager describes the challenges related to creating value in the 
Datagon acquisition: 
“Datagon has delivered as expected regarding IT-operations. 
However, in relations to the solutions part it has been difficult to find 
the key to pulling it into the future. Find the investment funds and set 
up a plan.” 
The acquisition integration is described as a success from the perspective of 
the Multifirm employees: 
“They are very well integrated in Multifirm. And they seem very 
satisfied. The ones that weren’t happy left either right after the 
acquisition, or they left because of downsizing. Few have resigned to 
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go elsewhere. (…) They never really felt integrated in the Datagon 
MNC system. (…) And now, after each re-organization they are 
becoming more and more integrated. So in these terms the acquisition 
was a success.” 
The Datagon employees below the middle management level seemed happy 
with where they were. This was described by one Datagon employee as 
follows: 
“Most people are happy with the acquisition and with our new 
employer. There have been very few negative reactions.”  
One Datagon employee describes what he feels Datagon and some of the 
other targets have contributed to his unit: 
“We brought structure with us. Related to budgeting and economy in 
projects. There we draw on experience from Datagon MNC. We are 
implementing new routines. (…) and we have strong contributions 
from the other targets, they have the ability to see things a little 
different from how Multifirm sees things. I get a lot of support from 
them. The consulting part, the customer focus, they are more 
performance oriented, and Datagon with the structure. These are not 
traditionally Multifirm’s strong sides.” 
Even though this person describes that he feels they have contributed with 
their knowledge, there is an undertone of the same struggles indicated by 
other Datagon employees. That is, the other targets aid in their change 
efforts, and that the Multifirm organization is not very receptive to new 
insights and perspectives.  
Some Datagon employees felt they did not receive the support and leverage 
necessary, whereas others felt everything had gone smoothly. However, 
neither of these assertions are in conflict with the experience asserted from 
Multifirm, that Datagon employees had been so happy to be acquired that 
they leaned back and exhaled once they were in the organization. As such, 
they did not make as large an imprint on Multifirm as Teknico did, either in 
terms of contributing with their knowledge or in terms of creating noise in 
the organization. I argue that the lack of threats to Datagon identity, 
combined with the low perceived need for interaction and ambiguous 
decision structures in Multifirm,  resulted in a corresponding insufficient 
push for mobilizing from Datagon and a limited ability to absorb from the 
Multifirm structure.  
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7.5 Conclusion and analysis 
The Datagon acquisition lived up to its promise in terms of the expected 
benefits as stated in the business case. However, the data shows little 
evidence of serendipitous outcomes in this acquisition. Below the findings 
from this case are summarized. 
Datagon’s employees expressed varying degrees of attachment to their 
former owner. However, in general employees conveyed a relatively strong 
resentment and lack of identification towards Datagon MNC. Their identity 
and loyalty seemed to be channeled towards the target organization. As a 
result they expressed that Multifirm represented an organization they felt 
would be compatible with their business, their organizational culture and 
their values. They expressed a shared identity with the target group and an 
appreciation for their common history. The acquisition did not challenge the 
identity of Datagon. 
Few management positions were assumed by the Datagon employees. In 
addition, the Datagon employees expressed that even though they 
experienced an increase in decision power, the potential for action inherent 
in this was not exploited. It seems as though the managers in Datagon 
somehow did not succeed in performing mobilizing actions. The lack of 
mobilizing efforts can be interpreted in different ways. It could be that the 
fragmentation and ambiguity in the Multifirm organization described above, 
combined with the lack of collective push towards protecting and preserving 
organizational identity, impeded all attempts at mobilizing efforts by the 
Datagon managers, until they subsequently resigned. Assuming cross-
organizational responsibilities requires target management to be visible for 
the acquirer, yet some Datagon managers felt neglected and dismissed in 
Multifirm, this lends evidence to the proposition that they were not visible in 
the organization. Nevertheless, I will argue that the lack of identity threat 
bereaved the Datagon target of a potential motivator for action, and as such 
compromised their ability to front their knowledge and competencies.  
Whatever the reason, there were few Datagon managers in the Multifirm 
organization post-acquisition. As such they were not in formal positions to 
have cross-organizational roles. This resulted in less impact and influence on 
the Multifirm organization from this acquisition. One possible interpretation 
of this finding could be that the Datagon managers were worn out by the 
lack of support they described in the Multifirm organization. This, combined 
with the perceived fragmented organization and ambiguous resource 
allocation and decision making structures, made the coordination of 
activities and task integration difficult. Another possible explanation follows 
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the claim of some Multifirm managers: Multifirm could not identify many 
individuals with management potential in Datagon. A third interpretation is 
that the lack of detection of management potential is due to Multifirm 
employees’ expectations towards the potential residing in the target, as 
related to solutions and competencies.  
Multifirm managers and employees described the Datagon middle managers 
as more laid-back and lacking the pro-active attitude displayed in other 
targets. They expressed that Datagon employees seemed to be expecting the 
Multifirm system to take the initiative in task integration efforts, and in the 
development of services and products. In contrast to this, other Datagon 
employees report of their expectations in terms of possibilities for their 
products as being met. Specifically, this seems to be the case later in the 
study period. 
The accounts of the target and acquirer are not necessarily conflicting. The 
accounts from Multifirm managers of Datagon employees being passive 
complement the Datagon employees accounts of not being supported and 
feeling like they were not aided by Multifirm. It could be that expectations 
regarding the roles and responsibilities of target and acquirer differ after the 
initial integration phase. This in terms of who is to take charge of the 
implementation, who is responsible for the target business, and what role the 
acquirer is to play in facilitating and aiding the target in the integration 
process.  
This can also be related to the assertion that Datagon managers were used to 
having limited decision authority, possibly resulting in a more passive 
approach. Datagon employees described Datagon MNC decision structures 
and formal routines and procedures as set in manuals available to the 
employees. This left individuals with less space to maneuver in. In 
Multifirm, they described these processes as more unstructured and the 
potential for individual decision making and influence greater. They 
perceived Multifirm to lack formalized routines and explicit procedures. It 
would seem that initially the Datagon managers were not able to change 
their behavior to accommodate the Multifirm way of operating.  
Some of the managers of the pre-integrated Datagon described trying to 
perform mobilizing actions. However, they perceived that their efforts were 
stifled due to lack of access to information, ambiguous decision structures, 
and a lack of agility in Multifirm. They blamed the difficult access to 
information on ignorance, negligence and protective behavior from parts of 
the Multifirm organization. There is evidence of mitigating actions, in that 
there was a significant amount of frustration at the management level of 
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Datagon, which did not seem to reach the employees.  The majority of the 
problems encountered by Datagon and described in this chapter, are issues 
encountered that affected the managers. The general satisfaction in the rest 
of the organization among the former Datagon employees was reported as 
relatively high on their satisfaction index. This picture also emerged from 
the interviews. As such, there seems to be evidence that the Datagon 
managers did perform mitigating actions, both from their own descriptions 
of trying to protect their employees from the noise around the integration 
process, and also judging from the general state of employee satisfaction 
among the Datagon employees.  
The data also indicate a few incidents of mitigating and mobilizing efforts by 
Multifirm managers and employees, a perceived low need for interaction and 
fragmented and ambiguous decision structures. Subsequently, I argue that 
there were low efforts to extract knowledge, few efforts made to organize 
and retrieve and little knowledge absorbed in the organization. There is 
however, a described potential for learning from Datagon. In terms of 
expected benefits, the acquisition delivered expected value. Thus, the 
conclusion in Multifirm was that the acquisition delivered the expected 
benefits. 
Based on the findings in the Datagon case I argue that in integration 
processes where the target organization does not experience a threat to their 
identity the acquisition integration process is less ridden with conflicts and 
more harmonious. However, this also results in a lack of motivation for 
action in the integration process. The result is that the acquisition generates 
fewer benefits for the acquirer organization.   
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8 Comco  
 
8.1 Introduction 
Multifirm acquired Comco MNC’s Infrastructure Management operations in 
both Norway and Sweden. The goals of this acquisition were to obtain 
growth in the Swedish market and to strengthen Multifirm’s position in the 
small and medium sized business (SMB) market.  The acquisition included 
the transfer of 320 employees, 230 in Sweden and 90 in Norway. The deal 
included 140 customers primarily in the areas of transportation, shipping and 
industry. Multifirm were to fully coordinate and integrate the target with its 
current activities. Integrating the activities was to lead to synergy benefits in 
terms of premises, technology and personnel. This was expected to lead to a 
reduction in the headcount in Multifirm’s Swedish operation. However, no 
reduction was expected for Multifirm in Norway as a consequence of the 
acquisition. The deal also provided for collaboration between Multifirm and 
Comco MNC on joint customers, which was expected to create synergistic 
benefits and strengthen both firms’ positions in the Swedish and Norwegian 
markets.  
8.2 Pre-integration context 
The Comco employees seemed to have few experiences with Multifirm pre-
acquisition, and few opinions of what characterized Multifirm as an 
organization. Indeed, at least initially, the Comco employees seemed 
indifferent to, and uninterested in the image or characteristics of Multifirm 
as an organization. Their main concern was how their individual tasks would 
be affected and potential changes in conditions for doing their job. They 
seemed to have a pragmatic attitude towards the acquisition, focused on their 
individual work, alongside the importance of continued performance of that 
work at Multifirm.  
Their initial experience with Multifirm in the pre-acquisition process was 
reported as positive. They reported that Multifirm seemed to be an 
experienced acquirer and that they handled the integration process 
professionally: 
“They are very agreeable and comfortable to work with. (…) they 
have been very professional around the negotiations. They have 
scrutinized the material we’ve given them, shown the ability to 
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mobilize, applied the right resources, and asked the right questions. 
So it has seemed really professional.” 
Some Multifirm employees mentioned that Comco’s employees were 
different because of the services they provided. Some Comco employees 
expressed that they were consultants, whereas Multifirm staff were IT-
operations people. However, initially these issues did not seem to be very 
salient, and some employees even remarked that Comco’s employees were 
probably more different from the management consultants in Comco MNC, 
than the IT-operations people of Multifirm:  
“I think we as a group are younger than the groups I have seen here –
, but honestly I don’t think we’ll stick out as different. My old job… 
was different – in (Comco MNC) there were management consultants 
in suit and ties, they would have stuck out here (in the Comco unit).” 
8.3 Post-acquisition integration 
After the closing of the deal, some unrest emerged among the Comco 
employees. This was connected to ambiguities surrounding the integration 
process, roles and responsibilities in the new organization. Before co-
location or any organizational integration occurred, Comco employees 
proactively tried to contact Multifirm to establish links across the 
organizations. However, they expressed that this effort was met with hurdles 
in Multifirm. The Comco employees expressed that they lacked information 
about how the firms were to be integrated and the ramification of integration 
for the individuals, which caused some frustration: 
“Except for the information meetings, we’ve had no contact with 
them. I know somebody who works there – so I have some contact with 
them. But we want to get in touch …with those who do the same thing 
as us, get some of the same information about how they work etc. We 
want to get started and prepare… so that we do things according to 
Multifirm standard, we’ve tried to get information about that. But we 
haven’t gotten it.” 
The employees in Comco initially appeared to be individually oriented in 
terms of their motivation and attitude towards the acquisition. Their main 
concern seemed to be having interesting and challenging work tasks, 
regardless of which firm they worked for. As such, their perception of 
“things taking too long” and the uncertainty about their general terms of 
work was argued to be the reason for what managers in both Comco and 
Multifirm referred to as “some turnover of employees” in connection with 
the transfer to Multifirm. Some Comco employees explained that they would 
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rather work for a firm that could tell them what they were to do tomorrow, 
than at Multifirm where things seemed uncertain. The Comco employees 
expressed that they had initially been proactive in their approach to 
Multifirm, because they were anxious to start preparing for the integration, 
and for working in Multifirm: 
“We tried to get hold of the guy who’s in charge of monitoring over 
there; they have a box in their organization chart that’s 
“monitoring”. We contacted him, you know, to get ahead and find out 
if there were things we should prepare. But he wouldn’t talk to us 
unless we went through the project manager for the transition project. 
But he said he’d contact us, which he never did. When we approached 
him again, he told us he’d rather not have contact with us as of now, 
wanted to wait till integration. So we’ve made some contacts, but it is 
difficult material…so now we’re just waiting.” 
The descriptions of the Multifirm structure as difficult, bureaucratic and 
lacking agility was contrasted to the proactivity that characterized the 
Comco-culture. After initial contact with Multifirm several employees 
focused their descriptions on the bureaucratic and formalized organization 
and decision structure, which they contrasted to the individual autonomy 
they expressed they had in Comco MNC.  
“They may not be used to working across the formal organization –
they need orders top-down through the decision structures, it could 
seem like that. And that’s not the kind of organization I’m interested 
in working for.” 
“The people who’ve been in Multifirm 15 years don’t have that frame 
of mind…but the people who came over have been very focused on 
being proactive, a focus on chargeability, on making money, to get 
additional services sold when they are in a project, to contribute and 
perform. (…)It had something to do with pride – and it made things 
exciting.” 
The Multifirm employees had varying expectations towards the Comco 
acquisition and the Comco employees. They acknowledged that Comco was 
acquired because of their Swedish operations, and they had little faith in the 
business and customers the Norwegian unit would contribute with. In 
general their business was described as unprofitable, and specifically their 
customers were described as small and unprofitable. One Multifirm 
employee describes the potential contribution from Comco: 
“I think they have the ability to be enterprising every day – to keep 
track of and bill every hour. But I also think they have a lot of 
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contracts that are incredibly unfavorable – but that is a different 
matter. They are not very profitable. But still they bring something to 
the table, and that is recording billable hours.” 
HR personnel from Multifirm focused on the competence of the individual 
Comco employees: 
“There are some really distinct, great resources, some aces from the 
Comco environment - really good people.” 
There seemed to be a low level of consciousness around the potential 
contribution from Comco in Multifirm, and an attitude that it would be an 
uncomplicated integration. Two years into the integration process, the 
frustration was apparent in the Comco informant’s accounts of the 
acquisition integration process, and how they had experienced the Multifirm 
system. The integration initiatives were reported to have mostly focused on 
integration of support functions and “human integration”. By contrast, task 
integration issues were claimed to have been largely ignored: 
“They made an effort to get us integrated and transferred, but it didn’t 
include the technology. It was just to get us transferred. Make sure we 
got the right account in the right place, that we got access, that we got 
employee benefits, recording of hours, got billing up and running, and 
things like that. But we brought with us a lot of other things, 
monitoring, we had customers, we had a lot of equipment. And the 
technology we brought with us was very different from what Multifirm 
had, different from their framework. And we got no support in 
converting any of that. It was just like – that has to be dealt with by 
way of “the line”. The challenge was that we didn’t have the capacity 
to convert and do our business at the same time. And besides, we had 
no knowledge of how Multifirm did these things, so we didn’t know 
what to convert to. Today, two and a half years after … we are still 
struggling with that. And a lot of the problems we have related to 
customers (…) are related to the fact that it was never integrated. 
Resources were never allocated towards it, and there was never 
enough focus on it. The people who were in production were left to 
take care of it. And that is an impossible task…to combine integration 
with business as usual.” 
“We didn’t get our deliveries adapted to the same concept. And what 
happened then was that when it went to the database department – to 
help the delivery, we were rejected because it wasn’t according to 
Multifirm standards, so they wouldn’t touch it, we don’t know 
anything about this, it is not transferred, ….so the people were taken 
away from us, but our deliveries were not adapted to follow the 
people, and there was a huge void… an oil company totally lost 
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follow-up. Many of our customers have suffered through this. If we 
had converted everything to Multifirm standard, gotten the same 
framework, changed the hardware, chucked the old servers and gotten 
standard Multifirm servers… then everything would have fitted the 
concept.” 
The Comco employees also described difficulties relating to the Multifirm 
culture and management style. In the process of appointing managers 
evaluations were made of Comco managers: 
 “When we got here we met a management that micro-managed. And 
they were evaluating us. And what baffled us was that we were never 
asked what results we’d achieved. They were more concerned with the 
soft issues and what other people around us thought, than what we’d 
achieved of concrete results.” 
The employees’ descriptions of the integration process focus on the 
obstacles to utilizing their competences, and the encounter with a system that 
did not facilitate, but hindered integration. One example mentioned was the 
contract structures that did not accommodate the Comco type of customer 
projects: 
“When I’m tied to all these contracts, for example bound by a fixed 
price contract, implying  200 hours per quarter – I could consume 
from those hours – but I only got 800 NOK an hour. All overtime work 
– I couldn’t bill, but I got all the costs associated with it. The system is 
not applicable to consulting services.”  
The term consulting did not appear to the same extent in the early interviews 
as defining and distinguishing characteristics. However, after Comco had 
been integrated into the Multifirm organizational structure, the term 
“consultant” started appearing both when the managers referred to their 
employees, but also when the employees referred to themselves as 
consultants in comparison to Multifirm employees. It would appear that in 
their prior organization their status as consultants had not been a relevant 
distinguishing feature and status dimension, whereas in Multifirm it was a 
meaningful term to distinguish themselves as prior Comco employees from 
the pre-acquisition Multifirm organization: 
”We had a much greater pride in Comco MNC than here in Multifirm 
and some people said…yes, now we are being degraded, now we’re 
entering the factory. We are no longer consultants (…) some felt that 
Multifirm wasn’t good enough for them.” 
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“Comco MNC was more popular; we had stronger work ethic and 
pride in a consulting firm like Comco MNC than here. You noticed 
that people said: wow – you work for Comco? Now it’s like, hm you 
work for Multifirm. This perception has been more obvious after we 
came in here, that working for Comco MNC gave more prestige.” 
A Comco employee explained the way they had worked in Comco MNC, as 
an explanation for the pride and the proactive attitudes that were 
characteristic of Comco: 
“Comco MNC had business developers and consulting. What was 
exciting there was that we (…) were responsible for operations and at 
the same time we brought business consultant that spent time with us, 
and with the top management team and came up with business 
concepts. I think that explains it – we went from the boardrooms and 
developing a customer to just making sure the foundations work. That 
affects your attitudes and proactivity.” 
This distinction was exemplified in the interaction with the rest of Multifirm. 
While the Comco employees characterized themselves as consultants, and 
this is an important concept in their self-definition, the Multifirm employees 
did not consider themselves consultants. A Comco employee retold a 
conversation between one of his Comco colleagues and a Multifirm 
employee at a social event in Multifirm: 
“One of them (a Multifirm employee) says that he was getting tired of 
working here in Multifirm, and he’s thought of becoming a consultant. 
And then the (Comco) guy was thinking, but for heaven’s sake - isn’t 
that what we are? (…) We consider ourselves consultants and are 
ambitious towards that.” 
The reported relatively high turnover soon after the integration process 
started was attributed to some of the employees feeling that they could not 
identify with Multifirm. This was due to their perceived image as an 
operations provider. To a varying degree the Comco employees focused on 
that they were consultants; some of them were reported to have returned to 
Comco MNC. A Comco employee describes why some of the Comco 
employees resigned: 
“Mostly people have been positive. Some made up their mind early 
that the last thing they wanted was to go to Multifirm. (…) they 
(Comco employees) are consultants; they don’t want to be in an 
organization characterized as an operations firm.” 
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The Comco employees focused on their profession or work tasks as a way to 
distinguish them from Multifirm. When describing the interaction with the 
Multifirm organization, the Comco employees also seemed to focus on what 
distinguished them as a group on individual characteristics from Multifirm. 
And as such they emphasized the original demarcations between the 
organizations: 
“”Come together”  was a nice arrangement, you meet a much more 
“diverse” group of employees…how can I put it…without being, well 
– put bluntly:  in my organization people are handpicked – you know 
– they have a college degree… they are versatile, and can work with a 
broad area. Here you have resources who’ve only worked with one 
thing, and pretty simple things.” 
Some Comco employees emphasized the differences in working for a large 
company compared to a smaller one. Some of these differences were related 
to negative changes for the Comco employees, whereas others were 
perceived as benefits. A Comco employee reflects upon what he perceives as 
the major differences in working for Multifirm compared to Comco MNC: 
“There are large differences. One thing…that I have been wondering 
about, it’s how things work in a large firm. All the things you have to 
deal with. We come from a fairly simple, small firm and are entering a 
large…thing. For example, if we were too many employees, we’d 
target one or two and make a simple programme for that. Here it is 
…huge and extensive, you have to involve and plan and inform, 
inform the market, inform…you have to this and that, there are a lot of 
considerations for every little thing you do. And we have no culture 
for unions, in a firm where…where everything is geared towards 
what’s the best for the consultants. You notice that there are strong 
unions working in the background. So …the decision structures and 
the processes…how they’re organized (…) we’ve had little 
maneuvering space – we had to ask about everything. Apply for 
everything – that is the culture we’re used to. Here we get more 
responsibilities and bigger possibilities for…we are being shown a lot 
of trust. It is regarding conditions for purchasing, equipment or stuff 
like that. Or what you need permission to do… a lot of it is based on 
common sense. We have more decision power here at Multifirm than 
we are used to.” 
A year into the post-acquisition integration process, some issues arose in the 
interviews related to the degree of integration and autonomy. The total 
integration of Comco in Multifirm was argued to be the reason for the 
acquisition not contributing to an increased focus on the SMB market for 
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Multifirm. It was also argued to be the reason for loss of employees and the 
disintegration of the environment from Comco: 
“We were not allowed to be a separate unit. To run our little shop in 
the shop. Everything’s supposed to be integrated, synergies captured. 
And that was what we did the first six months. But in retrospect, what 
you see is that if you’d wanted to keep the people and get something 
done in the SMB market, we should have been isolated like they’re 
doing with the consulting part now.” 
In terms of the human integration process, Multifirm’s HR staff described 
the Comco employees as unproblematic. They were viewed as undemanding 
and possessing a positive attitude, and as relatively inconspicuous in the 
organization. All in all, they seem to have not made an impact on the 
Multifirm organization, very few employees in Multifirm had any opinions 
about Comco, the goals of the acquisition or how it had proceeded. It 
appeared as the smoothest integration process. A Multifirm manager 
explains: 
“They seem a little – well, like it doesn’t really matter, its fine enough 
– they have no strong opinions. (…) there are not many demands or 
expectations from them” 
The Multifirm people that were involved with the Comco acquisition 
integration expressed that the integration was relatively simple. In 
implementing the acquisition Multifirm drew on their knowledge and 
learning from the Teknico acquisition integration. To a large extent the 
initiatives were a replication of those developed in the Teknico integration. 
In addition, the Comco integration process proceeded simultaneous to the 
Datagon integration, which was reported to be more demanding and time 
consuming. Comco on the other hand was: “so uncomplicated that it hasn’t 
posed any challenges” as explained by a Multifirm manager.  
This can be explained by the fact that the Comco acquisition included the 
transfer of fewer employees than the other acquisitions made at about the 
same time. However, it appears that there were very few expectations and 
very little interest in the Comco acquisition in large parts of the Multifirm 
organization. Many of the employees from Comco left. Some left 
immediately after the announcement of the acquisition, while one group left 
about a year into the integration because of what several Comco and 
Multifirm managers talked about as mismanagement. Here one Multifirm 
manager explains how they lost a group of approximately 15 consultants: 
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“We made a mistake, with the reorganization in October, no it was 
last year. Where one group was to be transferred to Vizcom, but then 
some of the managers in IT-operations realized that these people had 
useful competency for IT-operations, and they started splitting the 
group up. And then Vizcom didn’t want them, because they only 
wanted them as a unit (…) But one of our managers screwed it up. I 
don’t need to name names. (…) They ended up with deals of severance 
pay (…) they were angry and bitter, incredibly angry. They had 
argued as a group that they wanted to be transferred as a unit to 
Vizcom. I feel we handled this really badly.” 
About two years into the integration 60 % of the employees in the Comco 
acquisition had left Multifirm.  
8.4 Acquisition performance 
 The Comco acquisition was perceived as a success, according to the 
business case, and the strategic benefits that were expected were realized. 
However, there was a potential for value in this acquisition in Norway that 
was not exploited. As a Multifirm manager explains: 
“Comco is today the leading innovative and commercial force in 
Multifirm in Sweden. Comco came with sufficient volume there, a 
forceful substance compared to what Multifirm was, (…) The major 
benefits of competency, resources and way of thought and all that you 
can find in mergers – those things were influenced. It was a huge 
success both during, seen both during…and now after in Sweden. In 
Norway they were much smaller, with smaller customers, so it was a 
smaller merger(…)  In Norway you can’t find the same fundamental 
results of the merger.(…) they had a consulting environment that we 
didn’t manage to develop and capitalize on. We didn’t manage to 
make it a building block to build consulting services, and that was a 
part of the Multifirm strategy from 2005, to build a horizontal 
consulting service. We had bought Comco and thought that it could be 
a core that could form the basis for that”.  
It seems as if a lack of understanding of the Comco business and 
characteristics of the employees resulted in some decisions that were 
detrimental to value creation in the acquisition: 
“They were more consulting oriented than we had thought. (…) you 
can see people’s resumes and everything. And we went through all 
that. But they were that geared towards consulting, and so different 
from us in Multifirm, that was a surprise.”  
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When evaluating the success of the Norwegian part of the acquisition on 
subjective measures, employees and managers from both firms reported that 
the acquisition had not generated the expected or other benefits. In addition, 
a large number of employees had resigned two years after the announcement 
of the deal:  
“The numbers speak for themselves. 88 employees were transferred, 
after 2 years over 60 % of them are gone. So that’s not very 
impressive. Equipment and reuse of servers and environments and 
that part – I don’t think they’ve managed to reuse…only in terms of 
the customer base that then actually disappeared. They have not 
managed to keep, what was, in our world, large customers. They were 
too small for Multifirm.” 
 “We should have thought of …when all these restructurings were 
done in it-operations, Comco was a small part of that. And they got 
very lost. And in a market where there is great demand for 
competency, then they’re more susceptible to being head-hunted.(…) 
so we didn’t get to build on this hourly-based consulting sales.”  
The acquisition was reported not to have contributed significantly to the 
SMB effort, and this was partly blamed, both from Multifirm managers and 
Comco employees, on the strong degree of integration, the lack of autonomy 
granted to Comco and the fact that the Comco target was dispersed in the 
organization. Comco employees emphasized that the SMB effort from 
Multifirm was unfocused, and that Multifirm’s traditional way of handling 
customers was not adapted to SMB market: 
“Seen in retrospect, if the objective had been to take care of the 
resources within the SMB market, then we probably should have 
isolated it and kept it the same way they’re doing with the consulting 
units now.” 
“We have had a changing management that expresses; we are only 
focusing on large customers, but we are also making an effort in the 
SMB market. Very ambiguous and confusing message out to our 
customers. The customers that we brought with us were very uncertain 
about what Multifirm meant. We lost a lot of customers. So if you see 
Norway in isolation, then the acquisition hasn’t been very successful.”  
In addition the Multifirm managers were self-critical towards the way they 
handled these customers, and that the SMB market demanded a different 
business model: 
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“We’ve learned that we need to be careful when changing the 
business models in the customer relationships that we acquire. They 
had a business model – we could tell that it didn’t look profitable. But 
there was a reason it was like that. And when we got them over on our 
model, the customers didn’t like that.” 
One Comco manager, summing up the acquisition, paints a less than positive 
picture of how he perceives the acquisition to have impacted the Comco 
unit: 
 “The culture is shattered, it’s diluted in Multifirm, and our capacity 
to deliver, because we’ve been split up and not transferred to 
Multifirm as one unit, most of that is gone as well.(…) very little of 
what was acquired is left.”  
Both Multifirm managers and Comco managers and employees described 
Comco as possessing some competencies that Multifirm could have taken 
advantage of, and learned from. One of these was the ability to harness 
serendipitous opportunities in projects and learning from their consulting 
skills. The integration process was described by Comco to have eroded this 
type of competency and proactive behavior in the Comco employees: 
“It’s completely gone. They’ve tried several times with different 
suggestions, and nothing has happened, so they’ve lost their 
motivation – concerning capturing additional services, and to 
proactively make suggestions. It’s like with a little kid that’s always 
begging for stuff and always getting no for an answer, in the end they 
just don’t bother anymore. So we’ve lost that good culture along the 
way.” 
The acquisition was from the Multifirm side reported as not having 
contributed with management capacity: 
“The Comco managers are sort of one level down. They are managers 
on lower levels. We couldn’t find managers (in Datagon and Comco) 
to push the Multifirm managers out.” 
A Multifirm manager explained how the enthusiasm and proactiveness of the 
Comco managers had been eroded, and how this is attributed to the Comco 
managers realizing their limitations:  
“Comco resigned. They fought hard in the beginning, and then they 
gave up, I think. They…I think they realized that they weren’t 
managers at the level of the managers here. (…)I think they have 
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realized that it was right. We’ve tried a couple of them in higher 
management positions, but it just doesn’t work out.” 
8.5 Conclusion and analysis 
The Comco acquisition delivered according to the business case, both in 
Norway and Sweden. The expected benefits of the acquisition were realized. 
The goals of the Comco acquisition were mostly related to their Swedish 
unit in terms of growth in the Swedish market. Subsequently, the Norwegian 
Comco received little attention in the integration process, due to a lack of 
perceived benefit from this part of the acquisition. In addition, the Swedish 
unit had the bulk of the employees and customers. My findings indicate that 
the strategic capabilities of the Norwegian Comco unit were disrupted and 
the potential for beneficial outcomes of the acquisition not realized. The data 
shows an explicit potential in the acquisition for serendipitous outcomes that 
was not utilized. 
Initially the Comco acquisition seemed to lack organizational identity issues. 
Comco employees emphasized the technical work, the technology and their 
customers when describing who they were. However, there were few 
concerns about the identity of Multifirm, or “who Multifirm was” as an 
organization. Rather, they focused on the type of work they did, and the 
importance of belonging to an organization where they could perform that 
work, regardless of which organization that was. As such the locus of their 
identity seemed to be individually and professionally oriented. There were, 
however, as mentioned some concerns regarding the their status as 
consultants, and Multifirm being an IT-operations firm, and the lower status 
this was perceived to have.  
However, about a year into the integration process identity issues emerged. 
A full procedural, organizational and cultural integration as was 
implemented in the Comco-acquisition,  implies that it is impossible to 
distinguish the target from the acquirer organization post-acquisition. 
Subsequently, employees of the target may experience a discontinuity in 
their organizational identity. In the Comco acquisition, this meant that the 
Comco employees, considering themselves consultants and as employees of 
a consulting firm, had to renegotiate their organizational identity in 
Multifirm, as Multifirm was not a consulting firm. In this manner the 
organizational identity of Multifirm contaminated the target through 
integration. The triggering effects of identity threat, that potentially could 
have activated mitigating and mobilizing actions, did not reside in the 
collective group, but rather in each individual’s perceptions of status loss 
and professional identity. This occurred as they began to understand 
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Multifirm’s business, organizational culture and work organization. I argue 
that keeping the targets as autonomous units could have acted as a buffer 
from the disruption and identity issues of post-acquisition. As an 
autonomous unit the Comco unit’s identity issues could have resulted in 
collective action due to the threats to their identity. Subsequently, this 
collective action could have contributed to learning and knowledge transfer. 
However, as their organization was fragmented, I argue that their strategic 
capabilities were dispersed. 
Acquisition experience has been suggested to impact acquisition 
performance. However, as discussed in the theory chapter in this thesis, there 
are inconsistencies in the research regarding the ways in which this occurs. 
Multifirm developed knowledge and routines from their Teknico acquisition 
that explicitly were stated to have been applied in the Comco and Datagon 
acquisitions. However, the Comco acquisition could probably have benefited 
from being treated as separate and different in the Norwegian business. This 
can be interpreted as the acquirer generalizing erroneously from prior 
experiences, assuming that two targets are equal and that the need for 
integration initiatives corresponding. In retrospect, the Comco employees 
expressed that being left as a autonomous unit would have been beneficial to 
their business. However, given that the unit was to be integrated, the 
integration was experienced as too hands-off in terms of integrating 
technology. It appeared that Multifirm applied the integration scheme that 
had worked in the prior Teknico acquisition and that also worked in the 
Datagon acquisition, both relatively similar targets.  
There is no evidence of Multifirm managers performing mitigating or 
mobilizing actions, except the formal integration initiatives targeted to 
human integration. Multifirm considered the Teknico and Datagon 
acquisitions more complicated than the Comco acquisition. As a result they 
may have underestimated the potential for beneficial outcomes in the Comco 
acquisition. Comco was assumed to be an easy target to integrate, relatively 
insignificant both in size and business for the Norwegian operation. As such, 
I argue that the perceived need for interaction and mobilizing and mitigating 
efforts were underestimated. In addressing the Comco-acquisition they 
focused on the Swedish unit, arguing for its importance, correspondingly 
devaluing the Norwegian unit’s importance and potential contribution. 
Comco’s competencies seemed to a large extent to be unrecognized by the 
Multifirm middle management. Multifirm employees implicitly considered 
the target to have a lower status than them on some dimensions, such as 
having small customers and “red numbers”. Comco was expected to follow 
the two preceding acquisitions quietly, and adjust to Multifirm. It would 
seem that the logic of Multifirm’s business, needing a bureaucratic, top-
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down organization, and traditional line manager competencies, was not 
aligned with Comco’s business logic, as they needed more flexibility to deal 
with smaller customers and less standard deliveries. I argue that this 
subsequently led to Multifirm not being able to recognize the potential in 
Comco. 
The Comco acquisition in Norway, turned from being a seemingly 
uncomplicated process with people who were fairly content with being 
acquired, to a situation whereby a large proportion of the unit had resigned. 
Moreover, the competency represented by the Comco employees appeared to 
be underexploited and dispersed in Multifirm. Operationally, the Comco 
managers reported they were not integrated sufficiently to handle their 
customers efficiently, and the potential for the SMB market was reported to 
be unused. There is evidence, both from the Comco employees and from the 
Multifirm employees, that they in retrospect consider there to be unexploited 
potential benefits from the acquisition. This is in terms of competencies 
related to SMB market, consulting skills and project management skills. The 
Comco employees claimed that Multifirm did not sufficiently distinguishing 
the different business Comco provided in the SMB market, from Multifirm 
business that required a large scale approach to customers. As such, they 
were not able to harness the competencies and knowledge of the Comco 
employees.  
Based on the Comco case, I argue that in integration processes where the 
target experiences identity threats subsequent to being organizationally split 
up and integrated into the acquiring firm, the potential for action from these 
identity threats is not triggered. This is because the unit cannot muster the 
energy based on collective organizational identity protection. Thus, by 
keeping the targets distinct, having a prolonged integration phase may 
facilitate collective action and leverage the targets knowledge and 
capabilities.  
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9  Vizcom 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The strategic rationale behind the Vizcom acquisition was to expand 
application services to the local government, distribution and industry 
sectors. In addition, the acquisition was expected to give Multifirm stronger 
customer relationships at a strategic level. Vizcom was the consultancy unit 
in Vizcom MNC, a supplier of IT infrastructure products and services in the 
Nordic region. Vizcom consisted of 241 employees which were transferred 
to Multifirm.  In addition to expertise within technology, Vizcom provided 
Multifirm with competency in project management, system development and 
-integration, and change management. Vizcom was to remain a relatively 
autonomous subsidiary to Multifirm, organized in an application services 
business unit with Source. They were to employ the Multifirm HR systems, 
financial reporting and payroll system and shared support services. There 
were no announced reductions of employees or other cost reducing activities 
for Multifirm in connection with this acquisition. 
9.2 Pre-integration context 
Vizcom had been acquired by Vizcom MNC some years prior to the 
Multifirm acquisition. As a result they had, contrary to Source, both 
experience with being acquired and experience with being owned by a large 
corporation.  Vizcom had developed as a stand-alone IT-consulting firm 
prior to being acquired by Vizcom MNC. Vizcom employees described 
Vizcom’s position and conditions as a Vizcom MNC subsidiary in relatively 
negative terms. They had felt violated in the acquisition by Vizcom MNC; 
and claimed that Vizcom MNC did not understand their business and 
correspondingly did not provide them with the necessary conditions for their 
business. This was described by one Vizcom employee thus: 
“We felt pushed into a box. They (Vizcom MNC) had no 
understanding of our business, we had very different business models 
and very different needs (…) and when the party that is the owner 
perceives that the transaction is an acquisition and not a merger of 
equals, and assume that we were only to adapt to their structures, well 
– then you’re doomed to fail. And we’ve suffered under this…lack of 
understanding in the top management team in Vizcom MNC. They 
never understood what we were doing in Vizcom. The deal was 
communicated as a merger of equals, and then you would expect some 
level of understanding of the business of the other party. You do 
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expect that they’d have some competency and understanding for the 
need for support systems, control model and how to run a consultancy 
firm. That understanding was not there – they pushed us into some 
routines in a support system that did not work for a consultancy 
business. To put it another way, usually support functions and 
administration support deliveries, here it was the other way around. 
The delivery was there for the support functions – that was the culture 
there.” 
The Vizcom employees emphasized that being a unit in Vizcom MNC had 
been detrimental both to their business, and to their image and reputation: 
“Vizcom MNC didn’t have a great reputation. They had lost a lot of 
money and there was a lot of bad press. So a lot of people felt that 
Vizcom got a bad name, because Vizcom MNC had a bad 
reputation.(…) Vizcom had had a good name and people knew what 
we were, prior to the Vizcom MNC acquisition of us”  
Vizcom was divested from Vizcom MNC some months prior to the 
announcement of the Vizcom – Multifirm acquisition. Subsequently, 
Vizcom developed a new logo and reacquired the brand name “Vizcom”, 
which had been its name prior to the Vizcom MNC acquisition, while 
Vizcom was a stand alone. Several options had been discussed formally and 
informally in regards to their organization and ownership. These issues had 
created a substantial amount of optimism and enthusiasm in Vizcom. 
Subsequently, when the acquisition of Vizcom by Multifirm was announced, 
there was some disappointment from the individuals that had anticipated a 
stand-alone firm. A Vizcom consultant explains: 
“Our prior owner had created some expectations among the 
employees, who naturally were disappointed…prior owner, led by the 
CEO had promised that Vizcom would be an employee-owned 
business. People had started thinking about getting their savings 
together and investing it here – and they saw that this case was good. 
There was only one way to go, and that was up – so the fact that some 
people got pissed and left, is not Multifirm’s fault.” 
Despite their negative experience with prior acquisitions, and their 
experience of being mistreated in a large corporation, Vizcom seemed fairly 
positive to the acquisition. Vizcom consultants explained that “Multifirm 
told much the same story as Vizcom MNC had told”, meaning that their new 
owner to a large degree resembled their prior owner. However, even though 
Vizcom employees seemed apprehensive, they did not raise many negative 
issues initially. The issues that were raised were related to the type of 
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business Multifirm was, the type of organization and the role that Vizcom 
would have in this structure.  
Vizcom’s employees emphasized that they were experienced and well-
educated consultants. They asserted that the majority of them had master’s 
degrees and that they worked “academically” compared to the rest of 
Multifirm. They described their own organization as agile and fast-paced. 
Vizcom employees perceive Multifirm as a solid and well-running 
organization. However, they also saw Multifirm as resistant to change and 
slow-paced. This contributes to the portrayal of Multifirm’s image as dull 
and boring. Some Vizcom consultants explain: 
“Multifirm is a “sturdy” organization. The average age is high. It is 
not very agile. (…)They don’t turn around very quickly”.   
 “Multifirm is not sexy. They have an exceptionally boring logo. A 
really bureaucratic design – went out of date ages ago. (…) they have 
not kept up with the times. There really is a job to be done there. 
Incredibly unsexy. Vizcom has a much sexier name and cooler logo.” 
This lack of identifying with Multifirm is not only related to their image per 
se, but is also directed to the type of business they do. Vizcom was described 
as a consulting firm that was “higher in the value chain” than Multifirm’s 
other business. Many Vizcom employees emphasized that this gave Vizcom 
a relative higher status as an organization and as an employer than 
Multifirm. The Vizcom consultants emphasized the contrast and differences 
between Multifirm’s and their own business: 
“It has to do with identity. People want to be part of something that 
they can identify with, both the name and culturally, a consulting firm 
is something totally different from a large provider, like Multifirm.”  
Even though many of the Vizcom consultants seemed to perceive 
Multifirm’s status as lower on some dimensions, others focused on the 
possibilities related to being employees in a larger system and in a 
financially solid firm. One Vizcom consultant explained that the acquisition 
by Multifirm was a reason for her staying with Vizcom: 
“I actually quit my job, because Vizcom MNC were doing really 
badly, we actually though they would go bankrupt. So I quit to start in 
another consultancy firm, but during the three months – then this issue 
with Multifirm and Vizcom emerged, so I withdrew my resignation, 
because all of a sudden the situation was totally different. I also 
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withdrew because the offer to be in charge of a group, it sounded very 
exciting. It was a unique opportunity.” 
Initially, respondents revealed that there had been some relatively intense 
discussions concerning Vizcom’s logo and brand. This caused some 
disruption early in the integration process. Many of Vizcom’s consultants 
explained that they had spent considerable time and effort during the 
previous six months, preparing Vizcom’s new logo and designing business 
cards, letterheads etc. The logo did in a way represent their emancipation 
and status as an autonomous firm. These issues will be described below. As 
the Vizcom consultants perceived that they would be able to remain 
relatively autonomous, Multifirm’s perceived lower status did not cause 
further disruptions or identity threats.  
9.3 Post-acquisition integration 
The prospect of becoming an employee owned firm, independent of a large 
owner, had created enthusiasm in Vizcom, and the announcement of the 
acquisition triggered some ambiguities and misunderstandings with regards 
to the degree of autonomy and integration. In light of this employees were 
somewhat apprehensive about being acquired by Multifirm. However, 
despite the initial disappointment in the fact that there would be no employee 
buy-out, and the fact that they felt that there were some similarities between 
Vizcom MNC and Multifirm as acquirers, they also saw some positive sides 
to being acquired by Multifirm. A Vizcom employees accounts for his initial 
reactions to the announcement of the acquisition: 
“Multifirm told a pretty good story, I think. Vizcom was to remain a 
brand and a separate organization, with the same CEO and same 
structure. And really it was, we got the impression it was more of a 
financial acquisition”. 
Vizcom employees thought Multifirm was “telling a good story”, and there 
seemed to be an understanding that the objectives and consequences of this 
acquisition would be different from previous acquisitions. Furthermore, the 
contingencies for their business in Multifirm would be different than in 
Vizcom MNC. Nevertheless, there were some ambiguities concerning the 
mode and degree of integration: 
“When we were told that our business was a new focus area for 
Multifirm, that they were to build around Vizcom, that we were to 
provide the foundation for that business, that people thought was 
great. But many employees were asking themselves – are we to be an 
independent firm or not? Because historically we have been 
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independent, and that is important to many of us. But Multifirm 
emphasized that – and that is positive. Many were afraid it would be 
like the last time we were acquired, because Multifirm and Vizcom 
MNC did look a lot alike” 
Even though there seemed to be a unanimous focus on autonomy in the 
business case and on the strategic level, when the operationalization of the 
acquisition started, some of these issues had not been communicated or 
understood in the rest of the Multifirm organization. This created some 
conflicts around branding, as illustrated by the following quote:  
“People were a little surprised and a little put out in that meeting, 
when they realized that we were going to have Multifirm business 
cards and all that, because we’d pictured going back to the old days, 
when we were only Vizcom.” 
There were substantial ambiguities surrounding issues of operationalization 
of mode and level of integration. Vizcom employees explain their feeling of 
being exposed to integration routines as if they were to be processually and 
organizationally integrated into Multifirm, and the ambiguity surrounding 
these integration issues: 
“This is an organization that is used to acquiring – they have routines 
for it. But they are set – this is how we do it at Multifirm. And they do 
not listen to the input of others because they keep thinking: Multifirm, 
Multifirm, Multifirm as a unit. But Vizcom is actually to remain a 
separate firm, so this whole thing is not clear-cut, because it is a 
double message.” 
Multifirm was explained to have experience in acquiring and integrating 
acquisitions, and to have developed systems and processes designed to 
integrate and unify. However, my findings indicate that these processes and 
systems are not well aligned to address the integration issues represented by 
targets like Vizcom. The generalizing from prior integration processes to 
these cases is incompatible with the characteristics of the targets and the 
degree and mode of integration. Even though the top management team of 
Multifirm was aware of this, the degree to which Vizcom and Source were to 
be treated differently from the other targets and how to integrate these 
acquisitions was not properly communicated throughout the Multifirm 
organization. More specifically this materializes in particular in relation to 
branding, recruiting and presenting the firm, and to what degree Vizcom or 
Multifirm is emphasized in communication with customers and potential 
employees: 
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“Ok – so we have chosen to co-brand – cool enough, but it’s not 
goddamn cool with that logo in black (the Vizcom logo). I mean, 
you’re allowed to use your head. When you put an ad in the 
paper…you should have known the story…don’t know if you saw the 
ad – it’s a long story. In Multifirm they’ve been used to buying firms 
and pushing them into the great Multifirm structure, (…) but this is 
something totally different. We are a separate legal entity, with a 
board of directors on top, and yet they keep relating to us as if we’d 
been integrated into their system. (…) the first draft of the ad said that 
Multifirm was looking for consultants – when I first saw it I thought – 
who actually needs people…you couldn’t see that it actually was 
Vizcom that was looking for people.” 
Even one year into the integration process, people mention the co-branding 
strategy, not as a failure as a concept, but rather because the logo itself is 
disliked: 
“Now it is Multifirm in one corner and Vizcom in the other. I don’t 
know how successful it is. But often you do like this in a transition. 
When you do a co-branding it is because you have plans to do 
something later. So - there is something there. But I don’t know. (…) 
It’s …in a transition - not to lose the brand value, which implies that 
they have plans to do something later. But a lot of people are not 
content with it. (….) The only thing I keep thinking is that esthetically 
it doesn’t look good. They are so different these logos. (…) 
Multifirm’s logo is incredibly sad. And really old – the colors a little 
faded, kind of worn-out”  
Even though the upper echelons in Multifirm were aware that Vizcom 
represented a different type of acquisition, that needed a somewhat different 
integration approach, this knowledge, or the operationalization of this 
knowledge had not been sufficiently cascaded down the Multifirm 
organization. The support functions with responsibilities for different aspects 
of the formal integration process were not sufficiently sensitive to these 
issues and this created some initial noise. A Vizcom consultant explains: 
“They run over us a little and don’t really listen. People here feel that 
they have important points of views that are ignored. They give the 
impression that they’ve done this before, and that they have routines 
for how to do it”  
Even though Multifirm is described as a large bureaucratic structure that has 
constraining and controlling functions for Vizcom, most employees 
described Multifirm as a more lenient mother than Vizcom MNC: 
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“There was a tighter integration in Vizcom MNC’s infrastructure than 
here. We are allowed to exist on the side on some issues. Things are 
adapted for us. For example we got our own installed base and log on 
zone outside of Multifirm’s. We have different work hours, vacation 
arrangements” 
The tension between the need for autonomy and the need for integration and 
control is to a large extent materialized through disputes about branding and 
customer control. Vizcom employees felt that the Multifirm organization 
imposed on them in terms of client contact. 
“We do bring some pretty attractive clients for them (…) there were 
some who thought they’d have a free trip, and they tried to put some 
gate keepers on the top, and said that now you are under Multifirm 
and you have to adapt, and we need to control your clients. They tried 
to gain control over big clients. But it hasn’t really amounted to 
anything.” 
This feeling of interference by the Multifirm organization is perceived as 
illegitimate. Vizcom employees explain that their primary focus is on 
Vizcom’s profitability and Vizcom’s goals, and that these are not necessarily 
aligned with contributing to what is beneficial for Multifirm. As such they 
assert that what they would like is to perform “business as usual” with as 
little interference from Multifirm as possible in their daily operations. 
However, Vizcom managers report that they follow up the formal 
management initiatives from Multifirm, and that being loyal to these does 
not represent any obstacles for their business: 
“We have the decision-structure, you have the control systems here, 
we are in a type of business review once a month with the CEO and 
co, so you get the corporate guidelines properly imposed upon us and 
communicated. Then there are these common processes with the HCI, 
VCI and employee development conversations. And this co-branding 
part, these are the things that pull us into the Multifirm system.” 
“We have the best of both worlds. Full, or a great deal of freedom to 
run our business, as long as we deliver. And that is the threat.” 
Another issue that kept emerging was the IT systems. Vizcom consultants 
emphasized that the systems were not aligned with the type of business that 
Vizcom performed. In addition they experienced that they did not get the 
support they felt they were entitled to from the Multifirm system: 
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“But the architecture is not good…the set-up of the computers just 
doesn’t fit. If you call help-desk, and say you’re Vizcom, then – no, 
don’t know anything about that – can’t help you.” 
Managers in Vizcom seemed to be performing mitigating actions. To a large 
extent the managers reported that they did not like the co-branding strategy, 
that Multifirm reporting routines were not adapted to Vizcom business, or 
that they were not happy with the IT-support functions of Multifirm. In 
communicating with their employees, they did seem to protect them from 
this organizational “noise”. In other words they performed mitigating 
actions, to keep the employees focused on their tasks, thus remaining loyal 
to Multifirm decisions and integration initiatives. However, they also 
described how they, through own initiatives, in specific incidents, found 
ways around the system, that allowed for both satisfied consultants without 
not really compromising loyalty to Multifirm demands. An example is 
provided by a Vizcom manager, who emphasizes that even though Vizcom 
in general follows Multifirm instructions, certain incidents call for 
flexibility: 
“What am I supposed to tell people? You have to get an Ericsson 
phone – those are the rules? No - I say “buy yourself a Nokia and put 
it on your travel expenses”. I don’t want people to get pissed off 
unnecessarily because of a cell phone or some other administrative 
stuff. We need to find solutions, if not they quit, and then we’ve lost” 
In addition, Multifirm managers provided opportunities for mobilizing and 
mitigating actions. They provided Vizcom with the necessary leeway and 
flexibility. The constant struggle between autonomy and integration seems to 
be the seedbed for exchange between the target and acquirer. Below these 
struggles are contrasted with the situation in their prior owner: 
“In Vizcom MNC a lot of time was stolen from us, no matter how 
many hours I worked, it was never enough. We were pulled into 
administrative processes and management processes. Multifirm takes 
very little of our time. Of course, we have the reporting structure…but 
still we don’t spend two days a week on internal Multifirm issues. 
Multifirm has been good like that, Vizcom MNC were horrible”. 
“Multifirm was very professional in selling the acquisition to us, they 
were very professional in preparing things, but they have been 
incredibly clumsy in implementation, particularly in IT-issues. The 
fact of the matter is that even 12 months after we moved in here, 
things are not settled.” 
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As such both the Vizcom and Multifirm managers performed mobilizing 
actions, in trying to link Multifirm activities to Vizcom’s. In the example 
below the Vizcom managers took the initiative, but as described above, they 
were surprised by the Multifirm employees’ proactiveness and interest in 
their business. 
 “We made the initiative to have a meeting with Multifirm. We wanted 
to hear about Multifirm, and what customers they had in trade and 
industry. Vizcom isn’t really in that market, so that was our concern. 
It was me and Tom, and I represented consulting (…) now our agenda 
was to hear how Vizcom could move into those industries with our 
deliveries, however, but they wanted to hear about Vizcom. We were 
caught a little off guard, in a good sense…They were very hungry to 
know about us and our customers (…) and I think it is because they 
work on a different level in the value-chain than us, we work a little 
higher in the value chain (…) we have established contacts between 
salespeople and consultants after this, so it was a very positive 
experience.” 
Vizcom managers describe how their focus and motivation to meet their 
financial performance measures to secure autonomy and avoid further 
integration in Multifirm, maintained a focus on risk averse, short-term 
billable hours. This was instead of investing resources in project acquisition 
with Multifirm. The motivation for mobilizing efforts from the Vizcom 
organization seems not to be sufficient. 
“And our evaluation was that we’d spend way too much time, read: 
resources to write a proposal. And the risk…well, one: we wouldn’t 
meet the budget this year, and would have to use billable resources to 
write the offer. And two: we would use so much capacity on this offer 
that other initiatives would be neglected, so three: if we didn’t win the 
contract it would have cost me, and the loss would be all ours – so our 
answer was, no sorry!” 
These evaluations were made by the Vizcom management. In doing so, and 
as they are aware, they might be suboptimalizing in terms of overall 
performance for Multifirm. However, for Vizcom it is the optimal way to do 
business. Isolated for Vizcom, concerning their performance measures, these 
actions are rational and profit maximizing.  
“But we could have achieved more of this; maybe we could have 
helped Multifirm, as well. (…) We could have won new contracts, and 
managed it better. Now I am contradicting us wanting to be an 
autonomous unit, but it is a question – on the one hand what you get 
by granting us the freedom that we have is us strictly doing what’s 
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good for our business, optimalizing for our business.  But on the other 
hand, this can be considered suboptimalization.” 
There were some ambiguities in terms of authority structures and norms for 
decision making. Some Vizcom employees seemed to take advantage of this 
ambiguity by asking for forgiveness rather than permission in making 
decisions.  
“There are corporate policies in many areas – there are thick books 
that describe what is allowed and what isn’t allowed. For example – 
you have the famous security handbook that everyone refers to, that 
describes a lot of things, but no decision has been made in regards to 
which parts actually pertain to us. (…) and are we to adhere to all the 
regulations in the handbook, we might as well just shut down.” 
The mitigating actions performed by the Vizcom managers pertain to 
facilitating consulting work in a perceived inflexible decision structure: 
“We know that large cases, the ones that primarily go though the 
decision hierarchy; there is a given amount that requires decision 
meetings we never cheat there. But there are some more fuzzy 
borders, regarding TCV, or total contract value, and if we sell a 
consultant for a year, that’s 1,5 million, if we sell 2 consultants for a 
year, we’re above that limit, so principally that is in conflict with the 
decision matrix, even though there is no risk – so that we treat 
flexibly.” 
Vizcom consultants were to a large extent protected from the disruptive 
effects of the implemented integration mechanisms. Their managers 
expressed that they worked hard to mitigate. In terms of mobilizing to link 
activities and customers, this seemed to be done on a project basis. Some of 
the issues encountered are rooted in trying to align different business models 
of consulting and IT-services.  
9.4 Acquisition performance 
The Vizcom acquisition was reported to have performed according to the 
business case, and even better. The performance here relates to benefits 
accruing to Vizcom and to Multifirm. In terms of benefits to Vizcom, the 
main benefit was Vizcom gaining access to new customers through two 
mechanisms, first through cross-sales to existing Multifirm customers, and 
secondly through Vizcom being a Multifirm subsidiary, which gave Vizcom 
leverage and made them a safer choice for their customers since they had a 
solid mother backing them. As one manager in Vizcom expressed:  
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“And in a number of cases Multifirm really helps us. They have a 
financial size and solidity in the market, Vizcom alone would have 
been a little too slim. In some cases it is a benefit for us, if it is a large 
case, (…) that Multifirm fronts the offer to the customer, while we 
deliver resources to them” 
“There is a great deal of synergies for us being a part of Multifirm, 
and that we have several customers in common. Many of us have 
gotten new projects through Multifirm. On the consulting side we have 
been supplied with a lot of business from them.” 
There were some issues in the acquisition process that generated some 
negative outcomes. First, there were several problems related to IT-systems 
needed for the Vizcom consultants to work efficiently. One Vizcom manager 
explains how this impacts Vizcom: 
“So when the consultant sits there, and isn’t able to do anything, it 
has two consequences, one is that the interface they see to Multifirm 
isn’t working, and that is unnecessary - they get really annoyed. And 
two, the management in Vizcom appear to be pretty powerless, who 
have no way of dealing with it. So – it’s like a double negative really.” 
Not only did these issues cause disruption and unsatisfied consultants, it 
resulted in consultants not being able to do their job, lost earnings and a 
negative image of Multifirm. But it could, according to a Vizcom manager, 
have been avoided: 
“Multifirm could have made it easier on themselves if they had made 
it work and prioritized, because it is about prioritizing, to make a 
small hot-dog stand like Vizcom with 220 employees up and running – 
it’s not exceedingly difficult if you really want to. The consequences 
are millions in lost earnings, and a loss of reputation.” 
However, the general feeling about the acquisition was that it had been a 
success: 
 “This is a good story. Multifirm has lived up to their promises. The 
firm has made money, created value for Multifirm. At least seen 
compared to the price they paid for Vizcom. And the employees are 
pretty happy; we just did the HCI and came out pretty good.” 
In evaluating the performance of the Vizcom acquisition, Multifirm 
managers focused on the reasonable price they paid for Vizcom, and the fact 
that the market for IT-consulting services had been good. They also reported 
customer relationships and common projects with Vizcom: 
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 “We got Vizcom relatively cheaply, considering the key figures, so 
related to that it has been a successful acquisition. (…) They have 
made a valuable contribution to enhance Multifirm’s customer 
relationships” 
 “The acquisition has given us what we hoped for, not what we 
expected, what we actually hoped for.” 
“Vizcom has opened some customer doors to us, but primarily it has 
been consulting. Things we have not delivered earlier. (…) we are 
starting to see better cooperation across the units, and there are 
customers we can have a dialogue with now that we didn’t have 
access to before.” 
The Vizcom acquisition exceeded the expectations in the business case that 
Multifirm had developed for the acquisition. In terms of benefits accruing to 
the target, the Vizcom managers reported of gaining new customers through 
Multifirm, but also of access to new customers because they now had a solid 
owner, and they were not tainted by the poor image and reputation of 
Vizcom MNC. They reported that a substantial amount of their sales after 
the acquisition came from Multifirm customers, which was in addition to the 
work they charged to Multifirm.  
9.5 Conclusion and analysis 
The price paid for Vizcom was reported to have been relatively low. This, 
combined with a good market for Vizcom’s services, yielded performance 
according to the business case, “and beyond” as Multifirm top executives 
expressed. My findings indicate that serendipitous outcomes were created in 
this acquisition, both to the acquiring firm and the target. The evidence 
points to benefits accruing to the target in the form of attractiveness as 
employer. This is critical for Vizcom, especially when the market is good 
and the demand for competent consultants high. In addition, Vizcom 
reported easier access to customers through Multifirm, via two mechanisms. 
Firstly, 10 % of their business came from Multifirm customers. Secondly, 
Vizcom managers reported that by getting a financially sound mother 
backing them, they obtained increased legitimacy for larger contracts.   
Vizcom had a history of acquisitions, and had experienced these as 
detrimental to their business. Prior to being acquired by Multifirm, they had 
been allowed autonomy, developed their own brand, and it was insinuated 
that it was conceivable to remain as an independent firm. The acquisition 
appeared as a setback and, as some Vizcom employees said, as a repeat of 
prior acquisitions. The ambiguities surrounding branding and integration, 
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contributed to some initial friction immediately following the announcement 
of the acquisition. I argue that the causes of this friction are complex. First, 
Multifirm had changed integration strategy from the previous integrations. 
However, this strategy was neither sufficiently and unambiguously 
operationalized nor communicated to the parts of the organization 
responsible for tactical integration. This resulted in conflicting messages to 
the target from the top management and the support functions of Multifirm. 
While the former promised close to full autonomy and independence, the 
latter presented policies that were perceived to imply tighter integration, loss 
of autonomy and erosion of demarcations between the units. Secondly, the 
announcement threatened Vizcom’s prior identity as a consulting firm of 
higher status, and combined with their prior experience of detrimental 
integration processes, resulted in defensive behavior.  
The linking of activities and the proactive behavior from Multifirm in the 
Vizcom acquisition can be explained by the fact that they perceived them to 
have valuable knowledge, customer relationships and competency. They 
performed mobilizing actions that had not been evident in their prior 
acquisitions; these were in part perceived by Vizcom to be intrusive, and as 
unnecessary meddling with their business. The Multifirm initiatives were not 
backed by financial incentives. The incentives driving Vizcom actions 
encouraged short term, billable work for existing customers, rather than 
investing in larger and time consuming sales efforts with Multifirm.  
The Vizcom organizational identity was initially challenged in the 
ambiguous first phase of the post-acquisition integration. However, tensions 
seemed to be resolved through Vizcom management performing mitigating 
actions. The Vizcom managers did to a large protect the employees from 
headquarter control and impositions. At the same time, despite the efforts 
from Multifirm that were perceived as Multifirm controlling, Vizcom did 
express that they were given a great deal of freedom in Multifirm. The 
consultants from Vizcom were described as proactive and enterprising, thus 
likely to be performing mobilizing actions themselves.  
Based on the Vizcom acquisition I argue that in integration processes where 
there is intended autonomy, ambiguity in relations to integration 
operationalization may cause defensive attitudes initially. However, the 
efforts to remain distinct from the acquirer may drive the target to mitigate 
and mobilize and thus create benefits to both target and acquirer. At the 
same time acquiring firms that consider the target to have high status and 
knowledge will seek interaction with these and perform mobilizing actions 
resulting in further benefits accruing to both parties in the post-acquisition 
integration process.  
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10 Source 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The acquisition of Source provided Multifirm with an ERP solutions offer to 
the Scandinavian market. The deal consisted of Multifirm acquiring 100 % 
of the shares in Source in Norway and Sweden, and 63 % of the shares in the 
Danish subsidiary. Managers and key personnel in Source were contractually 
committed to Multifirm for 24 months. The CEO of Source remained the 
same post-acquisition. Together with the Vizcom acquisition Source was to 
provide Multifirm with an entry to the application services market. After the 
acquisition had taken place, the ERP solutions unit of Vizcom of 
approximately 40 people was transferred to Source. The two targets, Vizcom 
and Source, were organized in application services. However, they were to 
be run as separate units.   
10.2 Pre-integration context  
Source had been a stand-alone IT-consulting firm established about 6 years 
prior to the acquisition by Multifirm. One of the managers involved in the 
start-up of Source explained it as an experiment: 
“When we started Source it was primarily an experiment, testing what 
would happen to the productivity of a firm if we let the employees own 
the firm, as opposed to being consultants in a large firm with US, 
German or Norwegian owners…passive financial owners…and that 
experiment arose after some of us had been badly treated in large 
organizations like this.”   
The employees of Source considered themselves to be consultants, and 
emphasized how their business was qualitatively different from Multifirm’s, 
emphasizing the importance of customer relationships and the necessary 
business focus to perform their work.  
“We are consultants, with a customer across the table from us, and 
not a computer. We do work with IT – but we work in projects” 
As consultants the employees are expected to be proactive and take charge, 
issues of individual level autonomy were raised by many of the consultants. 
Source employees emphasize their individual autonomy and decision 
making power, and how these are necessary to achieve their business goals: 
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“If I have a good idea, I just say that that ball’s mine! And I take it 
and run. If I’d like to get a new concept to a customer, it’s just to do it. 
If I want to arrange some escapades for a customer – there are no 
formal approval procedures…if there are expenses related to it, you 
need to inform, preferably in advance…but it’s not a crisis…so – 
you’re your own boss. The projects and customers run our everyday 
business, apart from that I do as I please - I have full freedom under 
responsibility.”  
The creation of the Source spirit and “strong” organizational culture is an 
important issue underpinning the stories told by the Source employees. Both 
the managers and the consultants were explicit about how Source was very 
distinct from other firms, and how this distinct culture and identity was 
necessary to remain competitive. They expressed that Source had strong 
focus on activities and social events as an important vehicle for the creation 
of this culture: 
“Today our consultants are out working with 39 clients. Singapore, 
Houston, Ålesund, Bergen…if we don’t make sure we have a bonfire 
for them to gather around every Friday evening, and tell their stories, 
so that they feel they work in Source…that’s where their loyalty needs 
to lie. You bill the clients…as a consultant it’s easy to be too nice to 
your client, and your chargeability drops. The only way to secure this 
– is to develop a strong identity.”  
However, how internalized and important these events are for the 
organization is hard to discern. Source was described as having a strong 
culture, and through these descriptions the firm emerged as a strong locus of 
identification. The employees of Source portrayed their firm as a special 
firm, and distinguished Source from the rest of Multifirm. One manager 
characterized these social events not only as a mechanism for creating a 
feeling of belonging to the organization, but also as a mechanism for 
encouraging employees to contribute to the achievement of Source goals.  
”We arrange totally insane…first and foremost so that people tell 
each other stories. They tell Cowboy and Indian stories, we’ve been to 
Dubai, we’ve been to Africa and driven motorcycles in the bush. We 
do some absurd things…we’ve bet with the employees that if they 
make our budgets then I’ll make sure they get to eat dinner with 
Nelson Mandela. They believe it. And if they make the budget I’ll just 
have to handle Nelson Mandela.”  
Attitudes towards being acquired varied. The acquisition provided the 
employees with shares in Source with a large sum of money, and this 
transaction seemed to have caused some mistrust about the individual Source 
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manager’s motive behind the acquisition. However, the fact that they would 
be provided with a strong financial owner, and that it was communicated 
from both the management in Source and in Multifirm that they would 
remain autonomous, made employees perceive the deal as positive. The 
employees did not at all seem to perceive that being acquired contributed to 
a power-differential, with the target as the underdog, between Source and 
Multifirm. They emphasized Source being in charge of the transaction and 
the integration: 
“We were brought in to be the frontrunner for Multifirm (…) it’s not 
that we had to sell, or that we were so cheap. That was not the case, 
so we can stand up straight, we’ve built something in Source that 
people were willing to pay good money for, and we’re proud of that. 
We chose to be acquired.”  
However, autonomy issues were important to the Source employees. This 
was both in terms of individual decision power, but also in terms of Source 
being allowed to develop their strategy and keep their distinctive features. 
The descriptions of Multifirm from the initial interviews show a unanimous 
perception of Multifirm as a bureaucratic, “sturdy” organization.  
“Multifirm’s average age is high. There has been a low turnover rate 
for their employees. And what we are bringing to the party is an 
average age of 35, so our experience and goals are different. Our 
speed is different. We are…well, we are used to accepting 80%. That 
it is better to have 80 % in one week, than 100 in 3 months. So here 
we have some challenges…they are a little slow – I don’t want to say 
more than that – there’s nothing we can do about it. You can only pull 
a 50-year old so far…” 
 The differences relate to the type of business, the competencies they have, 
the organizational culture, and demographic differences, such as age. Some 
Source employees explain the differences in speed and individual 
proactiveness through the performance management systems in place at 
Source, and the lack of these in Multifirm: 
“The largest cultural difference is that Source consultants are 
measured and rewarded based on their performance. A much larger 
proportion of our salary is not fixed. It depends on speed and 
deliveries. While in Multifirm, under middle management – there 
really is no performance management. That does something to your 
patience. If you have a fixed salary, then you might be more 8 to 4 
oriented than we are.” 
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“There’s a huge potential cultural crash with Multifirm. When we 
approach their offices, we notice there’s a lot more spiderwebs; at 
least that is what we think we see. And we need to handle it. It’s 
exciting – a meeting of two very different cultures.”  
In the Source acquisition it was understood from the beginning that the firm 
was to be kept a separate legal unit. That is, the support functions of Source 
would be tied to the support functions in Multifirm. The sales resources were 
to remain in Source. Multifirm’s financial reporting and payroll systems 
were to be implemented. The firm was co-located after some months at 
Multifirm headquarters. This was planned to happen at a speed that did not 
interfere with business as usual for Source.  
The employees at Source had argued for their distinctiveness and their need 
for autonomy, and also seemed to have trust in Sources independence and 
autonomy after the acquisition. Source is described by its managers and 
employees as possessing a strong culture, and as a firm that they are proud of 
and seem to identify with. They described their status to be high, secure and 
not challenged by the acquisition. They strongly emphasized their 
distinctiveness from what they perceived to be the business, organizational 
culture and characteristics of Multifirm. The acquisition was perceived to not 
have a large impact on how they would run their business. In other words, 
the employees seemed secure in that they would remain autonomous. As 
such the acquisition did not seem to threaten who they were or what they 
would become.  
10.3 Post-acquisition integration 
After the announcement of the deal ambiguity around autonomy issues 
seemed to spark discussions around what autonomy actually meant in 
practice for Source. There were discussions around Source’s logo and 
branding, as an important sign of their distinctiveness from Multifirm. The 
argument from Source was that the Multifirm logo was not appealing: 
“The profiling thing is important. We have to accept that Source’s 
profile changes. To something a little more legitimate and boring, and 
unfortunately those two go together. We have to try to shut up about 
their logo not being very stylish. But I tell them: it looks like a candy 
wrapper, it is not cool, the name stinks, go to a UK client and say 
you’re from Multifirm – it doesn’t work. But it’s a cultural thing - we 
know we’re going to lose.”  
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“The Swedes hate it – I hate it too, but I don’t say anything. Above all 
else it is an incredibly sad logo. It is a sad name, when you approach 
an international client with Multifirm – they say – what’s that?” 
Even though there were some initial discussions around the logo, this did not 
seem to be disruptive to the organization. The degree of integration was not 
seen as problematic. The Source employees explained that they complied 
with efforts to assert head quarter control. However, the Multifirm 
requirements and impositions were ridiculed and stories of these efforts were 
used to describe Multifirm’s bureaucratic structure and “red tape”: 
“Once in a while some bureaucrat calls nagging us. They send us 
some of these personnel surveys  -“ can you find out how good the 
managers are” – it’s important not to get caught up in those 
ridiculous things – they could drive you crazy. Now we’ve had this 
amusing management survey. We laugh and have fun with it. This one 
was about how efficient you are as a leader. They bombarded us on an 
e-mail system, to test how we prioritize; I sat here thinking that here’s 
some psychologist having a field day.” 
The put-down humor seemed to play an important role in protecting 
Source’s distinctiveness. It was a way of handling the constraints and 
demands of Multifirm. Even though Source managers explained that they 
complied with Multifirm, they also ignored and shielded their business from 
what some described as a “time-wasting meeting culture in Multifirm”.  For 
example, integration mechanisms such as employee information meetings or 
gatherings to mobilize competency across the firms were not prioritized. 
This was in some instances even institutionalized via Source sending a 
representative to all-employee information meetings to bring back any 
relevant information: 
“I haven’t been to the information meetings, but it’s one of those 
things we feel do not concern us. And we do get notes from the 
meeting. We have representatives that do attend and make notes for 
Source use, so we get to know what’s going on.” 
“Then these old farts from Multifirm showed up (at the information 
meeting), older men in boring suits – just a confirmation of all our 
prejudices.” 
The Source employees emphasized that the integration of Vizcom’s ERP 
business into Source is not something they really appreciated. They 
described Vizcom’s ERP consultants as less experienced than them.  
Allegedly Vizcom had a large proportion of inexperienced, young trainees. 
This raised some concerns as to their competencies and whether or not 
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Vizcom would have to use a lot of resources on guiding inexperienced 
trainees. In addition, they expressed that the decision to merge the units was 
made without their consent: 
“What I react most negatively to is that it is obvious that we are not in 
the driver’s seat. We do not decide if and when Vizcom is to be 
merged with us. It was decided by Multifirm, I think.” 
Some concerns were also raised about Source’s autonomy. Some informants 
expressed that they thought Source had been naive in their approach to 
Multifirm, is that they were not as autonomous as they would like to think, 
and that even though they believed they could decide their own destiny, they 
were actually more dependent on Multifirm than they would care to admit: 
“Multifirm is more experienced and in a different league than us, so 
when we say internally here that we are in control, and that if we 
don’t want to move to their offices we don’t have to, that if we don’t 
want Vizcom merged with us – then they won’t…that Source will be 
the flagship, our clients won’t have to deal with Multifirm, but that 
they’ll just be financial investor backing us…that definitely isn’t the 
case. And I honestly think that is what they thought here. (…) I think 
they (Multifirm) are smarter than us like that, and it’s taken some time 
before they (managers of Source) have understood that here.” 
Some Source consultants also questioned whether the acquisition was a good 
move from Multifirm’s side. They acknowledged Source consultants’ 
possibly inflated egos and that this combined with the constraints on 
autonomy possibly posed by Multifirm could be detrimental to the 
performance of the acquisition: 
“I don’t know (if it was a good idea for Multifirm to buy Source). I 
think – I don’t know when they will make a profit on it. We are a 
spoiled bunch, we have experienced several very good years – and we 
think we’re pretty good at what we do. And many of us feel that we 
can leave here tomorrow and start our own business, and charge 2 
mill a year. It probably isn’t that easy, but many of us have a strong 
faith in our own abilities. So there’s a question about hanging on to 
the organization. After our lock-in runs out – the chances are that a 
group leaves with the best consultants – and that would be a 
problem.” 
A year and a half after the announcement of the deal, some consultants, both 
individually, and in groups left the firm. The job market for ERP services 
was good, and hence so was the job market for the Source consultants: 
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 “That’s the challenge, when you buy a firm where the only value is 
whatever is in the employees head. You can only hope that the culture 
is strong enough to keep it together. And it looks like…well it has 
started to fall apart a little.”  
“There are so many people out to steal our employees., they see that 
things are happening here, and figure it would be a good time to take 
off with someone from Source, because they haven’t been able to do 
that the last 6 years. The headhunters were told not to waste time on 
Source, because nobody would leave the firm, we thought that was 
cool. But now tons of people are calling, and we put a password on 
the list of employees on the web, because it was madness, we had to 
protect our employees from all these phone calls.” 
Some described that people were leaving the firm, not necessarily because of 
the acquisition, but rather because Source had grown into a substantially 
larger firm, with the routines and structures implied by that. Respondents 
explained that a couple of groups of consultants had collectively left the 
firm. At one point 11 employees resigned, however, a few of them were 
brought back. Employee retention was an explicit key success factor for 
successful acquisition. As key employees and managers were contractually 
tied to Multifirm for a period of time, retaining key personnel was initially 
not a problem. It was more a matter of dealing with the perceptions of the 
employees who weren’t contractually bound and at the same time had not 
made money on the acquisition themselves: 
“Half the firm has a lock-in period. It’s imperative that we go full 
throttle. That the people who now have gotten a pretty large number 
of million into their accounts don’t become laid back and lazy. We 
have to be an example and go for it. That the employees see that we 
will be around. I am not quitting. So that has to be known in the 
organization. We can’t show up with flashy cars…that’s why I’m 
picking up a scooter today, it’s an adaptation to working here. If they 
won’t give me a parking space…” 
The employees of Source described the Multifirm HR personnel responsible 
for the post-acquisition integration phases and the marketing department as 
conserving forces in relation to the integration processes. HR’s focus was 
described to be on effective and efficient integration. This meant aligning 
and implementing personnel benefits, retirement pensions, tariff agreements, 
communicating new branding and marketing strategies etc. Multifirm’s prior 
acquisitions had involved aligning and homogenizing very tightly integrated 
targets. Source respondents expressed that it did not seem that the 
background for the Source acquisition, the autonomy granted to Source, and 
how this autonomy was to be operationalized was clearly communicated to 
 121
the support functions of Multifirm. Instead, they were aiming for the 
systematized, quality approved one way to do integration. Source, in that 
regard posed a challenge, as one HR employee explains: 
“I remember being very skeptical to the fact that they were to be kept 
separate. It was hard for us in HR to imagine how to make this work. 
Well, they were to be co-located here, but not have any of the …other 
things, but I see now that it was a good choice. They have a very 
different culture, and they were very set on being left in peace. But the 
question is how much alone, and for how long?” 
After the initial ambiguities regarding the integration efforts, it seemed that 
Multifirm provided the opportunities for Source managers to perform 
mitigating actions and pace the integration as they saw fit. As one Source 
manager recalls: 
“Multifirm made some very wise moves, by not nagging us to move 
out here for example. We were allowed to be in peace on our location 
up until January 21, and then it was we who decided it was time to 
move closer to our mother” 
Source management performed mitigating actions by protecting their 
employees from disruption. For example, they protected them from 
headquarter controls by using humor in dealing with administrative control 
issues. However, Multifirm provided the slack and autonomy for these 
mitigating actions by being lenient and acknowledging the importance of 
Source remaining autonomous. This included allowing Source to carry on 
with some of their extravagant social events and leeway to judge when the 
timing for the move to Multifirm headquarters was optimal. 
The mobilizing actions from both Multifirm and Source were conducted 
through projects. Both parties describe projects that were part of larger 
efforts initiated strategically, in particular one large joint effort towards the 
government sector. This effort was dependent on both units’ competencies, 
that is Multifirm’s government sector competency and Source’s ERP 
competency. This effort included large investments from Multifirm, and 
allowed Source to recruit new consultants. There were also smaller efforts as 
a result of more bottom-up processes, such as when managers in a more 
operational positions initiated contact across the firms.  
10.4 Acquisition performance 
The Source acquisition was reported to have performed in accordance with 
the business case. The market for consulting services in general and the 
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demand for Sources services were increasing. As one manager in Multifirm 
put it “it was an extremely well timed acquisition”. The competency of 
Source’s employees was reported to have been used in settings that had not 
been anticipated. In addition Source employees claimed that their spirit and 
culture had “rubbed off” on Multifirm, and given Multifirm something to 
strive towards. Two Source consultants explain how Source has contributed 
to renewal in Multifirm: 
“Multifirm says: “we got left behind, and now we’re trying with 
something new – Source!” And we are considered the new and 
innovative, and in a way the future, also by Multifirm. We get a lot 
compliments – and yes! We are great. And they want to be like us.”  
“We’ve shaken up the established culture a little. Within the local 
government a lot of managers are happy about the speed and that 
somebody comes in and shakes things up a bit. Multifirm has hired 
some managers from firms like Source the last couple of years. And 
they’ve been frustrated about the lack of speed.” 
Source employees expressed that they were positively surprised by the way 
Multifirm accepted Source’s radical employee and customer initiatives. An 
example noted by a Source employee was in terms of promotion and 
marketing campaigns. In addition to being lenient and allowing Source the 
freedom to launch their campaign, the Source employee thought this 
campaign had contributed to renewal of the way Multifirm thought about 
marketing: 
“That we do wacky things like this (ad campaign) leads to Multifirm 
getting a little more updated and wild in their ways. Because - they 
are very proper. But now all of the sudden their (managers) are 
saying, hmm – yes maybe we should do this as well, (…) you know it’s 
a little more fun being insane.” 
 However the most serendipitous value seems to have been created for the 
target itself. In a business that, as the Source management claim: “is nothing 
more than what is in the heads of the employees”, being an attractive 
employer is imperative. Source management reports that recruiting 
employees for Source is easier after they got a large, “legitimate” owner, 
than when they were a smaller “crazy” firm: 
“When Source was established we attracted mostly the wacky guys. 
Those who thought it was fun that a new firm was established where 
the guys rode motorcycles and the girls went skiing in the Alps – and 
the whole thing was a little – yoo-hoo. But Source has slowly but 
surely become more serious, and that is why Multifirm thought we 
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were interesting. All of the sudden people with your background - they 
weren’t interested in working in a cowboy company – we had 
problems attracting the serious consultants who dressed nicely…from 
the big consulting firms we didn’t get any consultants, just 
technicians. From one we got technicians. But now we see with 
Multifirm’s legitimacy, floods of applications are coming from people 
who all of the sudden think we are legitimate. So we’ve hired 15 
people now in the second quarter. For us that is amazing. (…) I think 
Multifirm in their screwed up ways give us some sort of legitimacy.” 
“The first quarter we had record revenues in all the countries. 
Nobody had believed that was possible. I think everybody around us 
thought that Multifirm was going to destroy everything that Source 
was – and they definitely have not.” 
Source employees emphasize that the acquisition made both Source and 
Multifirm more attractive to customers and existing employees, as well. 
Source has both protected its distinctiveness and received the benefits of 
being in a larger structure. Correspondingly Source’s “coolness” is perceived 
as attractive to Multifirm employees: 
“We have managed to prove to our clients that we are the same firm 
we were before the acquisition. And there are a lot of positive effects, 
to have a large industrial owner like we have now; the potential 
career paths for our employees are doubled many times. In Source 
your locked in a consultant role with one IT-system, maybe you don’t 
want to do that the rest of your life. We do related business, and we 
are capable of handling Multifirm’s world, as well. And maybe 
Multifirm will see things the same way. We notice that Multifirm 
employees think it’s interesting and exciting, especially the younger 
ones … think that Source is a cooler firm” 
The formal integration and mobilizing efforts made by Multifirm seemed to 
be complied with reluctantly and perceived as partly interrupting business as 
usual. However, the operational bottom up processes of project acquisition 
served as mobilizing mechanisms. Individual management initiatives on a 
project basis linked people in the organization. Nevertheless, the formal 
mechanisms may also have been facilitated through the knowledge and 
competency of the Source employees regarding a particular customer.  
“They bring us to customers we normally wouldn’t be with. We have 
an example, a customer Multifirm has had for a while, we haven’t. A 
Multifirm salesperson approached me and asked if I wanted to meet 
the management team in this firm, I had never thought that would 
have been an option. And now we have a pretty good project there.” 
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The differences in business, target market, organizational culture and 
competencies that were emphasized by the employees after the initial 
announcement of the deal seemed to have faded as Source became more 
comfortable. The initial ambiguities regarding autonomy issues were partly 
resolved. Source employees and managers focused on the fact that Multifirm 
is solid and slow-paced also as a learning point for Source. When Multifirm 
and Source have had customer contacts together, this had encouraged Source 
to be more thorough, resulting in better deliveries: 
“I think it is good for us to be more patient. Nagging and rushing isn’t 
always good. It’s important to be thorough, and have evaluated the 
alternatives, so that you don’t have to start from scratch each time. 
For example we tell Customer that I think we should do it this way. 
And Customer says yes, fine – because they trust us. But then 
Multifirm says: Why? Could we please have two alternatives – and 
that takes time. It’s a spinal cord reflex, if you’ve developed an 
economy system 20 times, and have a pretty good idea about how you 
think they should be. You might not have the patience if somebody 
asks you to come up with 3 alternatives.”  
Multifirm had provided new challenges for Source. Particularly access to 
large customers, access Source would not have had without Multifirm. This 
also contributed to Source’s growth in number of employees: 
“Multifirm has provided us with new challenges by entering the public 
sector with us. We’ve established a large project for implementing a 
system (with Sources solutions) in the local government. It’s a large 
project (…) with a budget of over 120 million NOK – so it makes it 
possible for us to recruit heavily and immediately put people to work 
on a project that we sort of own. And it’s safe and nice to explain to a 
consultant that when you start working for us you’ll be on a project 
tomorrow.”  
Despite the lack of formal integration, there are several accounts of the way 
in which Source had contributed to Multifirm. Here a Multifirm employee 
explains: 
“The solution we’ll manage – thanks to Source. We would have never 
gotten the ERP efforts up and running without them. It would have 
been impossible. They spotted the danger signs right away, in terms of 
risk. I didn’t see it – Source came to me and told me about it – you 
have to watch out for this and that, this we can help you with. Initially 
I said, hell no, this is not a problem. But then I realized they know 
what they’re talking about and I learned to listen to them. I’ve 
thanked them for this, actually.” 
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Multifirm managers focused on the ERP competency and that they have 
contributed to their Nordic growth ambitions: 
 “We’ve learned a lot from them. How to use ERP, they have been 
really important, without them we couldn’t have chosen ERP as a 
platform – then maybe more years would have passed without us 
choosing a solution. So they’ve been really important for us.” 
“Source has been really important in connection with the ERP efforts, 
and they have been important in evaluating ERP. And in quality 
assuring the choices that were made.” 
“And now we’ve established a unit in Denmark through the 
acquisition of Source Consulting, and it is growing organically as 
well. So now we need to grow further on the Nordic arena, and that is 
our strategy.” 
The acquisition led to both expected and serendipitous value creation for 
Multifirm. However, it appears that the most unexpected and surprising 
wind-falls accrued to Source from the acquisition. They gained the 
legitimacy and means necessary to attract both customers and consultants to 
their practice from having Multifirm as an owner. It could be argued, 
however, that these windfalls were mediated by the favorable market for 
their services. On the other hand, in this market it is particularly important 
for a consulting firm to be an attractive employer. 
10.5 Conclusion and analysis 
My findings indicate that alongside delivering a successful business case and 
thus the expected value of the acquisition, Source may have contributed to 
some degree of organizational renewal in Multifirm.  
The data shows that there was not an experienced threat to Source’s identity, 
and no need for them to spend time and energy on self-enhancing, identity 
preserving behavior. Even though Source did not embrace and participate in 
some of the formalized initiatives towards mobilizing and creating cross-
organizational opportunities, there seemed to be a large degree of self-
organizing in cooperating with Multifirm. Source considered themselves 
both autonomous and competent, and expressed that the acquisition did not 
threatened them. The managers seemed to be performing mobilizing actions, 
drawing on both target and acquirer competency and customers. They 
emphasized that an important characteristic of Source was having proactive 
employees that took the initiative to generate business for Source. This is in 
line with the finding that the Source managers and consultants performed 
mobilizing actions.  
 126
Source had institutionalized ways to deal with some of Multifirm demands. 
This protected the Source employees from time consuming events such as 
all-staff meetings that were perceived to be irrelevant for Source employees. 
Source was still in spirit a small entrepreneurial firm, lacking formalized 
systems and structures. Some argued that this was a problematic feature of 
the Source organization, and that being acquired by Multifirm would 
contribute to require Source to develop more formalized systems and 
structures.  As such, there was a pull between these distinguishing 
characteristics of Source that were, on the one hand, the basis of their 
identity, and on the other hand, a problematic feature of their organization. 
Multifirm, with its large organization, processes and structures could help 
them to improve.  
Multifirm was reported to perform mobilizing actions, and they expressed a 
perceived need for interaction with Source. However, it may seem that some 
of the mobilizing efforts had unintended consequences. There were few 
formal integration mechanisms linking Multifirm and Source, and some of 
Multifirm’s attempts at controlling Source, even though they were complied 
with, did not seem to have an integrating effect. Rather, these controlling 
efforts were ridiculed and not really taken seriously. They seemed to 
function as a distinguishing mechanism for Source, upholding the 
demarcations between Source and Multifirm. As such, they protected and 
preserved the identity of Source. It appears that the managers in Source used 
humor to deal with these perceived disturbing issues, and as such they 
performed mitigating actions. The use of humor disarmed the potential threat 
to their autonomy posed by Multifirm demands and impositions. In addition, 
these initiatives enhanced the differences between the “unstructured, 
flexible, 80 % solutions, crazy” Source, and the “structured, bureaucratic, 
slow and thorough” Multifirm. Source considered their autonomy to be safe, 
there was no threat of contagion to their image and there was no real threat 
to their identity. They were allowed to remain distinct, keeping their 
distinguishing and central features, even enhancing them as they were 
contrasted with Multifirm’s different image.  
Based on the Source case I argue that remaining autonomous protects the 
target from experiencing identity threats, particularly in integration processes 
where the identity of the targets potentially would be threatened because of 
loss of status and strong identity orientation towards the target. The 
acquirer’s perception of the targets in these instances may contribute to the 
generation of serendipitous outcomes as the need for interaction is perceived 
as high. In integration processes where the acquiring firm’s employees 
perceive the target as having high status and valuable knowledge, individual 
managers may mobilize to get access to this knowledge and status.  
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11 Emergent themes, categories and overarching 
dimensions 
This chapter presents the themes, categories and concepts that were 
generated through an iterative process between the data and existing theory. 
Even though the study is inductive in nature, the study approach and the 
research questions have been informed and framed by prior literature and 
theory on identity and post-acquisition processes and outcomes. The 
empirical evidence was analyzed by tacking back and forth between the data 
and existing theory. Some additional literature was brought in during the 
analysis of the data. For example, literature on absorptive capacity that had 
not been addressed in the theoretical framework for the study was brought in 
as it could inform the analysis. Based on my findings I further theorized the 
concept of absorptive capacity. This process of going back and forth 
between the data and the literature is eclectic, concurrent, spiraling and 
overlapping in time. 
The first order themes, second order categories and overarching concepts 
represent different levels of abstraction. Figure 3 shows the template for the 
data structure. The first order themes are the “facts” of the empirical 
investigation. These “facts” are the accounts of the respondents as they 
describe the acquisition process, their experiences and their interpretations of 
events. The second order categories are the theoretical tags that I use to 
explain these “facts” in line with Van Maanen (1979). These were developed 
inductively but informed by existing literature in order to explain the 
patterning of the first order data. For example the first order theme “strong 
feelings of belonging to former owner” and “feelings of pride towards 
target” were abstracted to the second order category: “identity orientation”, 
which is a concept in the existing social identity theory literature (Brickson 
2000; Brickson 2005). As such, the process through which the concepts were 
constructed is based on both prior theory and my empirical material.  
The case descriptions present how the 5 acquisitions vary along the first 
order themes. For example, the first order themes of “managers buffer 
against Multifirm control initiatives”, “managers resigned” and “initial 
inward focus in target”, were found across the targets. These first order 
themes were abstracted into the second order category of “target mitigating 
and mobilizing” that was common for all the cases. In this manner the first 
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Figure 3 Template for data structure 
order themes that varied across the cases were theorized into categories that 
were common to all the cases. Then each second order category, along with 
other second order categories, was further abstracted and compiled into the 
overarching dimension of “target contributive capacity” in line with the 
process illustrated by Corley and Gioia (2004). I abstracted a total of 11 
second order categories from my data. These were theorized into the 4 
overarching dimensions of 1) Identity threats, 2) Contributive capacity, 3) 
Absorptive capacity, and 4) Acquisition performance.  
Identity threats, absorptive capacity and acquisition performance are well 
established concepts in the existing literature. My findings build on and 
extend these concepts. Contributive capacity, on the other hand, is a new 
concept developed in this thesis, and it is the main contribution of my study. 
It is closely linked to the concept of absorptive capacity, which will be 
discussed further in this chapter.  
In this chapter I link the data presented in the case discussion to theory. I 
present and discuss the emergent theoretical concepts. The chapter is 
organized into sections. Each section first presents briefly the overarching 
concept, and then discusses the second order categories each overarching 
concept is theorized from based on the empirical evidence. As such, this 
chapter presents a summary of the within-case findings via a cross-case 
comparison along the second order categories and overarching concepts. 
Relationships between the concepts are discussed in Chapter 12.  
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11.1 Identity threats: status, identity orientation and perceived 
level of integration 
My findings indicate how the members of the target firms perceived 
themselves in relation to the acquirer, and how the acquisition challenged 
their organizational self-concept, varied across the units. Identity threats 
emerged in my material and are theorized from the second order categories 
of: 1) Identity orientation: this refers to the locus of identification. In other 
words, whether the target employees identified with the target, the former 
owner, or the acquirer. 2) Status: the status relationship between the acquirer 
and target. In other words, how target employees interpreted the 
distinguishing characteristics of the acquirer, and how these characteristics 
compare relative to the characteristics of the target or their prior owner. 3) 
Level of integration, or to what extent the target is distinguishable as a group 
post-acquisition and to what extent they will become “one” with the 
acquirer. Figure 4 shows the emergent first order themes and the second 
order categories that make up the identity threats. 
 Each of the sections below addresses one of the three second order 
categories that together make up the overarching dimension of identity 
threat. The discussion centers on how each second order category was 
theorized through the first order themes in the data, how it varies between 
the cases and how it is linked to prior literature. Following this, the step from 
the three second order categories to the overarching dimension of identity 
threat is presented.  
11.1.1 Identity orientation: interpretation of identity claims 
My findings indicate that the announcement of the different acquisitions 
promoted the development of identity claims in the various organizations as 
people defined who “we” are and who “they” are. These identity claims were 
explicit statements about what characterized the target and the acquirer, and 
what group the individuals defined themselves as belonging to.  For 
example, statements that characterized the people of the firm included “we 
are young and cutting edge”, or “we are a technology focused bunch of 
people”. The identity claims were interpreted and made sense of, and either 
verified or falsified in discussions among people within units or between 
units, and in interaction with “the other”, in this case Multifirm. The 
sensemaking processes were evident in the respondents’ descriptions of how 
they judged these identity claims. Also in describing the acquiring firm, the 
self-perceptions emerged: “they are much older than us”. The category of 
“identity orientation” is theorized from these themes. 
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Figure 4: First order themes and second order categories for the 
overarching concept of identity threats 
The locus of identification varied across the target firms. Some targets 
showed a strong identification with their former owner, some identified with 
Multifirm and others with their profession. The variation presented in Table 
4 shows the emergent concept of identity orientation, the first order themes 
this was theorized from and raw data quotes in support of this. 
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Table 4: Identity orientation: first order themes and quotes  
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The empirical findings 
Teknico employees immediately resisted the integration and felt threatened 
by the acquisition. They showed attachment and feelings of belonging to 
Teknico and Teknico MNC. They emphasized their history in Teknico MNC 
and expressed pride towards both Teknico and Teknico MNC. They also 
acknowledged the strategic rationale for the acquisition, emphasizing that 
their core business was also that of Multifirm’s. The data indicate that they 
had a strong identity orientation towards both Teknico MNC and Teknico.  
The Datagon employees on the other hand expressed little identification 
with their former owner, Datagon MNC. However, the goals, values and 
characteristics they described as core to their firm were described as well 
aligned with how they perceived Multifirm. They immediately identified 
with Multifirm and welcomed the idea of being integrated. My data indicate 
that they identified with the Datagon target, and as such showed little 
identity orientation towards their former owner. Multifirm and Multifirm’s 
perceived values and culture represented a locus of identification for them. 
In the Comco acquisition, on the other hand, there were very few issues of 
organizational level identity immediately after the announcement of the 
acquisition. Early on the Comco target, employees focused on being 
different from the “management consultants in their dark suits” in Comco 
MNC. However, when they realized how “unconsulting” Multifirm was, 
their “consulting” identity became important. For the Comco employees it 
seemed that the most salient locus of identification was not the organization 
itself, but rather the consulting profession. This professional identity did not 
appear in the early interviews. Comco represented the consulting profession, 
and even if the employees’ identification with Comco had not been explicit 
earlier in the process, it became salient as their consulting identities were 
challenged.  
Vizcom employees had negative experiences from prior integrations, and 
their identity had developed in relationship to these. Their hopes of 
becoming a stand-alone consulting firm had triggered their strong feeling of 
belonging to Vizcom. The data indicates that Vizcom employees showed a 
strong identity orientation towards their unit and towards being a consulting 
firm. They did not identify with Vizcom MNC or what they perceived as 
Multifirm’s distinguishing characteristics.  
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Source was a stand-alone consulting firm and had no prior experience with 
being acquired or with being part of a larger corporation. They had a strong 
expressed identity centered on what they described as “the central 
characteristics of Source”. This included being different from other 
consulting firms, and being an entrepreneurial firm. My findings indicate 
that Source employees had an identity orientation towards Source, and that 
they made a point of their organizational identity being incompatible with 
Multifirm’s. 
Identity orientation as theorized 
I define identity orientation as the locus of self-definition. This locus of 
identification is the social category that the individual identifies with. The 
concept of organizational identification has incorporated the idea of identity 
orientation (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Brickson 2000; Brickson 2007). This 
refers to identity orientation as a distinction between personal, relational and 
collective identity orientations which in turn have corresponding individual, 
interpersonal or group loci of self definition. Depending on which of the 
identity orientations are activated, different social motivations, either self-
interest, others benefit or collective well-fare, are triggered (Brickson 2000). 
As I have defined it identity orientation refers to the extent that the 
distinguishing features of a social category are aligned with how the 
individual sees himself or herself.  
My data shows that the organizational identity of all the targets had a group 
orientation. However, the locus of identity varied among the targets. Identity 
orientation depends on which relevant comparison groups are made salient. 
In an acquisition process, the acquirer emerges as a salient reference group 
for the target firm and there are several possible loci of identification. As my 
findings indicate, the identity orientation of the targets were either target 
group, acquiring firm, former owner, profession or a combination of these. 
As such, this study focuses on the organizational level. 
In my data, the second order category I defined as “identity orientation” 
emerged as employees expressed their “belonging” to a particular 
organization. For example, this “identification with” emerged in themes 
related to whether the acquirer had a complementary business focus with the 
target. Here, the target employees described feelings of pride and feelings of 
belonging to the organization. Who they referred to as “we”, or rather, the 
locus of this “we”, is the orientation of identity.   
The concept of identity orientation is dynamic and relational. It is dynamic 
in that identity orientation becomes salient and conspicuous in a particular 
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setting, such as an acquisition. It is relational in that it is triggered by a 
relevant other, in this instance the acquiring firm for the focal target unit. 
The acquiring firm represents a significant other that the target unit’s 
characteristics are juxtaposed against. 
My findings indicate that the evaluation of the acquiring firm’s values and 
goals as attractive and compatible with own group’s, is critical for 
identification orientation.  The cases show that the individual’s goals can be 
integrated with the target’s goals, the prior owners, or even with the acquirer. 
Hall (1970) refers to identification with an organization as integration of the 
individual’s goals and the organization’s goals. Identity orientation thus 
refers to the extent to which the target perceives that the acquisition leads to 
goal-compatibility with the goals they perceive as core in their organization. 
I argue that identity orientation is a mechanism in organizational identity 
threat. This will be discussed later in section 11.2. 
11.1.2 Status 
Issues surrounding the relative status of the target and the acquirer emerged 
as important in the interviews with target employees. Even though the 
perceived relative status of the target, the acquirer and the former owner 
varied across the targets, all the targets, except Datagon, considered their 
target unit to have higher status than Multifirm. However, compared to their 
prior owners, the perceived relative status varied more. Table 5 shows the 
emergent concept of relative status, the first order themes this concept was 
theorized from, and the supporting raw data quotes. 
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Table 5: Status: first order themes and quotes 
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The empirical findings 
Status issues were expressed differently from the respondents of the different 
targets. Teknico employees strongly expressed that they perceived Teknico 
to have superior work-processes, technologies and competencies than 
Multifirm. They emphasized their young and energetic culture as distinctly 
different from the less attractive Multifirm culture. They also emphasized 
Teknico MNC as an attractive employer. My findings indicate that Teknico 
perceived both the target’s status and the status of Teknico MNC to be 
higher than that of Multifirm.  
In the Datagon acquisition, few themes emerged regarding status. My 
findings indicate that status was not explicitly an issue, as it was in the other 
targets. The Datagon employees perceived Multifirm as being a more 
attractive organization than Datagon MNC on some dimensions. Some 
Datagon employees mentioned that Datagon MNC had a more attractive and 
well-known brand than Multifirm. On all other dimensions mentioned, they 
perceived that Multifirm had better characteristics. The first order themes 
emerging from my material include being a better employer, increased 
decision power, and Multifirm having a more attractive organizational 
culture. My findings indicate that the Datagon employees perceived 
Multifirm to have higher status then Datagon MNC, and that Datagon’s 
status relative to Multifirm was therefore unproblematic.  
Initially, few themes emerged from the Comco case related to the status of 
the firms. Comco employees’ locus of identification appeared to be 
individual level. Indeed, few themes I analyzed were related to the concept 
of organizational level status. However, after organizational integration had 
taken place, Comco employees expressed that Comco MNC had a higher 
status because their business was “higher in the value chain”. This referred 
to their evaluation of Multifirm as an operations firm, and of themselves as 
consultants. In other words, subsequently they evaluated consulting firms as 
more attractive than operations firms. In addition they emphasized the 
Comco employees’ higher education and competencies. My findings indicate 
that after initial integration, the Comco employees evaluated Multifirm to 
have lower status than Comco MNC and Comco.  
Vizcom respondents to a large degree distinguished between Vizcom MNC 
and Vizcom in their descriptions of the firms. They perceived Vizcom MNC 
to be unattractive as an employer and as an organization, partly because of 
their bad financial performance. They expressed that being part of Multifirm 
implied a status enhancement compared to being a unit in Vizcom MNC. 
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Even though they judged Multifirm to be a better “harbor” for their unit than 
Vizcom MNC had been, they perceived Multifirm as “slow” and old. My 
findings indicate that the employees of Vizcom evaluated Multifirm as 
having higher status than Vizcom MNC. However, the status of Multifirm 
was perceived as low compared to Vizcom, based on Vizcom’s alleged 
higher competency and academic profile. 
Source employees perceived Multifirm as having a boring logo, and as 
“older” and more “bureaucratic” than themselves. They were explicit about 
Multifirm’s unattractiveness as an employer. They expressed that Source 
was “higher in the value chain” than Multifirm. In terms of competency 
level, they evaluated their own as higher than Multifirm’s. They emphasized 
Source’s “fun” and energetic culture as an attractive attribute. My findings 
indicate that the Source employees evaluated their own status to be higher 
relative to that of Multifirm.  
Status as theorized 
Status is a category that has been addressed in the social identity literature, 
as discussed in my theory chapter (Terry and O'Brien 2001; Terry 2003). 
The way I define status, based on my findings, is as a target’s position or 
rank, relative to the acquirer, on various dimensions defined by the target. 
Status refers to how the target evaluates the perceived characteristics of the 
acquirer relative to the target’s own perceived characteristics. My data shows 
that respondents referred to a variety of status dimensions. Technological 
innovation, autonomy granted to the employees, competencies and skills, 
organizational culture and attractiveness as employer are examples of 
dimensions that the organizations were judged on. The evaluation on these 
dimensions contributed to perceptions of the target’s, acquirer’s and former 
owner’s status. Even though the status position is indirectly tied to the past 
behavior of the organizations, it is also a product of the organization’s 
relations and affiliations. This implies that the status of a focal firm is tied to 
the status of firms the focal firm is associated with. Status refers to an 
organization’s position in a hierarchy of comparative organizations. More 
specifically, in the context of an acquisition: the acquiring firm, target firm, 
or prior owner.  
Members of the organization evaluate the attractiveness of their own 
organization with that of relevant others, when they compare their 
organization to relevant others. The dimensions used to evaluate may differ. 
This implies that status is not a fixed and static characteristic of an 
organization. For example, the Teknico employees emphasized their superior 
status on several dimensions compared to Multifirm. On the other hand, 
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Multifirm employees emphasized other status dimensions on which they 
perceived Teknico to have lower status than Multifirm. This is in line with 
social identity research on status in acquisitions, which predict that low 
status targets will emphasize their status on the status irrelevant dimensions 
(nice cafeteria, relaxed work environment) more than the high status targets 
will emphasize their high status dimensions (prestige in community, job 
opportunities) (Haslam 2004).  
As discussed in the theory section of this thesis, I view status as a social 
construction.  An individual’s perception of the dimensions that are status-
relevant and the dimensions that are not, may contribute to diverse 
perceptions of a firm’s status. Following a social constructivist approach, 
status is viewed as constructed in a dialogue, as members of the 
organizations interpret actions, people and events and try to make sense of 
these in post-acquisition integration. This view can be contrasted with an 
essentialist approach to status as a “thing” that can be objectively observed 
and measured. As such, I do not conceive of predetermined status 
dimension, that the organizations can be objectively measured on. Rather, 
the status relevant dimensions are those defined by the members of the 
organization. 
Through my approach, the relative, subjective character of the concept of 
status is emphasized. My findings indicate that status dimensions are not 
universal, but are instead context specific. The respondent’s perceptions of 
what constitute a high or a low status dimension, or a high or low status 
organization varies. Some respondents perceive a dimension to give high 
status, while others perceive the same dimension to give lower status. An 
empirical example from the cases in this study shows that employees of 
Teknico and Datagon claimed Multifirm to be characterized by the same 
characteristic, namely that Multifirm was “stable and sturdy”. However, 
whereas Datagon employees felt “stable and sturdy” gave high status, and 
was equivalent to “safe and well administered”, the Teknico employees 
perceived the same qualities as representing “boring and backwards” and as 
such, a low status feature. It was not a question of the different definitions of 
“stable and sturdy”, but rather if employees perceived an organization as 
attractive if it was characterized as “stable and sturdy”. Teknico employees 
wanted to portray themselves as “young and cutting edge”, and being “stable 
and sturdy” conflicts with this. Datagon on the other hand, having had a 
history of insecurity in a large US firm, welcomed the idea of belonging to 
something Norwegian, stable and sturdy.  
Status is as identity orientation a relative and dynamic concept. Status has, as 
explained in the theory section, been tied to identity in the social identity 
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literature. The possible “leaking” or “contamination” of inferior status by 
affiliation with an organization is an important mechanism in understanding 
the concept of identity threats. In the last section of this chapter I link status 
to the overarching concept of identity threats.  
11.1.3 Perceived Level of integration: planned, perceived and carried 
out 
The intended level of integration varied among the cases. It was announced 
at the signing of the deals through press-releases, information meetings and 
the companies’ internet and intranet sites. My data shows that the perceived 
level of integration corresponds partly to the planned level of integration. 
However, the interpretations of the level of integration and the ramifications 
this would have for the individuals and units varied across the cases. The 
variation presented in Table 6 shows the emergent concept of perceived level 
of integration, the first order themes this was theorized from and the raw 
data quotes that support the concept. 
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Table 6: Perceived level of integration: first order themes and quotes 
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The empirical findings 
The Teknico, Datagon and Comco acquisitions were announced to be fully 
integrated in the Multifirm organization. The employees and managers in 
these acquisitions never showed any doubts about the level of integration. 
These targets were to be fully integrated in the Multifirm structure legally, 
processually and organizationally. There were few ambiguities regarding 
autonomy or integration issues in these targets. There was a general 
acknowledgement that Teknico, Datagon and Comco would cease to exist as 
distinguishable units. 
Teknico employees did not question the intended level of integration, or raise 
the idea of more autonomy for the Teknico target. The integration was 
considered legitimate and necessary. Even though some complaints were 
made about the integration process being slow, there seemed to be a general 
feeling that Multifirm performed integration initiatives well. The target was 
integrated both procedurally and organizationally after 8 months. My 
findings indicate that the perceived level of integration was high and 
legitimate.  
Datagon employees did not question the intended level of integration, or 
raise the idea of more autonomy for the Datagon target. The integration was 
also considered legitimate and necessary, and they considered the integration 
process to have been well organized and executed. My findings indicate that 
the perceived level of integration was high and legitimate. 
Comco respondents voiced that Comco should have remained autonomous to 
protect their competencies and capabilities. These concerns were raised 
about a year after the acquisition was announced and after the Comco 
employees had been placed in the new organization. However, immediately 
following the announcement of the acquisitions, few concerns were raised 
about the legitimacy of the integration. My findings indicate that the 
perceived level of integration was high and illegitimate. 
In the announcement of the deal Vizcom was communicated to remain an 
autonomous subsidiary of Multifirm. It would be headed by its existing 
leader, and this leader would report to Multifirm corporate management.  As 
such, the perceived level of integration was initially low. However, there 
were some controversies and ambiguities regarding how to implement this 
level of autonomy. Vizcom had, before being acquired by Multifirm, been 
divested as a separate unit in their prior owner, regained their unit name and 
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worked towards becoming a stand-alone consulting firm. As such, the 
acquisition resulted in a loss of independence and complete autonomy. When 
uncertainties surrounding their autonomy in Multifirm arose, mostly because 
of branding and logo initiatives from Multifirm, this caused some 
ambiguities regarding their autonomy. My findings indicate that even though 
there were some initial ambiguities about level of integration, Vizcom had a 
low and legitimate perceived level of integration.  
At the time of the deal, it was communicated that Source would also remain 
an autonomous unit. They were to be headed by their existing leader, who 
would report to Multifirm corporate management. As Source had been a 
stand-alone firm, they did not have the same history, with integration and 
emancipation issues, as Vizcom did. My data suggests that this resulted in 
concerns regarding branding and logo not causing the same amount of 
ambiguities as in Vizcom.  Overall my findings indicate that the Source 
acquisition had a low and legitimate perceived level of integration.  
Perceived level of integration as theorized 
I defined perceived level of integration as the degree to which the target 
employees perceived their unit would remain as distinguishable from the 
acquirer. Integration initiatives emerged as a theme that members of the 
organizations needed to make sense of. My findings indicate that how the 
target employees interpreted this level of integration is critical for the 
integration process. Organizational members interpret what is meant by “full 
integration” or “remain autonomous” and anticipate the consequences of this 
for them as individuals, and for the target as a unit through this lens. If the 
target is announced to be an autonomous unit, the employees will have 
certain expectations regarding the integration process. For example they may 
expect few changes and little contact with the acquirer. An empirical 
example of this is the degree to which the targets perceived they would be 
able to work with their pre-acquisition technologies, their pre-acquisition 
processes, and with their pre-acquisition colleagues. As the acquisition 
integration unfolded, they observed and made sense of integration activities 
and interpreted these in light of the explicit, pre-determined level of 
integration or autonomy. As the interpretations of the level of autonomy and 
the practical consequences and operationalization of this vary at different 
levels of the organizations, ambiguities around integration issues may arise. 
For example, even though the top management team at Multifirm all agreed 
upon what it meant for Vizcom and Source to “remain autonomous”, this 
had not been properly communicated to the marketing department. When 
they presented the new marketing strategy for Vizcom, the ramifications of 
this strategy was perceived by Vizcom to signal a loss of autonomy.  
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My findings indicate that perceived level of integration is an important 
category in post-acquisition integration processes. The category can be 
understood in the light of the concept of permeable boundaries from social 
identity theory (Terry 2003; Haslam 2004). I connect the concept of 
“permeable boundaries” in the social identity literature with the concept of 
“level of integration” from the acquisitions literature. This is done through a 
focus on sensemaking, and the way the level of integration is made sense of. 
Incorporating this concept in an understanding of post-acquisition 
integration emphasizes that it is not the planned and explicit level of 
integration that is vital to the outcomes of the acquisition integration, but 
rather the extent to which the firms perceive that the boundaries of their units 
will remain intact.  
In the section below the second order category of perceived level of 
integration, along with identity orientation and status will be discussed and 
linked to the overarching concept of identity threat.  
11.2 Identity threats as theorized 
I have defined identity threats as a challenge to the self-concept of the 
organization. Organizational identity threats are defined through the 
categories of identity orientation, status and perceived level of integration. 
Even though these categories are theoretically distinct concepts, they overlap 
and are interrelated. Below I discuss how these categories together make up 
the concept of identity threats.  
11.2.1 The dimensions of organizational identity threats 
Threats to organizational identity have been suggested to arise in the event 
of an acquisition. Prior research has examined situations that theoretically 
should elicit a threat, and focused on the organizational response to these 
threats. Elsbach and Kramer (1996) defined organizational identity threats as 
consisting of 1) calling into question valued identity attributes of the 
organization, and 2) challenging the organization’s standing relative to 
others. They also refer to level of dissonance as an influence on the response 
to the threat. In line with this definition, an acquisition, even though it 
changes the social identity of the members of the organization by providing 
a new locus of identification, may only elicit identity threats if valued 
assumptions are challenged.  
My theorizing extends Elsbach and Kramer’s (1996) concept by specifying 
the three dimensions I argue may make up identity threats. These dimensions 
work together and address Elbach and Kramer’s definition of organizational 
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identity threats in two ways. That is, by shaping the way the valued identity 
attributes are called into question, and how the relative standing of the 
organization is challenged. Identity attributes are called into question when 
they are juxtaposed to a competing set of identity attributes. These 
competing identity attributes must be perceived to impact the organization 
somehow. There needs to be an understanding that these attributes can leak 
onto the focal organization through permeable boundaries. This refers to 
what emerged in my data as perceived level of integration. Level of 
integration, as an important factor in threats to organizational identity, is 
implicit in prior literature. In social identity theory (Boen and Vanbeselaere 
2001; Terry 2003), level of integration has been theorized as the 
permeability of boundaries. Level of integration is also implied through the 
concept of contamination in the organizational identity literature (Empson 
2001).  
Furthermore, I argue that the attributes that are called into question need to 
be valued as more attractive than the competing identity attributes. This is 
related to the concept of status, and how the relative standing of the 
organization is challenged. Finally, for any of these processes to emerge, the 
organization must serve as a locus for the self-concept. I have defined the 
dynamic and relative elements of identity threats. These identity dynamics 
are, as I have discussed above, interrelated and dependent on one another, 
but remain conceptually distinguishable concepts.  
The concepts of status, identity orientation and perceived level of integration 
are distinct concepts, both theoretically and empirically. However, they are 
intertwined and co-evolve in post-acquisition integration processes. A 
groups’ perception of its own high status is likely to coincide with them 
identifying with this group. This can be explained by the propensity for self-
enhancements that individuals have. If a person consider the organization 
they belong to as high status, they are more likely to identify with that 
organization. Equally, the idea of ingroup bias suggests that if a person 
identifies strongly with an organization, they will attribute attractive 
characteristics to that organization. Indeed, perceived level of integration is 
more likely to be a salient concept if the integration has consequences for the 
identity of a unit, than if it does not.  
11.2.2 Status and perceived level of integration: leaks and 
contamination 
Status relations between the target and acquirer firms influence the impact of 
social identity on the integration process in an acquisition (Hogg and Terry 
2000). Status relations are indicators of the degree to which the acquisition 
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challenges the self-concept of the organization. Based on social identity 
theory, researchers suggest that high status targets will respond negatively to 
an acquisition if the boundaries between the firms are seen as permeable 
(target perceives level of integration to be high). However, they will respond 
favorably if the status of the acquirer is perceived as high (Hogg and Terry 
2000). In other words, status and level of integration together shape the 
target’s response to the acquisition.  
The underlying argument is that people strive for self-enhancement. Being 
part of an organization that is perceived as attractive and having a high status 
leads to self-enhancement. As status leaks by affiliation (Podolny 2005), the 
high status of the acquirer will “leak” and enhance the target’s status. Status 
leakage (Podolny 2005) and identity contamination (Empson 2001) are 
related terms. Both relate to the perceived threat to an organization’s identity 
posed by affiliation with an organization of inferior status. If the acquired 
organization considers their status to be higher than that of the acquiring 
firm, they may show solidarity with their original organization and engage in 
interorganizational competition. This would undermine the success of the 
merger. If they perceive the acquirer to be of lower status and the borders to 
be permeable, they may fear contamination (Empson 2001). In this respect 
contamination is the “leakage” of an organization’s low status and 
unattractive image. The case of Teknico illustrates this and social identity 
theory supports this finding (Haslam 2004). The Teknico employees 
evaluated Teknico’s status to be higher than that of Multifirm. They 
perceived a high level of integration (permeable boundaries) and had a 
strong identity orientation towards their prior owner. As such, threats to 
organizational identity were especially emphasized in the Teknico 
acquisition.  
On the other hand, targets that consider the acquiring organization to have a 
higher status, and also assume that “becoming one” with the higher-status 
organization is possible (perceived high level of integration), may tend to 
disidentify with their original organization. This can be illustrated by the 
Datagon case. The Datagon employees perceived the level of integration to 
be high. As such, there were possibilities for leaking and contamination. 
Datagon employees did not explicitly state any identity threats. Very few 
concerns about Multifirm’s status were raised. They did not have a strong 
identity orientation towards Datagon MNC. Instead they evaluated the 
characteristics they described Multifirm to possess as positive and expressed 
that they identified with these characteristics. They perceived Multifirm to 
be more attractive as an employer and in general as an organization. 
Multifirm characteristics and distinguishing features were perceived as more 
consistent with their organizational identity than the characteristics and 
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distinguishing features of their prior owner. They did not express that their 
identity was threatened. I argue that the acquisition enhanced their 
organizational identity. As such, they did not experience any threats to their 
organizational identity. 
The early data from the Comco acquisition showed few signs of 
organizational identity issues. At first, the employees appeared to be 
individually oriented. That is, they were concerned with their individual 
identity, but showed few concerns about the status or image of Multifirm or 
Comco. Organizational level identity issues first emerged after initial contact 
with Multifirm. As the acquisition integration process evolved, it was 
evident that their identity was oriented towards profession and their identity 
as consultants.  It became obvious to them that Multifirm represented 
another type of business. The Comco employees did not recognize their 
consulting business in the Multifirm organization, and this threatened their 
identity as consultants. First then did the identity orientation towards Comco 
and their perceptions of their own higher status emerge. At this point there 
were perceived threats to their organizational identity. 
The targets that were kept separate, Vizcom and Source, illustrate this point 
well. In these cases, even though there were some ambiguities about 
autonomy and they perceived their own status to be higher than that of the 
acquirer, the targets perceived of their boundaries as impermeable. They 
perceived Multifirm as having lower status, and were explicit in that they did 
not want to be a part of Multifirm. However, they perceived that the 
Multifirm status could not contaminate them, as they were autonomous. The 
insecurities surrounding autonomy were problematic to Vizcom. Assuming 
that firms want to enhance, protect and preserve their identity, they will 
identify and seek to interact with firms that they perceive to have high status 
on the dimensions that they find relevant.  
When members of the organization assess the statements and identity claims 
of own their own firm and that of the other firm, there is inherently an 
evaluation and judgment of the attractiveness and relative status of the firms. 
When the acquirer is seen as legitimate, attractive, with higher status, and 
that it is possible for members of the acquired unit to continue with their 
tasks in the new organizations, chances are higher that the post-integration 
process will be successful (Buono and Bowditch 1989; Hogg and Terry 
2000). Status leaks can lead to both organizational identity threats and 
organizational identity enhancement. With high status targets and low status 
acquirers, the leaks generate organizational identity threats. By contrast, with 
low status targets and high status acquirers, the leaks generate organizational 
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identity enhancement. In this manner, identity orientation, status and 
perceived level of integration make up the dynamics of identity threats. 
11.2.3 Sensemaking, level of analysis and identity threats 
I have taken a sensemaking perspective and defined organizational identity 
threats as residing at the organizational level. Here I discuss how this 
sensemaking perspective allows for the concept of organizational identity 
threats to be understood at an organizational level. 
Evaluating one’s own organization’s attractiveness when a salient “other” is 
presented through the acquisition involves comparing the organizations on 
their perceived characteristic features. Social identity theory predicts that as 
people strive to enhance their self-esteem they will display ingroup bias. 
This happens at an individual level. Each member of the organization makes 
sense of who the organization is and how they feel about it. However, on an 
organizational level these individual level interpretations are communicated 
and constructed in dialogue between the members of the organization. They 
develop as members make sense of the organization, events, episodes and 
actions in the post-acquisition integration processes.  
Sensemaking is required to answer the question “who are we as an 
organization”. This collective sensemaking that organizational members 
engage in makes up organizational identity. Answering the question “who 
am I, and how am I part of this organization”, is the individual sensemaking 
and construction of individual identity.  It can be assumed that the degree to 
which the sensemaking process individuals engage in results in the “who am 
I” and “who do we want to be” being equivalent to “who the acquirer is” 
influences the integration processes. At the same time these processes are 
occurring on an organizational level. In the context of an acquisition, the 
process of categorizing and distinguishing between target and acquirer is 
needed.  
In taking a sensemaking view of organizational identity, I view it as 
constructed in interaction among the members of the organization. However, 
a sensegiving perspective assumes organizational identity to be imposed on 
the organization by managers: That is, “Through formal identity claims, 
then, organizational leaders and/or spokespersons attempt to influence how 
internal and external audiences define and interpret the organization, by 
locating it within a set of legitimate social categories” (Ravasi and Schultz 
2006:435). In acquisitions, where identity issues become salient, the 
conversation about “who we are” and “how we are changing” can be viewed 
as a control mechanism (Alvesson and Willmott 2002). Regulating and 
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shaping identity through stories of “who we are” were explicitly stated by 
some of the managers. In particular, in the two consulting firms Vizcom and 
Source there was an explicit focus of telling stories about “who we are” to 
make people feel they belonged to the organization. As such, my data also 
show identity as constructed through sensegiving, as a more conscious 
management-led process. However, I argue that not only managers partake 
in this sensegiving process. Instead, employees at all levels of the 
organization partake in this sensegiving process, through formulating 
identity claims and communicating these both to their colleagues within the 
target, but also in the interaction with the acquiring firm’s employees.  
Identity claims that are emerging in the interaction between target firm 
employees are interpreted and juxtaposed with the perceived characteristics 
of the acquirer. The level of integration influences how these sensemaking 
processes transpire. I can see from my data that in the fully integrated 
targets, these sensemaking processes seemed to be centered on their loss of 
distinguishing characteristics. In the independent firms, the sensemaking 
processes were centered on creating demarcations between the target and the 
acquirer. This is in line with the sensemaking perspective where: “shared 
beliefs to be subjected to periodic revision, as organizational members 
modify their interpretations in light of environmental changes” (Ravasi and 
Schultz 2006:435). I argue that both processes are at play. There is a more or 
less outspoken and conscious process of explicitly stating identity claims and 
attempting to shape members’ and outsiders’ views of the organization in the 
event of an acquisition. On the other hand, these identity claims and efforts 
are made sense of and influence members in modifying their interpretations.  
I argue that these sensemaking and sensegiving processes are in line with the 
view that organizational identity is a social construction that is developed 
through self-reflexive awareness (Giddens 1991). In the discussions here it is 
inherent that organizational identity is constructed in relationship to 
significant others. In the case of acquisitions, the acquirer becomes a salient 
other. My data shows the members of the target organization questioning 
who they are, and also interpreting and making sense of how the acquirer 
perceives them to be as an organization. However, as the organization posed 
the question “who are we”, “who are they” and “who do they think we are”, 
there is a juxtaposition of organizational identity and organizational image 
(Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Dutton et al. 1994; Gioia et al. 2000), 
specifically “who does the acquirer think we are and are they right.” They 
evaluate whether the statements and the image they perceive others to have 
of them is true or not. The images they portray of themselves and “the 
others” are rooted in stereotypical identity claims, or explicit claims posed as 
statements about the characteristics of the organization. In the emergent 
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categories in my model, this idea of reflexivity and interaction with the other 
is inherent in both identity orientation, (“us” vs. “them”) and relative status 
(how do we evaluate us, how do they evaluate us). However, the concept of 
organizational image is not included as a separate construct in the model. 
These interpretations make up the sensemaking processes in post-acquisition 
integration.  
The finding that the acquisition itself did not seem to threaten some of the 
targets, does not mean that issues in the acquisition did not threaten their 
identity. My findings indicate that in Vizcom, where the organizational 
identity of the target did not seem to be threatened initially, the issue of logo 
and branding was a salient issue that later threatened the identity of the firm. 
The interpretations of issues that pose threats are the focus of the work of 
Dutton and Dukerich (1991). These are path-dependent in that they elicit a 
well-learned response based on prior experience. Vizcom had negative prior 
experiences with integration and being part of a large organizational. 
Therefore, the sensemaking processes surrounding the logo initially elicited 
a threat to their identity early in the integration process. This was an issue 
that was easily categorizable for the members of the organization. This issue 
evoked strong emotions in the organization, and as such evoked different 
responses from the Vizcom organization than from the Source organization. 
The latter did not have any prior experience with this.  
How the acquisition is perceived by the members of the organization to 
influence their organizational identity affects their interpretations and actions 
in post-acquisition integration. The employees’ evaluation of the way in 
which the acquisition impacts their organizational identity has been shown to 
influence their commitment to the acquisition and willingness to accept 
change. Identity threats have in prior literature been suggested to inhibit 
change as employees attempt to protect their identity (Chreim 2007). 
Belonging to organizations that are perceived to be attractive provides 
organizational members with an opportunity for self-enhancement (Dutton 
and Dukerich 1991).  
11.2.4 Conclusion 
My findings indicate that even though acquisitions by definition change the 
boundaries of the target firm, this is not necessarily perceived as a challenge 
to the organizations self-concept. In other words, it is not necessarily a threat 
to the target organization’s identity. For the acquisition to represent a threat 
the boundaries need to be perceived as permeable. This is so that the 
acquirer’s identity and status can “contaminate” the target. In addition, the 
characteristics of the acquirer need to be less attractive, and its status lower 
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than the target or the target’s former owner. Subsequently, the target’s 
response to the potential threat to identity that an acquisition represents 
varies depending on if they see the acquisition as challenging the idea of 
who they are. Further, if that challenge will change the organization into 
something more or less attractive, leads to either an identity threat or identity 
enhancement.  
To claim that organizations can have an identity can be argued to represent a 
reified and reductionist view of identity. Ideas about identity can be argued 
to only exist at the individual level. There are “problems of reification and of 
imprinting unifying concepts on an ambiguous reality” such as organizations 
(Alvesson and Empson 2008:2). Organizations in post-acquisition 
integration processes represent such an ambiguous reality. By theorizing the 
concept of organizational threats as a social construction it is plausible to 
conceive of such a concept on an organizational level. The processes 
surrounding identity orientation and status are social phenomena that can be 
argued to exist as processes in the organization regardless of the individuals. 
I argue that one can perceive the threats to organizational identity and the 
organizational responses to these threats on an organizational level. By 
assuming collective action in response to these threats, one risks masking 
conflicts and the multifaceted social context that an organization represents. 
I do not assume one coherent response by some kind of collective 
consciousness. Rather, the perceptions and sensemaking of the individuals in 
the organization regarding their stratus, belonging and the degree of 
integration, together form the threats they respond to. These patterns of 
action, sensemaking and interpretations can be perceived as collective.  
As the informants told their stories of the acquisitions, their ideas about 
“who are we”, “who are they” and “who will we become” were salient. 
Informants were not asked directly about identity issues. Instead, themes 
emerged through my interpretation of their stories of the acquisition process. 
Identity threats were more or less explicit in the data. Some respondents 
were very clear on their identity being tarnished or contaminated by the 
acquirer. Others were more implicit in describing how they perceived the 
acquisition would impact who they perceived themselves to be. In some 
targets employees’ perceived valued identity attributes to be challenged by 
the acquisition. In others the acquiring firm was perceived to have more 
attractive attributes. As such the acquisition was not perceived as a threat. 
Acquisitions may challenge an organizations perception of what 
characterizes them as a group. I argue that as people strive for self-
enhancement, the judgment the target employees make of the attractiveness 
of the acquiring organization relative to their own organization, and the 
 151
degree to which they consider that they will be perceived as one with the 
acquirer, is likely to either threaten or enhance their image of themselves.  
In line with Albert and Whetten (1985), my data shows that the features of 
the target firm when perceived by the target as central, distinctive, and 
enduring are made salient and are seen in relationship to the acquiring firm 
in their descriptions of the acquisition process. However, these descriptions 
do not emerge in my material as objectively measurable attributes. Rather, 
they emerge through the narratives of the employees, reflecting upon these 
attributes. The content of identity, the existence of something central, 
distinctive and enduring, is not a primary concern here. According to my 
epistemological view organizational identity is socially constructed. People’s 
perceptions of the characteristics of the organizations are available to a 
researcher. These are constructed through the reflexive dialogue between 
members of own organization, and between members of own firm and the 
external environment. The target employees evaluate and rate their own 
organization on relevant features compared to the acquiring firm. This 
implies seeing one’s own firm’s identity as relative to the acquirer and 
evaluating the attractiveness of this organization.  
The event of an acquisition may threaten the organizational identity of a high 
status target that has a strong identity orientation towards their prior owner if 
they believe their organization will be integrated and hence become 
indistinguishable from the acquirer. Social identity theory predicts that 
individuals aim to preserve their identity (Tajfel and Turner 1985). Taking 
the responses to an organizational level, my findings indicate that 
organizations respond to the event of an acquisition in different ways 
depending on who they are and who they perceive the acquirer to be. 
I have theorized the concept of organizational identity threats as consisting 
of identity orientation, perceived relative status and perceived level of 
integration. These issues are addressed in social identity theory on an 
individual level. Prior literature dealing with organizational identity threats 
has not, to my knowledge, studied whether or not an event elicits a genuine 
threat to identity, or theorized what identity threats are made up of. Rather, 
they have focused on how the organization responds to a potential threat. As 
such, the overarching dimension of organizational identity threats has not 
been conceptualized in prior literature. 
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11.3 The target’s contributive capacity: cross-organizational 
roles, mitigating and mobilizing and decision power 
A target’s contributive capacity refers to the target organization’s ability to 
leverage its knowledge and capabilities in the post-acquisition integration 
process. Contributive capacity is what the “teacher” (target) in the learning 
dyad needs to transfer its knowledge to the student (the acquirer).  
Contributive capacity is theorized from the second order categories of 1) 
Cross-organizational roles: the formal and informal roles the managers of the 
target firm performed across target and acquiring firm organizational 
boundaries. 2) Target mitigating and mobilizing actions: the actions of 
managers to ease the impact of the disruption of the acquisition on business 
as usual, and their efforts to link activities between target and acquirer to 
facilitate integration. 3) Autonomy: the individual decision power and task 
autonomy target employees perceived the new organization to provide them 
with. Figure 5 shows the emergent first order themes and the second order 
themes that make up target’s contributive capacity. 
 
Figure 5: First order themes and second order categories for the 
overarching concept of contributive capacity 
Each section below addresses one of the three second order categories that 
together make up the overarching dimension of target’s contributive 
capacity: how each second order category was theorized through the first 
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order themes in the data, how it varies between the cases and how it is linked 
to prior literature. Following this, the step from the three second order 
categories to the overarching dimension of a target’s contributive capacity is 
presented.  
 
11.3.1 Cross-organizational roles 
The degree to which the target employees took on cross-organizational roles 
varied. Cross-organizational roles refer to boundary spanning roles. That is, 
the activities performed by the employees of the target that span both 
acquirer and target organizations. The variation presented in Table 7 shows 
the emergent category of cross-organizational roles, the themes this category 
was theorized from and the quotes that support the themes.  
The empirical findings 
Former Teknico managers were described explicitly by both Multifirm and 
Teknico respondents to have been assigned formal cross-organizational 
roles. The head of the Teknico target was post-integration responsible for an 
organization with twice as many employees as the Teknico target had pre-
acquisition. As such he was an important link between the target and the 
existing organization.  More managers were explained to have “emerged” 
from Teknico than from the other integrated targets. Multifirm managers and 
HR personnel described Teknico as having a large management potential, 
with many competent managers. They described the Teknico employees and 
managers as proactive. This can be both the cause and the antecedent of the 
high level of management roles assumed by Teknico employees in the new 
organization. Respondents from all the firms emphasized that there were 
many managers in the Multifirm organization that originally came from 
Teknico. The Teknico managers’ self-confidence came across in the 
interviews and the ways they described their organization, their work and 
how events transpired, and also in the way they were portrayed by the 
members of Multifirm. My findings indicate that Teknico managers had 
management positions that spanned the former organizational boundaries.  
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Table 7: Cross-organizational roles: first order themes and quotes 
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Datagon managers, however, were described by Multifirm managers and 
employees to not have been very interested in management positions. In 
addition, some managers in Multifirm claimed that the Datagon employees 
did not have the same leadership potential as the existing Multifirm leaders, 
or as the existing leaders from Teknico. My findings indicate that few 
Datagon managers had management positions that spanned the former 
organizational boundaries.  
From the Comco acquisition few managers were appointed managers. As 
with the Datagon case, the former Comco managers were evaluated to not 
have the same management potential as the existing Multifirm managers. My 
findings indicate that Comco managers had few cross-organizational roles or 
responsibilities that spanned the former organizational boundaries.  
Vizcom managers were part of customer projects and organized sales efforts 
in Multifirm. In the Vizcom acquisition some cross-organizational roles, in 
addition to the formal reporting structures, were established in relationship to 
customer projects and sales efforts post-acquisition. The leader of Vizcom 
was described as a “star” in the Multifirm system. He was also described as 
an informal participant in the top management team of Multifirm. Support 
functions spanned the boundaries of the firms. My findings indicate that 
boundary spanning activities and informal cross-organizational roles were 
performed by Vizcom managers for about a year post-acquisition.  
Two years post-acquisition the CEO of Source joined the Multifirm top 
management team. In addition, some support functions spanned the 
boundaries of the organizations. However, in terms of operational and task 
integration, the more informal project roles were important. My findings 
indicate that boundary spanning activities and informal cross-organizational 
roles were performed by Source managers about a year post-acquisition. 
Cross-organizational roles as theorized 
Cross-organizational roles are formal management positions in the new 
organization that span the former target and acquiring firm. They can also be 
more informal or project based roles performed by employees or lower level 
managers. Cross-organizational roles are roles and functions that the target 
firm employees performed in the new organization. In the fully integrated 
targets, these functions were seen as management functions. In the 
autonomous targets they were more informal roles that tied the acquiring and 
target firm through informal relations. Because of the target managers’ prior 
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roles they had the experience to know what capabilities the target had and 
where these capabilities were embedded in the organization. As such, I argue 
that the target managers have the knowledge to link the target and the 
acquirer’s capabilities, processes and technologies. In addition, the authority 
of their position most likely provided them with the level of power needed to 
do so. 
In the autonomous firms the cross-organizational roles were more evident in 
the data material throughout the study period. Here organizational 
boundaries were still intact for activities to be linked across. In the fully 
integrated targets these boundaries were disintegrated and distinguishing 
between target and acquirer as distinct units was difficult. Cross-boundary 
roles were interpreted as the themes that emerged when respondents referred 
to roles and functions in the new organization held by target employees. 
These could be either formal management positions, or roles that connected 
for example a customer from a target firm with a service delivered from the 
acquirer or vice versa.  
11.3.2 Target performing mitigating and mobilizing actions 
There is evidence of mitigating and mobilizing actions being performed by 
target managers and employees in all the acquisitions. However, my findings 
indicate that the timing, scale and impact of these mitigating and mobilizing 
actions varied across the cases. The variation presented in Table 8 shows 
how the emergent concept of mobilizing and mitigating is grounded in the 
data.  
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Table 8: Target mitigating and mobilizing actions: first order themes and 
quotes  
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The empirical findings 
In the Teknico acquisition there are accounts of the managers fronting the 
Teknico capabilities in the new organization. There are also accounts of the 
managers in this acquisition performing actions to ease employees concerns 
about the acquisition. Teknico employees described the actions performed 
by their managers to front and promote their knowledge and competencies in 
Multifirm. In addition, evidence of these actions emerged through the 
managers’ descriptions of own actions. This acquisition was the “noisiest”. 
This may be interpreted as the managers not succeeding sufficiently in their 
mitigating efforts, regardless of the absolute level of mitigating actions. 
However, based on the respondents’ accounts my findings indicate that the 
Teknico managers did perform mobilizing and mitigating actions post-
acquisition by actively promoting the target’s knowledge and competencies 
in the new organization. 
The Datagon managers described their attempts to link activities to 
Multifirm. It seemed they were initially unsuccessful. Respondents from 
Multifirm described Datagon as not making an imprint on the organization, 
not having leadership potential and not being active in the integration efforts. 
The dissatisfaction that initially seemed to permeate the management in 
Datagon was not very visible at the lower levels of the target. Datagon 
managers explained that they continually tried to promote positive attitudes 
towards the acquisition. They referred to the high scores on the employee 
satisfaction survey as an indicator of the employees not being affected 
negatively by the acquisition. One interpretation of this finding is that the 
managers mitigated employees’ concerns. However, there are few accounts 
of mitigating actions being performed. My findings indicate that Datagon 
managers performed a low level of mobilizing efforts. There are some 
indications of mitigation in my data, even though mitigating actions were not 
explicitly described.  
The Comco managers and employees showed initial efforts to link activities 
to those of Multifirm early in the acquisition process. However, after their 
unit was integrated organizationally into Multifirm there was little evidence 
of mobilizing or mitigating actions. My findings indicate initial mobilizing 
efforts that were thwarted by the Multifirm organization. For example, the 
Comco employees initially described trying to get contact with the Multifirm 
organization to cooperate in customer efforts and link activities across the 
firm boundaries. These were being turned down by the Multifirm 
organization.  
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Vizcom also dealt with the disruptions from Multifirm with buffering actions 
and ad hoc solutions. They argued that keeping the consultants happy was 
imperative both for retention of personnel, but also to keep them productive. 
There is also evidence of the Vizcom employees taking the initiatives to link 
activities across the firm boundaries. However, the Vizcom management 
emphasized that it was important for them to focus on their own business. 
They described a pull between doing what was best for the unit Vizcom and 
doing what was best for the whole of Multifirm. My findings indicate that 
there was a low level of mobilizing actions and explicit mitigating actions 
being performed by the Vizcom managers.  
In the Source acquisition the mitigating actions performed by the managers 
were mostly related to assuring consultants about their autonomy and using 
humor to deal with the impositions from Multifirm. Few mobilizing efforts 
were described initially. However, later on in the post-acquisition integration 
process some mobilizing efforts were evident. 
Target performing mitigating and mobilizing as theorized 
The mitigating and mobilizing actions performed by the target managers are 
here theorized as one concept. They refer to actions performed by managers 
and employees to facilitate integration and protect the employees from 
acquisition disruption. Mitigating actions refer to the actions performed by 
the target managers to ease the target employees’ concerns in the post-
acquisition integration phase. These actions help relieve ambiguity and 
uncertainly and through this keep the target employees focus on business-as-
usual, instead of being consumed by integration specific concerns. 
Mitigating actions are related to human integration (Birkinshaw et al. 2000).  
On the other hand, mobilizing actions are related to task integration. They 
involve initiating meetings with the acquiring firm to find possibilities for 
cross-sales, and promoting the target’s competencies in the acquiring firm as 
to facilitate cooperation. They also involve bringing back to the target 
organization information about the acquirer. The target managers know the 
acquired business and the acquired employees to the extent that they can 
provide the link between the two organizations. Their important role in post-
acquisition integration has been documented by Graebner (2004). 
Mitigating and mobilizing actions have in the existing literature been treated 
as two distinct concepts (Graebner 2004). In my data they appeared to be 
intertwined. Actions were motivated by a desire to combine resources and 
link activities in order to ease employees’ concerns. On the other hand, many 
of the employees’ concerns were related to the task integration, specifically 
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to the fate of their products and technologies. Therefore, the mobilizing 
actions performed by the managers had mitigating results. For example, the 
Teknico managers emphasized Teknico resources in the Multifirm 
organization, fronting their technologies. As the employees saw that 
Multifirm accepted and used their competence and knowledge, this lead to 
an easing of their integration concerns. The incidents where the themes 
relating to mobilizing and mitigating occurred, I interpreted the data as these 
concepts occurred intertwined. Mitigating and mobilizing actions can be 
evident empirically through several findings. First employees can describe 
their managers mitigating and mobilizing actions directly. Also, indirectly 
mitigating and mobilizing actions can be evident in the results of the 
integration process. For example, satisfied employees, cooperation between 
units, accounts of Multifirm using target technologies, etc. 
I argue that mitigating and mobilizing actions are the main mechanism 
through which the target influences the acquiring firm with their resources, 
competencies and capabilities. As such it is an important mechanism of push 
of target competencies and capabilities on the acquiring organization, or 
what I have called the contributive capacity of the target.   
11.3.3 Individual level autonomy 
Autonomy emerged as an important category through how the employees’ 
anticipated the integration would affect their individual task autonomy, 
authority, access to information and resources, and general ability to make 
decisions. This category was theorized from the respondent’s accounts of 
beliefs of the potential for individual action, and the forces constraining their 
actions.  
Autonomy issues, issues regarding individual level decision power and 
target autonomy, were salient theme in all the acquisitions. However, the 
data shows variation in terms of how these issues were perceived, to what 
extent they were salient and the degree to which the organizational members 
regarded the acquisition to have had an impact on their individual level of 
autonomy. This variation is presented in Table 9, which shows how the 
second order category of autonomy is grounded in the first order themes. 
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Table 9: Individual autonomy: first order themes and quotes  
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The empirical data 
Teknico employees described their individual decision power as being 
decreased in Multifirm. They described Teknico MNC as a system where 
they had had a great deal of decision making power and where the individual 
employee had had the freedom to shape their tasks and careers. They initially 
anticipated that less authority would be delegated to them, and their 
expectations appeared to be met. They focused on the Multifirm decision 
making schemes as complicated and slow, and completely dependent upon 
informal relationships and informal power structures. They also described 
these systems as unpredictable. My findings indicate that individual 
autonomy was an important issue in Teknico post-acquisition, and that the 
employees experienced a decrease in individual autonomy post-acquisition.  
Datagon employees expected that they would gain more freedom to perform 
their work and more individual decision-making power in Multifirm. Some 
time into the integration process, many employees described that their span 
of possible decisions to make was greater in Multifirm than in Datagon 
MNC. However, some employees reported that they still acted as if their 
decision making powers were restrained, and thus were not taking advantage 
of this increased authority in Multifirm. My findings indicate that the 
Datagon employees experienced an increase in individual autonomy, but that 
they were uncertain of how to exploit this.  
Comco employees described their individual decision power as being 
decreased in Multifirm. They described that they felt that the individual in 
the Multifirm system was restrained. They reported a lack of information 
and resources, which they explained as hampering individual initiative. My 
findings indicate that the Comco employees experienced less autonomy in 
the Multifirm system.  
Vizcom employees compared Multifirm to their prior owner with regard to 
their individual decision-making power and task autonomy. They felt the 
Multifirm system put less restraint on their actions, both individually and as 
a group. However, in the integration process some of the employees felt that 
their concerns were ignored. My findings indicate that the individual 
autonomy level was perceived as higher by the managers of Vizcom in the 
Multifirm system, than in the Vizcom MNC system,  but that some of the 
employees still felt their individual autonomy to be constrained by the 
Multifirm system. 
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In the interviews with the Source employees the idea of being able to make 
decisions in their customer projects and in general was important. Source 
employees focused on the freedom necessary to perform their work as 
consultants, which was an integral part of their identity. They voiced that 
they were independent from Multifirm. As such the hierarchical decision 
structure in Multifirm was contrasted to the perceived flat structure, and 
individual autonomy in Source. My findings indicate that the Source 
employees perceived autonomy constraints in the Multifirm system, but did 
not feel it threatened their own individual autonomy.  
Individual autonomy as theorized 
Individual autonomy refers to the target employees’ perceptions of own 
action space and authority in the new organization, in particular in terms of 
how they perform work in the new organization. It embodies the autonomy 
dimensions in the post-acquisition integration literature (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991; Chatterjee et al. 1992). However, from my data it is 
experienced as an individual level consequence. It is a consequence of the 
target firm’s autonomy and of the individual level consequences of this 
autonomy. In addition, it addresses the decision structures in the acquiring 
firm, and the consequences of these on the individual. It has a collective 
dimension in that decision-making and autonomy are issues that seemed to 
be constantly discussed and interpreted by the members of the organization. 
In post-acquisition integration processes new decision structures and 
authority regimes are imposed on the employees of the target. The 
perception of individual decision making power in the new organization 
influences the employees’ perceptions of their ability to impact their 
surroundings.  
My data shows that perceptions of individual decision power and task 
autonomy were important themes that respondents addressed in the 
interviews. The perception of the level of individual autonomy in the new 
organization varied between the targets. My findings indicate that the 
absolute level of decision power is less important than the change 
experienced in the relative level of decision power. The employees’ 
perceptions of loss or gain of individual decision power were relatively 
consistent within the targets.  
11.4 The concept of target’s contributive capacity as theorized 
The idea that the target firm plays an important role in post-acquisition 
integration processes has to a large extent been ignored in the literature. The 
focus has been on the resources and capabilities the target brings with them 
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to the acquirer. However, the value creation from these resources and 
capabilities has been assumed to be dependent on the acquirer’s ability to 
successfully implement the acquisition. Research on value creation in post-
acquisition integration processes and on the performance of acquisitions has 
to a large extent focused on the acquirer and acquired managers’ actions. 
Few studies have focused on the target as an active participant influencing 
the post-acquisition integration process. However, there are some 
exceptions. Target managers have in some prior literature been suggested to 
be critical for value creation in acquisitions (Graebner 2004). This work is 
supported by the literature on organizational performance in general that 
emphasizes the contribution of middle manager as strategic actors for 
organizational outcomes (Currie and Procter 2005).  
I will argue that the contributive capacity of the target firm determines the 
potential impact the target can have on the acquiring firm. It refers to the 
target firm’s ability to leverage its knowledge, competencies, and 
capabilities in post-acquisition integration. As described, the contributive 
capacity of the target is based on 3 second order categories: 1) Cross-
organizational roles provide the structural mechanism of the concept. 2) The 
action mechanism is provided through the mitigating and mobilizing actions 
performed by the target managers. 3) The motivational mechanism of 
contributive capacity includes individual autonomy. Together these 
mechanisms provide the structural, action and motivational mechanisms 
through which the target can contribute to the acquiring organization. Below 
the concept of contributive capacity will be discussed, first in terms of 
individual autonomy, and then managerial action, roles and responsibilities.  
11.4.1 Individual autonomy: perceptions and actions 
Individual autonomy is here seen as both a facilitator and a restraint on the 
actions of the employees of the target firm. It is also an explanation the 
employees in the target firms used for their failed mitigating and mobilizing 
efforts. The second order category of individual autonomy provides an 
important mechanism in the overarching concept of contributive capacity of 
the target.  
Individual autonomy emerged from the data as critical in the organizational 
members’ accounts of the target and acquirer. Decision power was a salient 
dimension used to describe the organization. Individual autonomy refers to 
the units and the individuals beliefs of constraints upon their actions in the 
new organization. The findings indicate that the lack of individual autonomy 
was claimed to be major constraint upon individual action in some of the 
integrated firms. I argue that the category of “perceptions of autonomy” is an 
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important factor in the way in which the target contributes to the acquiring 
organization.  
The immediate and intuitive assumption would be that an increase in 
autonomy would give employees the drive and possibilities to act. However, 
my findings indicate the opposite. Datagon expected changes post-
acquisition in terms of a higher level of individual autonomy and decision 
processes that were perceived to be less rule oriented. However, the potential 
for individual action implied by this did not seem to be exploited by the 
employees. My data shows that the Datagon managers did not exploit the 
fewer constraints on their individual decision power to promote and front 
their knowledge and capabilities. There is little evidence of them performing 
mobilizing actions. My findings indicate that in increased autonomy was 
associated with fewer mobilizing actions on the part of the target employees. 
From the Teknico case there was a reported decrease in individual autonomy 
for Teknico employees. However, here this decrease seemed to facilitate 
action, and hence the contributive capacity of the firm. The change in 
autonomy did not work as constraints on action, as would be intuitively 
assumed. Rather, the feelings of constraint seemed to fuel mitigating and 
mobilizing actions in post-acquisition integration. Another explanation could 
be that because the Teknico employees were mitigating, challenging the 
organization and linking activities, they experienced the limits of autonomy, 
whereas the employees that did neither did not experience the limits to 
autonomy. This implies that the employees only noticed the lack of 
autonomy because they were mobilizing and actively making decisions. In 
the Datagon acquisition, the target did not attempt to mobilize or proactively 
take charge, and thus did not meet the limits of individual autonomy. 
Nevertheless, I argue that low levels of experienced decision power are 
somehow associated with mobilizing and mitigation. I argue that the first 
explanation from my findings seem most feasible, however, the link to 
contributive capacity is still in individual autonomy motivating or restraining 
action in the target. 
My findings indicate that contributive capacity may be fueled by the belief 
that the new organization provides limited individual autonomy. This drives 
the desire to push the target’s knowledge and competencies on the acquiring 
firm. I argue that there is a relationship between these concepts and that 
individual autonomy is an important motivational factor. The Teknico 
employees expressed fears of not being able to use their competencies and 
knowledge in the new organization. They subsequently mobilized and 
promoted their competencies. In this manner organizational level identity 
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orientation and threat to identity by the acquisition integration facilitates the 
leveraging of organizational level contributive capacity.  
Individual autonomy was also an important issue in the Vizcom and Source 
acquisitions. However, as they were not organizationally integrated to the 
same extent, the links between these targets and Multifirm were mostly 
through the leaders. The autonomous consulting targets emphasized their 
individual decision power as something inherent in their way of doing 
business. This is in line with prior literature on professional service firms 
(Empson 2000). Vizcom and Source dealt with decision power as a matter of 
pride and status. The mantra was “you need forgiveness, not permission” to 
do something. This was argued to be important because their clients and 
their work changed too fast for the authoritarian decision structures of 
Multifirm.  
The consultants did not really experience any impositions or any large 
changes in their individual decision making power. Because of their 
organizational independence, they did not perceive that their individual 
autonomy would change in the Multifirm structure. Instead, they kept on 
doing “business as usual”. Because they were not integrated, the contact 
between the targets and the Multifirm structure was minimal on 
administrative issues. For example, they had some common projects, 
responded to some headquarter HR or control issues, but apart from that they 
were fairly independent. This is also related to the mitigating actions of the 
managers, which acted as a buffer between Multifirm’s demands and 
restrictions on the one hand, and the consultants in the target on the other 
hand. 
Vizcom and Source employees described a lack of individual decision power 
as a quality of the Multifirm system. It was described as a characteristic of 
the system that made it incompatible with the Vizcom and Source 
organizations and cultures. Issues regarding individual decision making 
power were salient in these two acquisitions in stories of how independent 
the consultants were, and how performing their work for their clients was 
dependent on them being able to make decisions without restrictions. Both 
targets emphasized the importance of the consultants having freedom to 
define their own job and the required task autonomy for performing 
consulting work successfully. These descriptions were juxtaposed to how 
they perceived Multifirm to be. Individual decision making was a 
characteristic feature of their organization that distinguished them from 
Multifirm.  
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11.4.2 Managerial action, roles and capabilities 
My data shows that the target managers showed different patterns of actions 
in the post-acquisition integration phase in the different cases. The degree 
and way they took on cross-organizational roles, performed mitigating and 
mobilizing actions, and their perceptions of individual autonomy, all deal 
with the target’s capacity to contribute to value creation post-acquisition. 
From my data a variety of themes emerged referring to the target firm’s 
active part in acquisition integration and the interaction of the target and 
acquiring organizations, characteristics, actions and perceptions.  
The target’s actions, characteristics and role in providing their knowledge 
and competency to the acquirer have emerged from my data as critical in 
post-acquisition integration. Both target and acquiring firm respondents 
described how the target managers and employees performed mitigating and 
mobilizing actions and had cross-organizational roles. I have identified this 
as contributive capacity. It interacts with the acquiring firm’s absorptive 
capacity to combine the firms’ resources and capabilities to create value 
from the acquisition. The impact of the footprint the target leaves on the 
acquiring organization is an indication of what the target has been able to 
absorb, but also of the contributive capacity of the target.  
Social integration impacts learning through either use of formal 
coordinators, or informal networks (Zahra and George 2002). As such, the 
establishment of cross-organizational roles implies a formal coordinator, and 
through this a social integration mechanism that may promote knowledge 
transfer. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue the need for individuals at the 
interface between the firm and the external environment, or between 
subunits of the firm to facilitate knowledge transfer. These roles are an 
important factor constituting absorptive capacity of the firm. My findings 
indicate that these roles and functions are important for the contributive 
capacity of the target firm, as well. These interface functions can be seen as 
parallel to Graebner’s (2004) cross-organizational roles. My data shows that 
the target managers or employees assuming these roles allow the target 
opportunities to contribute with its knowledge. They also facilitate the 
mobilizing and mitigating actions performed by the target managers. On the 
other hand, having cross-organizational roles and responsibilities put the 
managers in situations where they have the authority, knowledge and support 
needed to perform mitigating and mobilizing actions.  
The extent to which the targets were perceived to have contributed with their 
competencies and knowledge and the impact they had had on Multifirm 
varied. My findings indicate a high level of contributive capacity in the 
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Teknico case. It was low in the Datagon and Comco cases, whereas the 
Vizcom and Source cases had a medium contributive capacity. The data 
shows variations in levels of contributive capacity across the cases and over 
time. There were different dynamics involved in the emergence of 
contributive capacity, as well as in the ramifications on the development of 
the integration process. 
11.5 Acquirer’s absorptive capacity: the need for interaction, 
mitigating and mobilizing and fragmentation and ambiguity 
Absorptive capacity is a concept discussed in prior literature. Absorptive 
capacity has been defined as a firm’s ability to recognize, assimilate and use 
new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Absorptive capacity emerged 
in my material and is theorized from the second order categories of 1) 
Perceived need for interaction: the degree to which the acquirer perceives it 
is necessary to interact with the target organization to gain access to 
competencies in the target firm, or simply because integration made 
interaction necessary. 2) Acquirer performing mitigating and mobilizing 
actions: actions performed by acquiring firm managers and employees to 
facilitate human or task integration. 3) Organizational structure: how the 
acquiring organization’s decision-making, information systems, routines and 
processes were aligned with the targets’.  Figure 6 shows the first order 
themes, the second order categories and the overarching concept of 
acquirer’s absorptive capacity.  
 
Figure 6: First order themes and second order categories for the 
overarching concept of acquirer’s absorptive capacity 
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Each section below addresses one of the three second order categories that 
together make up the overarching dimension of acquirer’s absorptive 
capacity. They also cover how each second order category was theorized 
through the first order themes in the data, how it varies between the cases 
and how it is linked to prior literature. Following this, the step from the three 
second order categories to the overarching dimension of acquirer’s 
absorptive capacity is presented.  
11.5.1 Acquirer perceived need for interaction 
The data shows that the need for interaction with the targets perceived by 
Multifirm varied across the cases. All the three fully integrated targets were 
perceived to have few resources, capabilities and competencies that were 
valuable to the acquiring firm, besides the products and markets they 
brought with them. Teknico was perceived initially to not bring anything 
except the Teknico MNC customer. As such, most Multifirm employees saw 
little need for interaction with the integrated targets.  The level of initiatives 
from the acquirer in terms of tactical integration was also low. However, 
even though the autonomous consulting targets did not have complementary 
deliveries, this did not deter the perceived need for interaction in terms of 
establishing customer contacts and initially attempting to control target 
businesses. These targets had higher status, perceived valuable knowledge 
and competencies. As such the perceived need for interaction includes the 
relevance and value of specific competencies, but also of more general 
attributes. The need for interaction varied according to whether respondents 
believed the target had valuable knowledge or capabilities that could 
contribute to Multifirm business, as in the consulting firms, or whether the 
level of integration itself made interaction necessary, as in the fully 
integrated targets. The first order themes, along with quotes showing how 
these themes are grounded in the data are presented for the second order 
category of perceived need for interaction in Table 10.  
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Table 10: Acquirer perceived level of integration: first order themes and 
quotes 
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Empirical findings 
In the Teknico acquisition the Multifirm employees to a large degree 
expressed that Teknico had the same competencies as them, and as such, 
access to new competencies did not drive a need to interact. In addition, the 
customers they brought were described to be relatively small and 
insignificant (except the Teknico MNC customer). As such, the Multifirm 
respondent did not perceive of Teknico to have resources that the rest of the 
Multifirm system could take advantage of. The main reason for acquiring 
Teknico was the access to and the competencies connected to the Teknico 
MNC customer. Besides this there was little perceived need to interact from 
the Multifirm system. My findings indicate that there was a relatively low 
degree of perceived need for interaction. 
In the Datagon acquisition the need for interaction varied among the 
Multifirm employees. The basis for the low degree of need for interaction 
with Datagon was argued to be that Datagon had customers in a different 
segment, and as such it was not that important to have a great deal of 
interaction with Datagon.  
In the Comco acquisition Multifirm employees focused on the Swedish 
business and seemed to pay little attention to their Norwegian business. The 
Norwegian part of the acquisition was perceived to add little value to 
Multifirm. Multifirm employees emphasized that Comco’s customers were 
small compared to Multifirm’s. Later in the integration process some 
respondents pointed out that Comco’s competency in the SMB market was 
of strategic importance to Multifirm. Comco’s competencies for billing 
customers were also a learning point for Multifirm. The desire and perceived 
need for the Multifirm respondents to interact with Comco did seem rather 
low. Even though these three targets were to be fully integrated in Multifirm 
there was little expressed need for interaction. 
Vizcom and Source were perceived to have important competencies and 
customer relationships that could be exploited by Multifirm. Their autonomy 
made the need for interaction to be based on access to specific capabilities, 
and not dependent on a general need to interact to link their business to 
Multifirm. The attitude in the Multifirm organization towards these targets 
varied. Whereas some expressed that these target were to remain 
autonomous, and as such Multifirm did not need to interact with them, others 
expressed the need for interaction based on access to valuable customers and 
competencies. In addition, the targets expressed that Multifirm employees 
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sought interaction with Vizcom and Source because they were more 
attractive firms.  My findings indicate that there was a relatively strong need 
for interaction based on access to valuable knowledge and competencies.  
Perceived need for interaction as theorized 
The perceived need for interaction as I define it is motivated by the expected 
gains the acquirer perceived to get from the target. In my data this need for 
interaction was expressed by the acquiring firm respondents as the degree to 
which they felt that they could benefit from interaction with the target and 
the degree to which it was necessary for them to interact.  
The need to interact appeared in my data through several themes. First, the 
expected operational and tactical gains the acquirer assumed they could 
achieve from the interaction with the target. This referred to the benefits of 
accessing valuable target firm competencies, resources and customer 
relationships for the acquiring firm managers and employees. Acquiring firm 
managers and employees evaluated the benefits of interaction based on these 
assets. In addition, the degree to which the announced mode of 
organizational integration made interaction necessary provided a rationale 
for the individual employee in terms of how connected they felt they needed 
to be with the target, and how relevant and related to their everyday tasks the 
target was. Lastly, there was an expressed individual motive in a desire to 
interact and be part of a more attractive firm, such as Vizcom and Source 
represented.  
The perceived need for interaction with the target embodies the “intent to 
learn”  at the outset of the deal and of pre-acquisition overlap of technology 
as mentioned by Mowery et al (1996) in discussing pre-alliance 
contingencies for absorptive capacity.  Perceived need for interaction is 
related to the ability to recognize the value of new experiences (Lane and 
Lubatkin 1998). Acquiring employees that recognize a large potential for 
new and valuable knowledge in a target firm, will more likely see the need 
and benefit of interacting with the target and learning from the target, than if 
the perceived potential for new knowledge or any contribution from the 
target firm is perceived as insignificant. The perceived need for interaction is 
the motivating mechanism in the concept of acquirer’s absorptive capacity as 
it provides the incentive for interacting.  
11.5.2 Acquirer performing mitigating and mobilizing actions 
The emergent themes theorized as acquirer mobilizing and mitigating actions 
were related to formal and planned integration efforts and to informal efforts 
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performed by individual managers. The data shows that Multifirm performed 
formal, planned integration initiatives in all 5 acquisitions. These included 
information meetings for new employees, initiatives to link sales activities 
across the firms, employee satisfaction surveys and other HR initiatives. The 
informal efforts relate to how the managers in Multifirm approached the 
target’s employees in post-acquisition integration. The first order themes, 
along with quotes showing how these themes are grounded in the data are 
presented for the second order concept of acquirer performing mobilizing 
and mitigating actions in Table 11.  
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Table 11: acquirer mitigating and mobilizing: first order themes and quotes 
 175
 
Empirical findings 
Teknico employees reported that Multifirm managers were slow to use and 
acknowledge their tools and competencies. They also reported that Multifirm 
managers lacked the flexibility to allow for incentives to ease employee 
frustration with a stressful integration process. In terms of task integration, 
there were reports of Multifirm managers and their way of working 
hindering Teknico customer relationships.  However, my data also shows 
that planned efforts to integrate Teknico employees were well carried out.  
As such my findings indicate that formalized mobilizing and mitigating 
initiatives were well carried out, whereas there was a lack of more informal 
mitigating and mobilizing actions. 
Some Datagon managers expressed a lack of management support in the 
integration process to link their activities to the Multifirm system, and in 
getting support for their strategy. They also described a lack of information 
from the Multifirm managers. However, the data shows little evidence of the 
lower level Datagon employees experiencing a lack of support. There are 
few themes describing the Multifirm managers’ actions in post-acquisition 
integration except for the formal integration activities, which were evaluated 
as good.  My findings indicate that formalized mitigating and mobilizing 
actions, through integration initiatives, were performed by the Multifirm 
management. However, my findings indicate that these formalized 
mitigating and mobilizing actions did not sufficiently ease the Datagon 
managers concerns. Initially there was a lack of mobilizing efforts to 
integrate Datagon business.  
Comco respondents described the Multifirm managers as performing 
formalized integration initiatives aimed at integrating the Comco employees 
administratively into the Multifirm organization. They described a lack of 
information and a lack of support in terms of integrating their business, 
technologies and processes. My findings indicate that formalized mitigation 
efforts were perceived as well carried out. However, the results in terms of 
task integration show a lack of mobilizing efforts from the Multifirm 
managers. 
Vizcom employees experienced Multifirm managers as performing 
formalized integration initiatives successfully. They also describe Multifirm 
managers as initiating initiatives to coordinate customer activities across 
firm boundaries, and Multifirm managers as being engaged in the Vizcom 
business. However, they perceived some of these actions as imposing. My 
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findings do indicate that Multifirm managers performed mitigating and 
mobilizing actions, and that these actions had mobilizing and mitigating 
effects. For example, acquiring firm managers took the initiative to meet 
with Vizcom to plan common sales initiatives that resulted in cooperative 
efforts.  
Source employees described Multifirm managers as being lenient and easing 
the integration process by giving Source a lot of freedom to conduct its 
business. They described the Multifirm managers as experienced and 
professional in the post-acquisition process. However, some of the Multifirm 
management initiatives were described as interfering with their business, 
taking a lot of their time away from business as usual, and as an illegitimate 
effort to gain control over their business from the acquirer. In addition, some 
of these efforts were perceived as not being compatible with their business 
and their culture. My findings indicate that Multifirm managers did perform 
mitigating and mobilizing actions in the post-acquisition integration process.  
Acquiring managers mobilizing and mitigating actions as theorized 
The themes relating to acquiring managers mitigating and mobilizing actions 
are both formal and informal actions performed to intentionally or 
unintentionally ease employees’ concerns or facilitate operations across 
former firm boundaries. The actions of the acquiring firm managers are to a 
large extent related to acquiring firm’s acquisition integration schemes and 
transition methods, in addition to the more informal actions performed by 
individual managers. These actions are comparable to the mitigating and 
mobilizing actions performed by target management described in the 
contributive capacity section.  
The themes theorized as mitigating and mobilizing actions performed by the 
acquirer were largely related to the planned human integration efforts. These 
are mitigating and mobilizing efforts carried out to ease the combining of the 
two firms. These integration efforts include introductory courses, dealing 
with payroll, location issues, work contracts, and everything that 
administratively integrated the employees. As Multifirm was a multiple 
acquirer these activities were routinized and explicit in Multifirm. By the 
targets, these efforts were seen as thoroughly and meticulously carried out. 
They acknowledged Multifirm’s integration experience, and the integration 
schemes led to descriptions of Multifirm as a “well run integration train”, 
that ploughed its way into the target firms, disregarding their insight and 
objections and concerns.  
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Mobilizing actions appear in my material as actions performed to link 
activities, technologies and processes. These are conceptually distinct from 
the mitigating actions performed by managers. However, my findings 
suggest that the mobilizing actions performed by acquiring firm managers 
may have mitigating consequences. The intended consequences are to link 
activities, and the unintended windfalls are mitigation of both target and 
acquiring firm employees’ concerns. In addition, many of the employees’ 
concerns are connected to the integration of their business. In the same 
manner, the mitigating actions lay the foundation for the connecting of 
activities across the borders of the target and acquiring firms, and as such 
have mobilizing effects. 
The mitigating and mobilizing actions performed by acquiring firm’s 
managers are the action mechanism in acquiring firm’s absorptive capacity. 
11.5.3 Organizational structures and systems 
Organizational structure emerged in my data as themes about the division of 
information, resources and authority in Multifirm. The first order themes did 
not vary much across the cases. Respondents from all the acquisitions 
reported that the Multifirm structure was fragmented and that decision 
structures were ambiguous. Many explained that this was because many 
prior acquisitions had not been properly integrated, and instead existed as 
sub-units with their routines and “ways of doing things”. The independent 
targets responded differently to this fragmentation as they to a large extent 
felt they did not really need to deal with it. The first order themes, along with 
quotes showing how these themes are grounded in the data are presented for 
the second order concept of alignment of systems and structures in Table 12. 
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Table: 12 Organizational structure: first order themes and quotes 
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The empirical findings 
Teknico employees described the integration process as fraught with 
ambiguous decision making and ambiguous decision routines. They 
described that a couple of years into the integration process, Multifirm lost 
focus on integration issues, and that also prior acquisitions had been 
insufficiently integrated. This resulted in co-existing and incompatible 
routines, technologies and processes. My findings indicate that Teknico 
encountered a misalignment in organizational structures. 
Datagon employees perceived the Multifirm organization as difficult to 
maneuver in. They also mentioned that there was a lack of communication 
between units in Multifirm and a lack of coordination between the units. My 
findings indicate that Datagon perceived the organizational structures as 
ambiguous.  
 The Comco employees were integrated in such a manner that the Comco 
organization appeared fragmented to the employees, and their business was 
reported to be “lost” in the Multifirm system. The Comco employees 
described the Multifirm organization as fragmented and not aligned with 
their business. My findings indicate that the Multifirm organizational 
structure and systems did not support the Comco business post-acquisition.  
Vizcom employees initially had problems with the IT-systems in Multifirm. 
This lead to frustration because the systems would not accommodate them, 
and the Multifirm organization used a long time to respond to these issues. 
They described an inflexible organization that was not aligned with their 
business. My findings indicate that the Multifirm organization and systems 
were not aligned with the Vizcom organization. 
Source employees described Multifirm’s decision making structures and 
systems as incompatible with their way of operating. They also described the 
Multifirm organization as fragmented and ambiguous, and the division of 
roles and responsibilities as not optimal. My findings indicate that the 
Multifirm organization and systems were not aligned with the Source 
organization. However, as they perceived to be independent from Multifirm, 
these issues were assumed to be that important. 
Multifirm employees and managers also described the organizational 
structure and decision structure of Multifirm as fragmented. The main cause 
was expressed to be several acquisitions that through the years had not been 
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properly integrated. This referred to acquisitions made a few years prior to 
the focal acquisitions. Another salient issue was the issue of decision making 
not following the formal structure and being dependent on named 
individuals, instead of following formal authority structures or being 
dependent on the necessary competency of the decision maker. 
Organizational structures as theorized 
Organizational structure as it emerged, and as I have defined it, is related to 
the distribution of information, resources and authority in the organization. 
Organizational structure is empirically and theoretically linked to decision 
making processes in the organization. From the target respondents this was 
theorized through first order themes dealing with the flow of information, 
resources and authority. These first order themes dealt with issues such as 
unclear reporting structures, unpredictable decision making, perceptions of 
conflicting information and a conflict in what top management 
communicated and what the employees perceived to actually happen. The 
perceptions of organizational structures were relatively similar among the 
cases. However, this category emerged in the data as a relative concept. 
Respondents compared the organizational structure of the acquirer to their 
prior owner or target unit’s organizational structure. As such, this concept 
also embodies alignment of organizational structures and changes in 
organizational structures.  
My data suggests that the acquiring organization, specifically because of its 
history of mergers and acquisitions, was perceived to have a fragmented 
organizational structure by the target employees. To some extent prior 
acquisitions had been integrated in the firm. However, several units still 
referred to prior owners and the way they did things, or their technology as 
having roots in prior owners. Even though the targets were organizationally 
integrated, prior organizational cultures, identities and structures were salient 
and contributed to the acquiring firm appearing fragmented and decision 
structures being ambiguous. The expressed fragmentation in organizational 
functions and ambiguity about roles and responsibilities hindered the 
absorptive capacity of the acquirer. As this was assumed to be due to prior 
acquisitions not being sufficiently integrated, it led to ambiguity surrounding 
where and how authority and decision power resides. Work processes and 
routines remained from the prior targets and there were issues around 
conflicting norms and values in the Multifirm organization. These findings 
suggest that prior acquisition experience, though it could lead to absorptive 
capacity through an expanding knowledge base, could also diminish 
absorptive capacity through disruption of structures and processes necessary 
for knowledge transfer and learning between target and acquirer.  
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Regardless of the acquisition history of a potential acquiring firm, its 
organizational structures and decision making routines may appear 
fragmented and ambiguous to the target employees, merely because they are 
unfamiliar. However, the descriptions by the target employees of decision 
making being dependent on informal ties and individuals in Multifirm, 
supports the claim that the formalized organizational structure was not 
implemented sufficiently. 
 
11.6 Absorptive capacity as theorized 
In the case of acquisition integration, the acquirer needs to have the ability to 
recognize the knowledge, competencies and capabilities in the target firm to 
assimilate it into their organization and use these in their activities. In my 
data the concept of absorptive capacity was derived through first order 
themes dealing with the acquirer’s efforts to integrate and interact with the 
target. How the acquiring managers and employees acted and how the 
acquiring organization functioned in relationship to the targets. 
My findings suggest that absorptive capacity is not something an 
organization has as a constant capacity, but something it has in relationship 
to another organization or the external environment, and that can be 
leveraged given certain circumstances. Absorptive capacity refers to intent to 
learn, the degree to which the acquirer is able to recognize the knowledge, 
organize and use it. Here absorptive capacity is theorized from the second 
order categories that embody the perceptions of the acquiring managers 
(need for interaction), the actions of the acquiring firm (mitigating and 
mobilizing actions) and structural contingencies (organizational structure).  
Absorptive capacity refers not only to the acquirer’s ability to obtain, 
accumulate and assimilate knowledge, but to the ability to exploit and use 
that particular knowledge. In the event of an acquisition this means not only 
acquiring the competencies and transferring capabilities in the integration, 
but linking this knowledge to the existing knowledge base of the acquirer.  
Absorptive capacity is the capability to use outside knowledge, and it is a 
dynamic capability that allows firms to build other capabilities, such as 
marketing, production and distribution (Zahra and George 2002).  
Prior research on absorptive capacity in acquisitions is scarce, with some 
notable exceptions (Barkema and Nadolska 2003; Bjørkman et al. 2007). 
Some research has focused on both the acquirers’ and targets’ absorptive 
capacities, in that they focus on both units abilities to absorb capabilities 
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from one another (Bjørkman et al. 2007). However, studies have not focused 
on the capacity of one unit to contribute to another unit. By that I mean the 
unleashing of capabilities, knowledge and competency to influence the other 
unit. Absorptive capacity has been addressed in the acquisition context as an 
intermediate variable to account for organizational outcomes of acquisitions 
(Bjørkman et al. 2007).  
Absorptive capacity not only refers to the accumulation of the individual 
organizational members’ absorptive capacity, but also of the firm’s ability to 
transfer knowledge across and within units of the firm. Coordination 
mechanisms and structures are considered necessary for the acquisition and 
assimilation of knowledge. Learning from external sources needs to be 
supported by organizational structure. In an acquisition process, disruption 
may cause both fragmentation of structures and ambiguity surrounding 
integration issues in the organization. Organizational structure is assumed to 
be imperative to absorptive capacity. In particular, the communication 
structure between the organization and its environment, and within the 
organization between subunits (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Fragmented 
structures and ambiguous roles and responsibilities can therefore be seen as 
an inhibitor to knowledge transfer.  
Whereas the term absorptive capacity has been applied as referring to the 
firm’s interface with the environment, the event of acquisitions pose a hybrid 
of firm-environment (interfirm) and intrafirm knowledge and capability 
transfer that is not entirely external nor internal (Ranft and Lord 2002). In 
the target and acquirer dyad, the level of integration decides to what extent it 
is possible to empirically detect a two-way learning relationship. In 
organizationally integrated acquisitions, targets cease to exist as actors and 
unities after the integration. As such, detecting to what extent the former 
target has learned anything from the acquirer is empirically difficult to 
examine. Organizational level learning processes are difficult to detect in the 
target itself, as it is part of the newly merged organization.  
Absorptive capacity depends on the individuals at the interface of the firm 
and the external environment (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In post-
acquisition integration, several line managers, HR managers and integration 
team members involved in the acquisition are at this interface. They are 
involved with interpreting the target organization, competencies, structures 
and actions, making sense of these and how to integrate them with the 
acquiring firm’s organization, competencies, structures and actions. This 
relates to the managerial action, as represented by the acquiring firm 
managers’ mitigating and mobilizing actions. 
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Absorptive capacity is assumed to consist of prior knowledge base and 
intensity of effort (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Kim 1998). The individual 
units of knowledge that make up the firm’s prior knowledge base facilitates 
and increases the ability to make sense of and assimilate new knowledge. 
Exposure to diverse and complementary sources of knowledge increases the 
opportunities for developing absorptive capacity (Zahra and George 2002). 
Having complementary or competing knowledge is another factor that 
influences absorptive capacity. I will argue that this can occur through the 
perceived need for interaction as well as through the cognitive abilities to 
attach new knowledge to existing competing knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). A multiple acquirer like Multifirm, through various 
acquisitions of different target firms, has been exposed to differing 
knowledge bases. They have acquired targets with knowledge bases that are 
both complementary, but also with diverse specific knowledge. 
Subsequently the potential for development of absorptive capacity has been 
high. The targets have mostly been organizationally integrated in the 
acquirer. As such, it represents a type of grafting where Multifirm has added 
a unit that possesses some type of knowledge or resource they need, but do 
not possess themselves (Huber 1991). On the other hand, some of 
Multifirm’s acquisitions have to a large extent been scale-driven, in that they 
are acquiring more of the same type of resources and knowledge that they 
possess already to gain scale advantage. This was the case particularly with 
Teknico, Datagon and Comco.  
The data indicates that the acquisitions varied in the extent to which the 
acquirer possessed the ability to obtain, accumulate and assimilate 
knowledge from the different targets. This suggests that absorptive capacity 
is relative and context dependent, and not a static capability of the firm.  
Prior acquisition experience is argued to be a deterrent in terms of 
expressing a need for interaction. As acquirers become more experienced, 
the need to interact and gain feed-back from the target regarding integration 
issues may decrease with the acquirer’s increasing self-confidence in its own 
integration competency. Through formalized integration initiatives and 
integration routines, the acquirer may perceive the need for interaction to 
decrease, as they trust their processes and routines to be sufficient. The 
concept of not invented here is described in the literature dealing with 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In my data it emerged as a 
concept describing patterns of inertia in the acquiring firm. This inertia is 
described as the acquiring firm resisting to accept new ideas from their 
environment, namely the target organization. This resistance may be linked 
to the lack of perceived need for interaction, the acquirer perceiving the 
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target’s knowledge base irrelevant, or the acquirer’s own knowledge being 
considered as superior.  
Intensity of effort implies the amount of energy expended by organizational 
members to solve problems (Kim 1998). My findings indicate that this 
energy expended and intensity of effort materializes in mitigating and 
mobilizing actions from the acquirer. The perceived potential for knowledge 
and the potential benefits from that knowledge represents the perceived need 
for interaction. This provides the incentives for actions by the acquirer. 
Parallel to this is the concept of intent to learn (Mowery et al. 1996). 
Absorptive capacity is as such a combination of effort made to learn and 
knowledge bases of the firms. 
The concept of absorptive capacity is built upon organizational structure 
issues, the actions of managers and members of the organization (mobilizing 
and mitigating) and perceptions of the employees (perceived need for 
interaction). It includes the motivation, the actions, and the leveraging or 
constraining organizational structures impose upon action. R&D activities 
are assumed to be a facilitator for firm’s learning in other areas. R&D 
activities act as a primer for other learning (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In 
the same manner, one could assume that acquisition experience would act as 
a primer for integrating later targets, as experienced acquirers repeatedly had 
integrated target firms’ knowledge and capabilities,.  
In conclusion, the first two concepts, “perceived need for interaction” and 
“mitigating and mobilizing actions”, correspond to the intent to learn or 
intensity of effort. These are motivational or incentive aspects of absorptive 
capacity. The perceived need for interaction is the motivation behind the 
intensity of effort, which materializes in the mitigating and mobilizing 
efforts. “Organizational structure and systems”, refers to the structures that 
facilitate or hinder knowledge transfer and learning from the target.  
11.7 Acquisition performance 
Acquisition performance is in this thesis broadly defined as the value 
creationor value-destruction that follows as a result of the acquisition. It is a 
response to the question of whether the acquisition was a success or not. The 
overarching dimension of acquisition performance was predefined as an 
important concept in my research questions. I wanted to investigate how the 
outcomes of an acquisition are generated.  
Table 13 summarizes some categories of acquisition outcomes reported 
about 2-3 years after the acquisitions were announced. These were categories 
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deductively derived from the literature on acquisitions. They are important 
themes related to acquisition performance (Lubatkin et al. 1999; Graebner 
2004). 
 
Table 13: Overview overall reported performance  
Acquisition performance is an overarching concept that framed the research 
questions. I asked the informants explicitly about the performance and 
outcomes from the acquisition. From the accounts of the respondents I 
abstracted some first order themes related to acquisition performance, and 
second order categories were specified: 1) Expected outcomes: outcomes 
and benefits that motivated the deal and that was part of the business case. 2) 
Serendipitous outcomes: unexpected outcomes and benefits from the 
acquisition.  Figure 7 shows the first order themes, the second order 
categories and the overarching theme of acquisition performance. 
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Figure 7: First order themes and second order categories for the 
overarching concept of acquisition performance 
Each section below address one second order category that together make up 
the overarching dimension of acquirer’s acquisition performance: how each 
second order category was theorized through the first order themes in the 
data, how it varies between the cases and how it is linked to prior literature. 
Following this the step from the two second order categories to the 
overarching dimension of acquisition performance is presented.  
11.7.1 Expected value 
The expected value creation refers to the benefits that motivated the deal. 
The first order themes, along with quotes showing how these themes are 
grounded in the data are presented for the second order concept of expected 
value creation in Table 14.  
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Table 14: Expected value: first order themes and quotes  
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The empirical evidence 
The Teknico acquisition was explained to have delivered according to the 
business case. The Teknico case was described as having provided the 
customer and the technologies expected. The acquisition allowed Multifirm 
to increase the volume on the deal with Teknico MNC, and take out 
synergies based on scale effects.  
The Datagon acquisition also delivered according to the business case. The 
motivation behind the deal was to gain access to the public sector market, 
and that was said to have been accomplished. However, some claimed that 
the organization and Datagon’s solutions had been in a worse state than 
Multifirm had expected. Even so the findings indicate that expected value 
was realized. 
The Comco acquisition also delivered according to the business case. It had 
provided the basis for growth in Sweden. My findings indicate that the 
expected value related to the overall business case was realized in this 
acquisition.   
The Vizcom acquisition delivered according to the business case. The price 
paid for Vizcom was claimed by the respondents to have been very low, and 
compared to this price the target performed very well. In addition the market 
for their services was very good post-acquisition.  
The Source acquisition provided Multifirm with the expected benefits and 
delivered according to the business case. The market for their services post-
acquisition was very good.  
Expected value as theorized 
Expected value refers to the benefits that were expected from the acquisition, 
which emerge as statements of the strategy behind the acquisition and how 
these had been realized. Expected value emerged as connected to the goals 
stated in the business case or in the explicit goals for the acquisition 
communicated to the stakeholders.  
The five acquisitions were all described as “according to business case” or 
“exceeding the business case” by the top management team. This implies 
that they delivered the value and benefits that were expected and expressed 
prior to the deal. Even though all acquisitions were categorized as 
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successful, the subjective evaluation of the overall performance of the 
acquisitions varied. Managers and employees judged the performance of the 
different acquisitions to vary in terms of the value generated from the 
acquisitions. This was elaborated by respondents both in the top 
management team and at lower levels of both target and acquiring firm.  
The business cases were presented to the boards of directors prior to the 
acquisition. They also provided the parameters for evaluating the extent of 
success. A problem in tracking performance according to the business case 
over a longer period, and particularly tracking the performance on financial 
or accounting based measures, is that as soon as the firms are integrated, 
separating the businesses to track performance is difficult. In addition, using 
the performance of the entire organizations is problematic, as there is no 
base line to measure performance against. The performance of the firm 
without the acquisition is impossible to measure.  
Acquisition performance has been measured in many ways. The abnormal 
return to shareholders is one way acquisition performance has been 
measured. This is calculated as the difference between actual stock returns 
and the return that would be expected given the market (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein 1999). For example, Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) used a 
window of three trading days before the announcement, and three trading 
days after the acquisition took place. These measures are dependent on the 
stock market being able to interpret the consequences of an acquisition as it 
is announced. Studies have shown, as discussed earlier, that the abnormal 
returns to shareholders are negative (Andre et al. 2004). However, there are 
problems related to using these measures, as stock prices are influenced by a 
multiplicity of factors. In my cases, the acquisitions were relatively small, 
and subjective evaluations from the top management team were that their 
stock prices were not affected by the acquisitions.  
The five acquisitions studied were all reported to have delivered the 
expected benefits. In terms of business case performance, they all met the 
expectations or exceeded the expectations. The targets that were integrated 
were more difficult to track after integration, however, subjective measures 
of how profitable they were judged them to be profitable.  
 
11.7.2 Serendipitous value 
I define serendipitous value creation as the unexpected windfalls from the 
acquisition. In my cases serendipitous value refers to the unexpected benefits 
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that either the target brought to the acquiring firm, or that accrued to the 
target through the acquisition. These can be in terms of learning, new 
knowledge, unexpected technology, or new ways of working. This concept 
has been theorized in prior literature, particularly by Graebner (2004). In the 
cases I studied it immediately emerged as an important distinction. As such, 
the concept of serendipitous value is grounded in the data.  
Serendipitous value creation is the construct that varied most across the 
cases. The first order themes, along with quotes showing how these themes 
are grounded in the data are presented for the second order concept of 
serendipitous value creation in Table 15.  
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Table 15: Serendipitous value: first order themes and quotes 
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The empirical evidence 
The Teknico acquisition was reported to have brought organizational and 
cultural renewal to Multifirm. The data suggests that serendipitous value was 
generated in the Teknico acquisition. There were reports of unexpected 
knowledge, work processes and a general renewal of the Multifirm 
organization resulting from this acquisition. Teknico had also supplied 
Multifirm with some new technologies and processes on a tactical level. 
Multifirm managers reported that Teknico had contributed with management 
potential and “creative and innovative” people. My findings indicate that the 
Teknico acquisition generated some serendipitous value for Multifirm.  
Regarding the Datagon acquisition few themes emerged regarding 
unexpected benefits. The respondents from Multifirm focused on Datagon 
having poorer solutions than expected, but reported no unexpected positive 
benefits. Some Datagon respondents emphasized that they had yielded 
systems, for example in terms of budgeting, to the Multifirm organization. 
As Datagon MNC is a firm well known for its elaborate management 
systems and structures this is not unexpected. As such, it is more unexpected 
that this potential did not get exposed in the interviews with the Multifirm 
respondents. There was little unexpected knowledge or other benefits 
described as accruing to Multifirm from this acquisition. My findings 
indicate no serendipitous value from the Datagon acquisition.  
The Comco acquisition in Norway was reported to have disintegrated after 2 
years. Many employees had left the firm. The Comco employees reported 
that their culture had been shattered and that there was nothing left of 
Comco. In retrospect Multifirm respondents claimed that the potential 
provided by Comco had not been realized in terms of benefits that appeared 
in the post-acquisition integration phase. For example, themes emerged in 
my data around the Norwegian part of Comco not utilizing the potential for 
developing a consulting practice for Multifirm. As such, my findings 
indicate that there was a potential for generation of serendipitous outcomes 
that was not exploited. The Comco case in Norway can in some ways be 
perceived to represent a case of value destruction. Not only was the 
acquisition reported to not have produced any unexpected benefits, there was 
also an explicit potential for serendipitous value creation noted both by 
Comco and Multifirm employees. 
In the Vizcom acquisition most themes relating to serendipitous outcomes 
emerged around benefits accruing to Vizcom as being a part of a large, solid 
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firm like Multifirm. Vizcom reported winning customers they would not 
have obtained access to in Vizcom MNC.  My findings indicate 
serendipitous outcomes accruing to the target firm.  
The Source acquisition was reported to have contributed to organizational 
renewal and “shaken up the culture” of Multifirm. Source employees 
reported getting access to customers through Multifirm directly, and because 
Source provided their customers with more security as part of a large system 
like Multifirm than as a stand-alone firm. In addition, both Source and 
Multifirm employees reported that the acquisition opened up new career 
paths for employees from both firms. My findings indicate serendipitous 
outcomes for both target and acquirer in the Source acquisition.  
 
Serendipitous value as theorized 
Serendipitous value was analyzed from themes related to both concrete 
technological and process benefits. In addition, qualitative benefits such as 
cultural and organizational renewal were voiced as important unexpected 
benefits. The degree to which these benefits were unexpected or were just 
benefits that did not motivate the deal, can be discussed. The descriptions of 
these benefits were voiced both by target and acquiring firm respondents.  
As the members of the organization told the stories about how they 
perceived the outcomes of the acquisition, these serendipitous benefits 
emerged. These were not specified prior to the deal, and were not part of the 
motivation for buying the targets. However, they were important in the 
descriptions of both target and acquirer employees in their stories about what 
the outcomes of the acquisitions had been. These included unexpected 
windfalls, such as the renewal of routines and processes, new technologies, 
an expressed renewal of organizational culture and other examples of 
learning.  
Prior studies examining the performance of acquisitions have to a large 
degree focused on contextually stripped variables. These variables do not 
take into consideration the unexpected windfalls of an acquisition. However, 
I argue that experienced managers factor in these unexpected windfalls 
implicitly when valuating acquisitions. So even though the overarching goal 
of the firm is to create value for the shareholders, making acquisitions that in 
the short run do not affect abnormal returns to shareholders need not be 
irrational, as there are long-term effects that are difficult to measure 
quantitatively in a reliable way. My research extends our understanding of 
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acquisition performance by building on Graebner’s (2004) concept of 
serendipitous value, and the mechanisms through which serendipitous value 
is created. Even though I define serendipitous value creation according to 
her definition, I further theorize the concept by elaborating on the 
contingencies for the realization of serendipitous value creation. This is 
discussed further in section 12.3. 
 
11.8 Value creation as theorized 
Value creation is defined as the benefits that accrue to either the acquirer or 
the target firm as a result of the acquisition. As I am interested in both short-
term and long-term benefits, I have included parameters that are detectable 
in the short run, like performance of the acquisition evaluated against the 
business case. In addition, I have included indicators of future value-
creation, in terms of reported transfer of capabilities, competence and 
technologies between the target and acquirer. The data shows acquisition 
performance as a construct consisting of a variety of unexpected benefits 
accruing to the acquiring or target organization, in addition to the expected 
motivational benefits.   
As mentioned in the literature review, explaining acquisition performance 
has been the main focus of a large body of research on acquisitions. Prior 
research on acquisitions has, as has been noted several times, not been able 
to explain performance. I argue that this in part is related to how 
performance has been measured. Based on the empirical findings from this 
study I find that perceptions of acquisition performance are fairly consistent 
within each case. That is the respondents from both sides of the dyad 
evaluate acquisition success in the same way.  
Furthermore, research has shown that on average acquisitions do not create 
value. Instead, value creation is considered to be the value that acquirers 
generate from the acquisition. When judged upon the stock prices of the 
acquirers, studies have found that acquisitions destroy rather than create 
value (Porrini 2004; Meyer 2008). My findings indicate that even though the 
acquirer could not see any value creation, judging by their stock prices, there 
was value created in all the acquisitions. I argue that the observed value 
creation in my cases, defined as reaching the strategic goals for the 
acquisition (expected value creation) and access to new capabilities, 
knowledge, resources and technologies not included in the business case, but 
judged by employees and managers of the target and acquiring firm to be 
valuable benefits accruing to either target or acquiring firm (serendipitous 
value) is contingent on the long term performance of the firm. I argue that by 
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including both the expected value creation and the serendipitous value 
creation, a long term perspective on value creation is introduced.  
I argue that value creation from acquisitions can be most accurately 
measured by not only taking into consideration the expected performance 
that initially motivated the deal. Evaluating all the capabilities and potential 
benefits from a target pre-entry is virtually impossible. Every acquisition 
will have unexpected potential for value or value that was expected to accrue 
to the acquirer that is not realized. Factoring in serendipitous value creation 
provides a more accurate picture of value creation, than evaluating only the 
expected benefits, when evaluating the performance of an acquisition. 
However, this includes having to deal with ambiguous and “subjective” 
measures, like knowledge creation, organizational renewal, and new 
strategic ideas. 
As expected value did not vary much across the cases, I have chosen to focus 
on explaining the generation of serendipitous value in post-acquisition 
integration in my further analysis in the next chapters. 
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12 Identity threats, integration and value creation 
In this thesis, I have argued that identity issues influence the post-acquisition 
integration process, and subsequently, that value is created in post-
acquisition integration.  More specifically, I started out posing two research 
questions: 
• How does organizational identity influence post-acquisition integration 
processes? 
• How does the post-acquisition integration process influence expected 
and serendipitous value creation? 
In this chapter, I investigate and argue for possible relationships between the 
concepts that emerged from my data and discuss these in light of prior 
research. My findings indicate that organizational identity threats impact on 
how the post-acquisition integration process evolves, through motivating 
action. Threats to the organizational identity of the target trigger perceptions, 
interpretations and actions to preserve this identity. As such, identity threats 
trigger the target’s contributive capacity. The target’s contributive capacity 
and the acquirer’s absorptive capacity interact and influence value creation 
in the acquisition. These proposed relationships are illustrated in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8: Emergent model: identity threat driving integration process and 
generating value 
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In post-acquisition integration, the firms come together to fulfill the 
objective of the acquisition. Integration implies the combination of the 
target’s and acquirer’s resources, capabilities and competencies to create 
value (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). Some acquisitions are explicitly 
carried out to gain access to new specific technologies, knowledge or 
resources. The strategic motives behind the acquisitions in this study varied. 
However, all the acquisitions represented a potential source for new external 
experiences, capabilities and competencies for the acquirer firm. There was a 
potential for the target to challenge existing knowledge, organizational 
culture and processes in the acquiring firm, ultimately leading to knowledge 
creation and learning.  
My findings indicate that not only does the organizational response to 
identity threats shape the way the integration process evolves, but it also 
shapes the potential for leveraging the absorptive and contributive capacities 
of the organizations to create or destroy value. As a result, my findings show 
that the interaction between the acquirer’s absorptive capacity and the 
target’s contributive capacity influences the outcomes of the acquisition.  
Empson’s (2000) high school dance metaphor for the integration process is 
useful to illustrate the interaction of the target and the acquirer organizations 
during a post-acquisition integration process: 
 
 
 
My findings indicate that 2-3 years after the announcements of the deals, 
granted their different integration level, the number of dance-partners, how 
they performed the dance, their motivation for dancing, and the outcomes of 
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the dance varied in the 5 cases. Understanding how and why the dance-floor 
took on such different patterns in the different cases is key to further the 
understanding of post-acquisition integration processes.  
Prior research on organizational identity and post-acquisition integration 
were the starting points for the study. Identity threat emerged as an important 
concept to understand the patterns of events and development of post-
acquisition integration processes. Based on my data, I can suggest some 
implications of the organizational responses to identity threats in the post-
acquisition integration process. If the acquisition is perceived to threaten the 
distinctive characteristics of the organization, granted that the organization is 
a meaningful and important category for organizational members, this may 
influence action, and subsequently, the integration processes and outcomes 
of the acquisition.  Identity threats triggered actions and the contributive 
capacity of the target. The contributive capacity of the target and the 
absorptive capacity of the acquirer tie organizational identity threats to 
acquisition outcomes. 
To answer the research questions, I have made some propositions as to the 
relationship between 1) organizational identity threats and the contributive 
capacity of the target, 2) the contributive capacity of the target and the 
absorptive capacity of the acquirer, and 3) how the interaction of these 
capacities influence serendipitous value-creation. These emergent findings 
and the propositions derived from these are discussed and juxtaposed to 
existing literature in the next chapters. This chapter provides a discussion of 
how the emergent data from the cases provide insight into the research 
questions.  
12.1 Responding to organizational identity threats: leveraging 
the contributive capacity of the target 
The first question I set out to answer was: How does organizational identity 
influence post-acquisition integration processes? I answer this question by 
showing how organizational identity threats influence the target’s 
contributive capacity in post-acquisition integration. Identity threats are 
conceptualized as the identity orientation of the target, their relative status 
and the perceived level of integration. My findings indicate that identity 
threats influence the contributive capacity of the target. This is 
conceptualized as the cross-organizational roles the target managers assume, 
the mitigating and mobilizing actions performed by target managers and the 
perceptions of individual autonomy.  
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12.1.1 Responding to organizational identity threats 
My findings show that target organizations respond to the event of an 
acquisition in very different ways. As discussed in my theory chapter, the 
literature on the “human side” of mergers and acquisitions has found that 
individuals are likely to respond negatively to the event of an acquisition 
(Buono and Bowditch 1989; Empson 2000; Empson 2001; Cartwright and 
Schoenberg 2006). The organizational identity literature has found that large 
changes may threaten an organization’s identity (Gioia and Thomas 1996; 
Ravasi and Schultz 2006). In addition, prior research on acquisitions show 
that threats to organizational identity cause disruption and conflicts in post-
acquisition integration (Empson 2001; Ullrich et al. 2005).  
My data supports this literature. However, my findings indicate that the 
emergence of threats to an organization’s identity may trigger collective 
action in the target, aimed at organizational self-enhancement. It can take the 
form of mobilizing actions, which are aimed at linking target and acquiring 
firm activities, and mitigating actions, which are aimed at shielding the 
organization from the disruptive effects of the acquisition. These mobilizing 
and mitigating actions, the cross-organizational roles managers take on and 
the level of autonomy perceived by the target together comprise the 
mechanisms of contributive capacity. As a result, I argue that organizational 
identity threats may generate beneficial outcomes in the post-acquisition 
integration process by leveraging the contributive capacity of the target.  
The case of Teknico illustrates the influence of organizational identity 
threats on the contributive capacity of the target. The Teknico target’s 
organizational identity was initially threatened by the acquisition. They 
perceived the integration process to leave their target unit as 
indistinguishable from the Multifirm organization. As they perceived 
Multifirm as having a less attractive organization and lower status, this 
threatened their self-perception. Responding to these threats the target 
employees and managers acted to protect their organizational identity. These 
actions included promoting their strategic capabilities, competencies and 
resources in the new organization. As such, I argue that the organizational 
identity threats experienced post-acquisition influenced the leveraging of 
their contributive capacity. 
On the other hand, in the Datagon acquisition there were low levels of threat 
to organizational identity. I argue that this lead to the low level of 
contributive capacity. The Datagon employees expressed that Multifirm had 
a more attractive organizational identity and more attractive features than 
their former owner. Subsequently, they did to some degree experience 
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identity enhancement through the acquisition. One could argue that this is 
connected to the target wanting a different owner for practical purposes, and 
for a different work environment. However, I argue that the data shows 
identity related issues. This implies that even though Datagon was 
organizationally fully integrated with Multifirm, and became 
indistinguishable from the Multifirm organization, this did not threaten the 
view of who they were as an organization. On the contrary, it was perceived 
to be a continuation of the target unit’s organizational identity. In the 
Datagon integration process, integration proceeded relatively smoothly. This 
finding is supported by social identity theory and research on acquisitions 
that find that providing continuity for the target employees is beneficial for 
acquisition integration (Ullrich et al. 2005). An acquisition that does not 
pose a threat to the organizational identity of the target, but rather enhances 
its identity, like the Datagon acquisition, can be assumed to lead to fewer 
disruptions and higher satisfaction with the acquisition among the target 
employees and smoother integration processes.  
I argue that responding to the threats of an acquisition triggered actions to 
protect and enhance organizational identity. From my data it seems that 
threats to organizational identity leveraged the target’s contributive capacity. 
I argue that identity threats trigger the target managers’ actions to push their 
own competency and knowledge in the integration process. In this manner 
the target firm’s contributive capacity is leveraged as the target firm seeks 
self-enhancement by actively acting to promote their capabilities, 
technologies, activities and knowledge to the acquirers in the integration 
process. This is line with Graebner’s (2004) work on target managers’ role in 
the acquisition integration process. Target managers’ actions proved to be 
critical for acquisition performance in her study. She found a direct link 
between the target manager’s actions and roles and value-creation. My 
findings support this, and specify the importance of the target in impacting 
value creation through the target’s contributive capacity. As such, I include 
mitigation and mobilization, cross-organizational roles and issues of 
individual autonomy to explain value creation through the contributive 
capacity of firm.  
12.1.2 Identity threats, integration and autonomy and contributive 
capacity 
My findings indicate that collective action is not only facilitated when 
people think of themselves in terms of a collective, as in when the 
boundaries of their organization are intact and they are distinguishable from 
the acquirer. When collective identities are triggered, people act on behalf of 
the collective (Brewer and Gardner 1996). My data shows that when the 
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target’s organizational identity is threatened, the target employees act on 
behalf of the target. Action on behalf of the target organization, that is, 
pushing target competencies and facilitating task integration is dependent on 
not only the perception of the target as a unit and the perception of 
organizational identity, but also that there is coordination within the unit to 
facilitate this action. This coordination is dependent on the target group to 
remaining intact and also the cross-organizational roles performed by 
managers. This leads to the paradox that for identity threats to emerge the 
target’s boundaries need to be challenged. Yet, for identity threats to elicit 
action on behalf of the target, the target still needs to exist as a group.  
Balancing integration and autonomy has been an important distinction in the 
literature on post-acquisition integration. This balancing act is a real 
challenge during acquisition integration. This refers to the need to preserve 
the strategic capabilities of the units on the one hand, and integrating the 
units to promote cross-organizational fertilization on the other. In my data, 
the concept of level of integration and more specifically the organizational 
members’ interpretations of level of integration, and how it would affect 
their organization, emerged as important themes. In my study the level of 
integration has been included as “perceived level of integration” and is one 
of the mechanisms of identity threats. In essence this is the dilemma between 
integrating the targets too fast, causing disruptions and ruining the strategic 
capabilities of the target, or integrating them too slowly, and not quickly 
utilizing the potential for new knowledge and capabilities in the target, and 
as I argue, losing the momentum of the triggering effects of organizational 
identity threats.  
The Comco case illustrates this point. They experienced identity threats after 
being organizationally split up. These organizational identity threats did not 
trigger action, because the Comco unit could not muster the energy based on 
organizational identity protection. The Comco target was integrated without 
the organization as the locus of identity, and did not have a common 
platform for action, a common purpose, or a unit to protect and preserve. 
Their contributive capacity remained untapped. Early in the acquisition 
integration process, the employees of Comco were motivated to act though 
what seemed like an individually oriented identity. Evidence of their 
professional identity being threatened appeared first in the later interviews, 
after integration process had lasted for some time and they had been exposed 
to the acquiring firm’s organization. The professional identity was embedded 
in the Comco unit. As such, an organizational identity orientation was 
triggered. Had their unit remained autonomous for a while, the strategic 
capabilities referred to later by both Multifirm and Comco employees could 
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have been protected and leveraged, as the intact Comco unit would have 
facilitated collectively based actions. 
In integration processes where the identity of the targets potentially would be 
threatened because of loss of status, and there is a strong identity orientation 
towards the target, being kept autonomous protects the target from 
experiencing identity threats. In addition, keeping the targets structurally 
separate protects the distinctiveness of the target’s identity and pushes 
collective action, as discussed earlier. In integration processes where there is 
intended autonomy, ambiguity in relations to operationalization of the 
integration strategy may initially cause defensive attitudes.  
The Vizcom and Source cases can illustrate this. I argue that keeping these 
consulting units autonomous was essential to the performance of these 
acquisitions. The acquisition did not initially pose an immediate threat to 
Vizcom’s identity. However, when the integration efforts were initiated 
ambiguities around their autonomy emerged. I have characterized the 
Vizcom acquisition as not having large issues with organizational identity 
threats. However, there were some ambiguities surrounding their autonomy 
immediately after the announcement of the deal. These ambiguities initially 
threatened their organizational identity. A loss of autonomy would mean a 
contamination from the lower status of Multifirm on their Vizcom identity. 
For a short period immediately following the announcement of the 
acquisition, issues surrounding branding and logo created some disturbance 
and disruption. The resolving of these autonomy issues early in the process, 
however, resolved identity threats.  
In the Source acquisition there were less explicit ambiguities surrounding 
Source’s autonomy, and subsequently less potential threat to their identity. 
They emphasized their autonomy, and this emphasizing can be interpreted as 
a way of nurturing and reinforcing their identity faced with a potential threat. 
In doing so, they dodged the threats posed to their identity by the acquisition. 
My data shows that these two targets initially showed a low level of 
contributive capacity. 
Knowledge intensive firms, like the consulting units, experience a more 
substantial disruption and strain from integration than other firms (Paruchuri 
et al. 2006). However, in the cases where autonomy was preserved, there 
seemed to be little threats to the targets’ organizational identity and little 
disruption. In the Comco case, the opposite was evident. The possible threats 
in the Vizcom and Source acquisitions were halted by target managers 
performing mitigating and mobilizing actions, and assuring the target 
employees that their unit would continue to exist as it had. In addition, the 
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Multifirm managers explicitly reassured the targets of their autonomy and 
allowed them the autonomy needed. However, these pulls between 
autonomy and integration were visible in the acquirer’s efforts to 
“streamline” control mechanisms, HR and financial reporting structures, etc. 
These efforts were perceived as invasive and threatened the autonomy of the 
target. They were also ridiculed, efforts to ignore them were 
institutionalized, and mitigating actions to avoid them were performed. As 
such, integration pressures were relieved and the acquisition did not pose a 
threat of contamination or decreasing status for the target employees.  
Empson’s study (2001) on knowledge transfer in a merger between 
professional service firms shows how threats to organizational identity (the 
fear of contamination and the fear of exploitation) act as impediments to 
knowledge creation and knowledge transfer post-acquisition. This may 
initially seem to be in contrast to my findings that identity threats leverage 
contributive capacity. However, I argue that this contradiction can be 
explained by the consulting firms’ organization and focus on access to 
customers, both on an organizational level, but also on an individual level. 
For example, the Teknico acquisition had a business that implied that the 
target and acquiring firm would cooperate to serve their customers. As a 
result, some time into the acquisition, they felt the need to leverage their 
common knowledge. Consultants on the other hand, both individually and on 
a group level, compete for the same clients. Their image and reputation are 
critical for client retention. From my data, it is evident that the consulting 
firms protected their clients and did not welcome Multifirm’s interference 
with their clients, in the end supporting Empson’s findings.   
An important factor that can help explain these issues of contamination, is 
the high status the consulting targets feel they have compared to the IT-
operations and IT-solutions units of Multifirm. This status is built on them 
defining their business as higher in the value chain. The businesses of the 
consulting targets and Multifirm’s IT operations rest on very different logics. 
The logic of IT-operations is scale advantages, the creation of a service with 
the right quality to the lowest possible cost. Many IT-operations contracts 
are obtained by acquiring the internal IT-unit of the customer, the logic 
being that an IT-operations firm has scale advantage, thus producing the 
service at a lower unit cost through synergy realization. Consulting firms sell 
competencies and help their customers in solving unique problems that they 
cannot solve themselves. The importance of keeping the problems “unique”, 
providing “tailor-made” solutions and keeping the appearance of a 
competency gap between the consulting firm and the customer is the basis of 
their ability to charge for their services. The more “unique” problems require 
a strong degree of tailoring, the more and rare competencies needed, and the 
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larger legitimate effort they have to invest to provide their services – the 
more the customers must pay. The most important driver for their business is 
the consulting firm’s reputation. As a result, contamination by a lower status 
organization is particularly threatening.  
The status of the target is assumed to be critical for the acquisition 
integration. In a study (Paruchuri et al. 2006) found that integration had a 
disruptive effect on the productivity of knowledge workers in the target. In 
particular, these negative effects of integration were more severe for 
members of the target firm who lost the most status in the acquisition. These 
employees suffered the most disruption from the integration.  My findings 
partially support this. Perceived loss of status seemed to lead to disruption in 
post-acquisition integration. However, in target organizations that have a 
strong sense of identity and still act on behalf of their group, this threat and 
disruption elicits actions that are beneficial to the transfer of capabilities and 
knowledge. On the other hand, in the target organizations without this group 
identity, these actions did not have the momentum of collective action. 
12.1.3 Conclusion and proposition 
My case analysis shows that identity dynamics worked differently in the 
cases. Teknico employees experienced organizational identity threats 
immediately following the announcement of the deal. However, the slow 
organizational integration phase allowed for collective action and the 
leverage of contributive capacity. On the other hand, in the Datagon 
acquisition there was no evidence of threats to organizational identity, and 
even if there were instances of mitigation and mobilization by the Datagon 
managers, their contributive capacity was not leveraged. The Comco case 
shows a different development in organizational identity threats. Initially, 
there was little evidence of threats to their identity. However, as the 
integration process evolved, the threats to their organizational identity 
became salient. At this point, their organization was already dispersed, so 
that collective action and contributive capacity was not leveraged.  
The Vizcom and Source cases show that there were some threats to their 
organizational identity initially. These were due to ambiguities related to 
target autonomy. However, these threats were thwarted by mitigating actions 
from the target firm’s management and from the Multifirm management. As 
such, my findings indicate that their contributive capacity was not triggered 
by identity threats. I will show in section 12.3 below how these two firm’s 
contributive capacities eventually were triggered 
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My data supports Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991) suggestions as to how to 
implement symbiotic acquisitions. Symbiotic acquisitions are acquisitions 
that require the transfer of socially complex and tacit knowledge. They 
suggest delaying integration, so as to let the units interact and develop 
mutual trust in order to ease later integration. My data suggests that the link 
between delayed integration and the contributive capacity of the target goes 
through the identity threats. Leaving the target autonomous for an extended 
period induces the target to nurture their organizational identity. It allows for 
relative comparison of distinctive features of the organization and through 
this intergroup comparison.  
In conclusion, and as an answer to the first research question, I propose that 
organizational identity influences the post-acquisition integration process 
through organizational identity threats that trigger the contributive capacity 
of the target firm. I have shown how the mechanisms of organizational 
identity threats, identity orientation, status and perceived level of integration, 
together push collective action in the target. Also, the mechanisms of 
contributive capacity: mitigating and mobilizing actions, cross-
organizational roles and individual autonomy are influenced by identity 
threats. I argue that organizational identity issues influence how the post-
acquisition integration process unfolds. Based on my findings I propose: 
P1: Organizational identity threats positively influence the 
contributive capacity of the target firm in post-acquisition integration 
process. 
12.2 The interaction of acquirer absorptive capacity and target 
contributive capacity 
The second research question I set out to answer was: How does the post-
acquisition integration process influence expected and serendipitous value 
creation? My findings indicate that the answer to this question lies in the 
interaction between the target and the acquiring firm. More specifically, it 
lies in the interaction between the target’s contributive capacity and the 
acquirer’s absorptive capacity. These capacities trigger one another in a 
dynamic, complex and intertwined spiraling pattern influencing value 
creation in post-acquisition integration. First, I will discuss how these 
capacities interact, before discussing how this interaction influences 
serendipitous value creation. 
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12.2.1 The dyadic nature of absorptive and contributive capacity 
Absorptive capacity has been conceptualized in prior literature as a relatively 
static concept. Even though absorptive capacity is suggested to develop in a 
cumulative fashion, and as such has some dynamic aspect, it has been 
conceptualized as an attribute of the firm that does not change according to 
the context. Absorptive capacity has also been conceptualized as a dyadic 
concept, relative absorptive capacity (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). This takes 
into consideration that firms do not learn equally well from all other firms, 
suggesting that similarities on certain firm attributes promotes 
interorganizational learning.  
The concept of transparency takes into consideration characteristics of the 
teacher part of the dyad. Transparency facilitates learning in that it makes 
knowledge available to the other firm (Larsson et al. 1998). I argue that the 
concept of transparency, even through argued to be dynamic, is not 
sufficiently specified and conceptualized as to show the mechanisms through 
which the teacher in a learning dyad contributes to knowledge creation and 
transfer. There is lack of knowledge of the contingencies for a firm’s 
openness to its partners. 
The concept of absorptive capacity has been developed in the literature 
dealing with knowledge transfer (Zahra and George 2002). The transfer of 
knowledge from one unit to the other requires “a teacher” to demonstrate 
knowledge and make it available to “the student”, which needs to “absorb” 
this knowledge. I argue for a dynamic and relative view of absorptive 
capacity. In such a view absorptive capacity is dependent upon interaction 
between the “teacher” and the “student”, in the case of post-acquisition 
integration: the target and the acquirer. I emphasize absorptive capacity as 
dynamic, in that a firm’s absorptive capacity changes over time and also 
depending on the context. Firms may leverage their absorptive capacity in 
some contexts and not in other. In addition, I argue that it is relative. It is not 
dependent on a fixed set of attributes or processes in the firm. Rather, 
absorptive capacity is leveraged and developed in a dynamic relation to the 
external environment or teacher firm. As such, it is path dependent. In each 
learning dyad, certain attributes, characteristics and processes in the firms 
interact to produce the capacity to absorb new experiences and new 
knowledge. 
Absorptive capacity, knowledge transfer and learning have been explored 
mostly from the perspective of the “student” partner in the dyad, and mostly 
the acquirer in the M&A literature. In doing so, it is implicitly suggested that 
a firm’s absorptive capacity is constant, and not dependent on “the teacher”. 
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The research has focused on the how actions and characteristics of the 
acquirer impact on learning or knowledge transfer. Research on interpartner 
learning in strategic alliances has suggested that there are several factors that 
contribute to the learning potential of an interpartner relationship. These are 
1) intent, referring to the partners’ perceptions of the relationship as a 
potential source of learning, 2) whether the partners had a competitive or 
collaborative attitude, 3) the transparency, referring to the “openness” of the 
firm to its partner, and finally 4) receptiveness, or absorptiveness of the firm, 
that is, its ability to take in new knowledge (Hamel 1991). Intent is closely 
related to the ability to recognize new knowledge. I argue that this ability or 
intent to learn has both ability and an intention built into it that is parallel to 
the perceived need for interaction. This refers to either the perceived 
learning potential in the target, or the need to interact because of structural 
integration. 
The social context has been argued to be important to interpartner learning 
and knowledge transfer (Dhanaraj et al. 2004). This implies that the level of 
trust and the strength of social ties impact the way actors interact and share 
knowledge. Acquisitions provide a specific type of interorganizational 
relationship. Pre-acquisition integration, the relationship between target and 
acquirer is an interorganizational one. Through post-acquisition integration 
the aim is implicitly to make the relationship an intra-organizational one. 
However, to accomplish procedural, organizational and cultural integration, 
the development of trust and social ties is necessary. In these the intent of the 
units (manifest in the acquirers perceived need for interaction and the targets 
perceived identity threats in this study) is important for achieving integration 
and for creating value.  
Absorptive and contributive capacities can be understood with reference to 
the concept of dynamic capabilities. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000:1107) 
define dynamic capabilities as: “The firm’s processes that use resources - 
specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release 
resources - to match and even create market change. Dynamic capabilities 
thus are the organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new 
resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die.” 
The need to achieve new resource configurations is the essence of the post-
acquisition integration process. Implied is that these capabilities are 
necessary both to leverage the contributive capacity of the target, and the 
absorptive capacity of the acquirer. Dynamic capabilities relate to change, 
for example change relating to entering a new business, create new product 
or processes, or grow through acquisitions (Helfat 2007).  
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 Eisenhardt and Martin go on to specify (2000:1108): “Still other dynamic 
capabilities are related to the gain and release of resources.” The “release of 
resources” can be interpreted as hinting at what I have argued to be 
contributive capabilities. That is, the ability to release the target’s resources 
onto the acquiring firm.  
Capabilities are a set of specific and identifiable processes that are path 
dependent (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). They are socially complex and 
embedded in the organizations context, and any change to this context could 
result in these resources diminishing. An acquisition represents such a 
change to this context. I argue that this is related to the disruptive effects 
discussed in the acquisitions literature in Chapter 3 in this thesis. On the 
other hand firms can have boundary-spanning dynamic capabilities that 
allow them to link resources from other firms to their own through 
acquisitions (Helfat 2007). As such, acquisitions may destroy dynamic 
capabilities through the disruption in acquisitions, or the firm may have 
boundary spanning dynamic capabilities that allow them to create, extent or 
modify their resource base.  
12.2.2 The spiraling interaction of the target’s contributive and 
acquirer’s absorptive capacity 
My findings indicate that the target’s contributive capacity and the acquirer’s 
absorptive capacities co-evolve in a spiraling interaction.  I argue that a 
target’s contributive capacity can offset and leverage the absorptive capacity 
of the acquirer, and vice versa.   
In the interorganizational learning literature the concept of relative 
absorptive capacity has considered the dyadic nature of learning between 
firms (Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Lane et al. 2001; Lubatkin et al. 2001). 
Relative absorptive capacity has been conceptualized by similarities in 
knowledge bases, organizational structures and compensation policies, and 
dominant logics (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). As such this work considers that 
a firm’s potential learning from other firms depends not only on the 
absorptive capacity of the focal firm, but also on the alignment of 
characteristics of both firms. This assumes that similarity on some firm level 
characteristic facilitates interfirm learning. However, this research does not 
investigate the mechanisms through which these characteristics interact, and 
the reciprocal learning is assumed to be based on rather static characteristics 
of the firm. I emphasize the dynamic and relational process involved in this 
learning dyad.  
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My findings indicate that the interaction between the acquiring firm’s 
absorptive capacity and target firm’s contributive capacity does not only 
depend on characteristics of the two firms and their given capabilities. These 
capacities are contingent upon characteristics of the process, or the 
interaction of the firms in post-acquisition integration. My findings indicate 
that absorptive capacity is not a static characteristic of the firm. The capacity 
to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge varies in the acquirer over 
time. It also varies in turns of the relationship to the target the acquirer is 
learning from. I argue that the contributive and absorptive capacities interact 
in the integration process to produce value, and that the capacities are not 
constant characteristics of the firms, but rather dynamic capabilities that 
need leverage to be realized.  
For the teacher to be able to teach the student (contributive capacity), the 
student needs to be open to learn (absorptive capacity). Regardless of how 
much contributive capacity the target has, the acquirer needs to have a 
minimum of absorptive capacity for there to be actual learning. This may be 
the distinction between potential and realized absorptive capacity (Zahra and 
George 2002). I have not distinguished between potential and realized 
absorptive capacity. Neither have I done so in the theorizing of contributive 
capacity. For the acquirer to realize the potential for absorptive capacity 
there needs to be a minimum of contributive capacity in the target, and vice 
versa. In order to realize the potential contributive capacity of the target 
there needs to be a minimum of absorptive capacity in the acquirer. In this I 
argue that there is an important distinction between potential and realized 
contributive capacity, and that this depends on the other party in the learning 
dyad. A lack of contributive capacity in the target can be compensated for by 
a strong absorptive capacity in the acquiring firm. This entails a drive in the 
acquiring firm to learn through the perceived need for interaction with the 
target, mitigating and mobilizing actions performed by acquiring firm 
managers to facilitate knowledge organization and retrieval, and acquiring 
firm organizational structures that promote this through avoiding ambiguities 
and fragmentation in post-acquisition integration.  
On the other hand, a lack of absorptive capacity can be compensated for by a 
strong target contributive capacity. The Teknico acquisition illustrates this. 
In this acquisition the absorptive capacity of Multifirm seemed low. There 
was a low intent to learn, lacking motivation to interact with the target, 
combined with a fragmented organizational structure and decision structures 
that hampered absorption of knowledge.  However, the Teknico contributive 
capacity was sufficiently strong to push the knowledge, competencies and 
capabilities on to acquiring firm. This resulted in the generation of 
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serendipitous value, even though Multifirm’s ability and intent to learn, and 
thus its absorptive capacity initially was relatively low. 
Several characteristics of the firm and its alliance partners have been 
hypothesized to contribute to absorptive capacity. R&D intensity, pre-
alliance level of technological overlap, and size of the firm are factors that 
were assumed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) to be important factors. In my 
data these variables were relatively constant across the cases. As the same 
acquirer is the buyer in all transactions, its R&D intensity and size are 
constant. Technological overlap, however, is acquisition specific, and could 
explain the differences in absorptive capacity. I found that even though the 
technology in some of the acquisitions was more overlapping, this alone 
cannot explain the differences in absorptive capacity. Instead, the data shows 
rather large differences in the “intent to learn” (Hamel 1991). I argue that it 
is this intent to learn that varies most between the acquisitions. It is indicated 
by the level of perceived need for interaction and mitigating and mobilizing 
actions, influenced by the fragmentation and ambiguity in the organizational 
structure. These are the mechanisms that link contributive and absorptive 
capacity.  
My findings indicated that the two separate units, Vizcom and Source, in 
particular experienced a misalignment with Multifirm structures and 
systems. However, these issues were modified by the mitigating and 
mobilizing managers of Multifirm. Keeping these units autonomous, 
allowing them the sovereignty and authority to operate counter to the 
Multifirm structures, is one of the mechanisms through which Multifirm’s 
absorptive capacity emerged.  
In the two autonomous acquisitions identity threats did not drive interaction 
on the target side. Instead, it was the perceived need for interaction and the 
benefits perceived to the acquiring firms managers of the target’s customer 
base or competencies. My findings suggest that the perceived need for 
interaction influences the acquiring managers’ and employees’ approaches to 
the new target. If they perceive the target to have important competencies 
that can be accessed through integration, or they perceive the success of the 
acquisition to be contingent on close cooperation between target and 
acquirer, they will probably perceive a stronger need for interaction with the 
target.  
In my data the perceived need for interaction was argued for procedurally. 
The respondents referred to the motive behind the deal, and the planned level 
of integration that required interaction between target and acquirer. In 
addition, as the acquirer got to know the target a need for interaction 
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emerged as the acquiring firm’s managers saw the potential for knowledge 
and competencies in the target.  In the Source acquisition the Multifirm 
managers mobilized as they discovered competencies, customer 
relationships and knowledge that they perceived as beneficial, and that they 
wanted access to. The Source managers, on the other hand, seemed 
preoccupied with shielding the target from the disruptions from the 
acquisition, and mitigating employees concerns about autonomy issues. A 
large reason for their contributive capacity not being leveraged to a greater 
extent, I argue, is the lack of triggering by identity threats.  On the other 
hand, as projects came along, and as the acquirer mobilized, I argue that 
their relatively low contributive capacity was compensated by the acquirer’s 
absorptive capacity. My findings indicate that as the acquirer mitigated and 
mobilized, the target firm’s contributive capacity was triggered even though 
it initially had not been leveraged. This example illustrates the interaction 
between these capacities.  
The question to be answered in terms of acquisitions is to what extent 
absorptive capacity develops with each acquisition. Learning from 
experience has been studied both in terms of acquisitions and other types of 
alliances. An important question, related to this, is how does the contributive 
capacity of the target depend on their prior experiences with acquisitions, or 
other types of alliances? Multifirm is an experienced acquirer, and has 
grown mainly by mergers and acquisitions. Implicitly therefore the 
acquirer’s absorptive capacity could be limited because of multiple 
acquisitions that need to be integrated over a short period of time. This could 
lead to ambiguous organizational structures. Organizational structure is 
important in the knowledge processing ability of the firm. This implies the 
“degree of formalization and centralization used by the firm when allocating 
tasks, responsibilities, authority, and decisions” (Lane and Lubatkin 
1998:465). In each case Multifirm’s perceptions of the target, emerging in 
the data as the perceived need for interaction varied. The extent to which 
mobilizing and mitigating actions were performed by their managers varies. 
However, descriptions of the Multifirm organizational structure in the 
impact-zone of the target did not vary. The fragmentation and ambiguity of 
organizational structures was blamed on the pace and number of 
acquisitions. Decision structures were described as unpredictable, 
bureaucratic and slow, information as not readily available, and 
discrepancies in the relationship between authority and responsibilities were 
depicted. I argue that these organizational structural issues impaired 
Multifirm’s absorptive capacity.  
As an experienced acquirer encounters the issue of an acquisition, this meta 
issue is a well known, easily categorizable event that elicits a well-learned 
 212
response. Multifirm has developed processes and routines for acquiring and 
integrating targets. This can be viewed in how the Multifirm employees 
address the issue of acquisitions: “We’ve done it before – the same as last 
time”. However, underlying the issue of each acquisition are several 
unexpected issues that have not been experienced before. The first three 
targets in this study, even though they appear initially to be similar, needing 
a similar integration approach, evolved differently through interactions 
between the acquiring firm and each target. Ultimately this resulted in 
integration processes that did not need a general learned response, but rather 
a response that was specific and context dependent. My findings suggest that 
different parts of the acquiring firm interpreted to what extent the target 
represented something new differently. Subsequently, multiple acquirers can 
be hypothesized to have a decrease in their absorptive capacity with the 
increasing number of acquisitions because of fragmented organizational 
structures and processes that force a generalized response to the complex 
event of an acquisition. This effect can be stronger than the learning effect. 
This can also help explain the inconclusive empirical evidence on the 
relationship between acquisition experience and acquisition performance.  
The data shows that the absorptive capacity of Multifirm was leveraged in 
relationship to the autonomous targets. Even though the autonomous targets 
perceived the fragmentation and ambiguity surrounding the Multifirm 
decision structure etc, the Multifirm absorptive capacity in relationship to 
these acquisitions were stronger, given Multifirm’s evaluation of the targets’ 
knowledge and status. Multifirm perceived that these acquisitions could 
bring them higher in the value chain and could give them access to new 
clients. As such, the need to interact seemed pertinent. This again affects the 
mitigating actions performed by Multifirm managers. The absorptive pull 
from the acquirer replaced the push from identity threats. In addition, as the 
target experienced the mobilizing efforts from the acquiring firm, this further 
facilitated interaction and mobilizing on their part. 
Acquisition integration causes disruption to the functioning of the two 
merging organizations in two ways. Integration issues may interrupt 
business-as-usual by occupying management capacity and resources.  As 
Multifirm was a multiple acquirer, HR resources and management capacity 
was involved in some sort of acquisition or integration issues at all times of 
the study period. Especially for HR the downsizing, pay-roll, contracts and 
other integration specific issues demanded a lot of time. In addition, 
assigning tasks, roles and functions to the new employees that were 
integrated was a main management concern. Keeping the momentum of 
performing business-as-usual and keeping the employees focused on the 
operational activities and not being preoccupied with integration issues and 
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politics is subsequently a challenge. This requires a substantial amount of 
management effort, making management resources a scarcity in the 
integration phase.  
 
Figure 9: Capacity spiral 
My findings indicate the spiraling interaction between the target’s 
contributive and the acquirer’s absorptive capacity was offset differently in 
the different cases. In the Teknico acquisition it was offset by a threat to the 
target’s identity, pushing the contributive capacity of the target that again 
leveraged the absorptive capacity of the acquirer. In the Source and Vizcom 
cases it appeared to be the opposite. That is, the absorptive capacity of the 
acquirer (strong need for interaction, and mitigating and mobilizing actions) 
offset the contributive capacity of the targets (that was initially low, no 
identity threats to trigger it) (Figure 9). In Datagon neither the contributive 
capacity of the target, nor the absorptive capacity of the acquirer, was 
leveraged. In the Comco case, I argue that when the target’s identity was 
threatened, the target organization was dispersed, resulting in lacking 
structures for collective action. As such, their contributive capacities were 
not leveraged. In this case, the acquirer also had low absorptive capacity. 
Based on my findings I therefore propose: 
P2: The target’s contributive capacity and the acquirer’s absorptive 
capacity interact in post-acquisition integration in a spiraling, co-
evolving manner. The target’s contributive capacity may offset the 
acquirer’s absorptive capacity and vice versa.  
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12.3 Serendipitous value creation in post-acquisition integration 
My findings suggest that the absorptive capacity of the acquiring firm and 
the contributive capacity of the target firm interact in the post-acquisition 
integration process. This influences the progress of the integration process 
and its outcomes. All five acquisitions in the study met their performance 
goals, as stated in the business case and reported by members of the top 
management team. I have chosen to focus specifically on serendipitous 
value-creation. My findings indicate different levels of serendipitous value 
creation. My data suggests that this variation is related to the interaction of 
the target’s contributive capacity and the acquirer’s absorptive capacity. I 
argue that some of the cases did not manage to leverage the potential for 
serendipitous benefits. In the Datagon case, little serendipitous value 
creation was reported, despite my data showing a potential for learning and 
organizational renewal for the Multifirm organization from this acquisition. 
In the Comco case, disintegration of the organization, loss of personnel, 
reported loss of customer contracts and reported inability to learn from their 
consulting skills also insinuate unused potential for serendipitous value 
creation. 
The absorptive capacity of the acquirer works as a pull mechanism, 
promoting the identification, organization and utilization of knowledge to be 
extracted from the target. The target’s contributive capacity, on the other 
hand, is a push mechanism, promoting the leverage of the knowledge, 
competencies and capabilities of the target to the acquirer. The interaction of 
these capacities takes place in post-acquisition integration. It is contingent on 
the target’s and acquirer’s history, characteristics and interpretations of 
events and actions.  The sensemaking, interpretations and evaluating 
performed shape the interaction of these capacities. 
As mentioned, absorptive capacity has been suggested to be dependent on 
overlapping knowledge bases. However, it may become so overlapping and 
specialized that it impedes the incorporation of external knowledge, leading 
to the not-invented-here syndrome (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In the 
Teknico acquisition, the not-invented-here syndrome was mentioned both 
explicitly and implicitly several times. This acquisition consisted of the most 
overlapping knowledge. As such, this acquisition could be expected to be the 
least problematic, because the common specialized knowledge suggests both 
access and a common language to communicate between acquirer and target 
firms. However, this supports the proposition that a common knowledge 
base facilitates knowledge transfer. On the other hand, the knowledge that 
was mostly mentioned as serendipitous value was organizational knowledge, 
process knowledge and other non-technological knowledge.  
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The knowledge base of the firms is also relevant. The balancing between 
having similar and different knowledge is important. Lane and Lubatkin 
state: “student firms have the greatest potential to learn from teachers with 
similar basic knowledge but different specialized knowledge” (1998:464). 
Empson’s consulting firms had both similar specialized and generalized 
knowledge. This implies that the only thing they actually could gain from 
one another was access to customers and client relationships, thus directly 
jeopardizing their relationships if they did not perform or actually “stealing” 
contracts if they did perform well. This can be interpreted as a background 
for Vizcom’s apprehension to Multifirm accessing their clients. I argue that 
the knowledge base is important, however, in Source and Vizcom, the access 
to their clients was a major concern. 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) found mixed support for their hypothesis that the 
more similar the organizational structure of the alliance partner, the more 
interorganizational learning occurs. However they found support for their 
hypothesis that similar compensation practices are correlated with 
interorganizational learning. Acquisitions are both inter and intra-
organizational learning situations, even so, these findings are relevant to the 
cases in this study. The delegation of individual decision power and 
authority is a prominent feature of organizational structures. My findings 
support that these are important issues in interorganizational interaction. 
However, in extension of Lane and Lubatkin’s (1998) findings, and as a 
possible explanatory factor for their mixed findings, it is perhaps not the 
differences in organizational structures per se, but the evaluations and 
interpretations of these that make up the contributive capacity of the target 
firm.  
The data shows no potential sources for value creation that were unused, or 
destroyed. Argue that this was because Datagon lacked contributive capacity 
to make visible the potential for serendipitous value, combined with 
Multifirm’s lack of absorptive capacity. The Source and Vizcom acquisitions 
produced serendipitous value to the acquirer. In addition, as they remained 
autonomous, one could observe unexpected benefits from the acquisition 
accruing to the target. These acquisitions were judged as very successful 
partly because of good timing. However, the Teknico acquisition was the 
acquisition reported to have produced the most serendipitous value. Figure 
10 shows the development of the level of contributive and absorptive 
capacities and serendipitous value creation in the targets. 
The creation of serendipitous value in Teknico and not in Datagon can be 
argued to be not because of identity threats, but because they served different 
customers. They also had a different approach and a more proactive sales 
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culture. I argue that the data show that there were threats to organizational 
identity. In addition, a lack of proactiveness because of a lack of sales 
culture seems farfetched. Teknico had developed as an internal IT unit, and 
had no apparent reason to have a more proactive sales culture. One could 
also argue that the Datagon employees did not experience any threats to their 
identity because they were passive. Whether creation of serendipitous value 
in the acquisition is directly linked to identity threats is difficult to state. 
However, it seems feasible from the data that the identity threats lead to 
actions, perceptions and structures that drove the target’s contributive 
capacity. However, another explanation may be that the targets simply did 
not possess the knowledge and capabilities that the acquirer could make use 
of. However, there is no evidence for this latter point. For example is there 
little distinction in the reported potential for learning from either the target or 
Multifirm early in the acquisition phase regarding Datagon and Teknico. If 
anything the reported potential for learning in the Datagon acquisition was 
perceived to be higher. 
 
 
Figure 10: Contributive capacity, absorptive capacity and serendipitous 
value by acquisition 
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Dynamic capabilities are seen to be the antecedent to other capabilities, 
competencies and organizational and strategic routines in the organization 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). As such I argue that through acquisitions 
these dynamic capabilities can be developed, as organizations get an influx 
of new organizational and strategic routines. The target organization may 
question old ways of doing things. However, there is also the chance that the 
multiple acquirers fall into the not-invented-here trap. By having performed 
a large number of acquisitions, and generalizing from one to the next, 
ignoring the intricacies of each acquisition, the acquirer might not be able to 
discover and assimilate new knowledge. Once again, this is related to the 
limits of absorptive capacity.  
Other explanations may be in the actual competencies and knowledge bases 
of the firms. Teknico could have been underappreciated at the outset, while 
the expectations to Datagon had been higher than they could deliver. 
Subsequently, the perception of Teknico’s contribution would have been 
high relative to expectations, and vice versa in the Datagon acquisition, 
higher expectations leading to disappointment with the outcomes. The 
employees of both target and acquirer report evidence of actual learning 
happening in the Teknico acquisition. Even though the accounts of the 
Teknico employees insinuate that the full potential for learning was not 
utilized. Even so, this does not exclude that there was an element of unmet 
expectations in the Datagon case, accounting for the perceptions of little 
serendipitous value creation in this acquisition. However, this explanation 
does not fit with the experiences accounted for in the interviews of Teknico 
managers performing mitigating and mobilizing actions and taking on cross-
organizational roles, along with the lack of proactive action in Datagon.  
The leakiness of status in an acquisition setting may be an obstacle to 
acquisition integration and consequently acquisition performance if the 
status of either party is considered lower than that of the other. Hence, the 
absorptive capacity of the acquirer in this study may have been affected by 
the intent to learn, based on their perceptions of what the target could 
contribute with, not based on real knowledge, but rather on the target’s 
reputation and status. One could argue that Teknico’s contribution to the 
Multifirm system stemmed not from the contributive push from the target, 
but rather from the fact that Teknico had a “bad” reputation initially. 
Multifirm was, after initial encounters with Teknico, surprised to find 
knowledge, useful technologies and processes, as their expectations had been 
low. And vice versa, Datagon’s reputation and status could have been 
perceived as higher, and the expectations to this target have been higher. 
Subsequently the differences in serendipitous value reported could be due to 
unmet expectations in the Datagon case. In other words, it could have been 
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not a reflection of actual serendipitous value, but rather perceived value 
compared to expected value. However, I argue that there is evidence of the 
processes through which the serendipitous value is being created in the 
Teknico acquisition, and lacks of these in the Datagon integration that imply 
that the differences described are not solely due to expectations being met or 
not. 
Following this, one may hypothesize that if the competencies and knowledge 
in the target had been known and communicated, and the benefits to 
acquiring firm managers and employees been emphasized, thus leveraging 
absorptive capacity, more value could have been created in the acquisition. 
On the other hand, it could have been the resistance in the acquirer that 
interacted with the target to leverage their contributive capacity. In 
conclusion and as an answer to the second research question, I propose: 
P3: The interaction of the target’s contributive capacity and the 
acquirer’s absorptive capacity positively influence serendipitous value 
creation in post-acquisition integration. 
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13 Conclusion 
This chapter first outlines the main findings of the study. Next, the 
theoretical contributions of the study are presented, which is followed by a 
discussion of the implications for managers involved with acquisition 
activities are discussed. Finally, the limitations of the study and the 
implications for further research are suggested.  
13.1 The main findings of the study 
This study addresses the relationship between organizational identity, post-
acquisition integration and acquisition performance. Acquisitions have 
ramifications for employees, managers and other stakeholders. Over the last 
decades, acquisitions have grown in number and value for both the private 
and public sector. However, research shows that there are substantial 
challenges for organizations related to acquisitions. One of the major 
concerns is value creation. 
The strength of this study is its longitudinal and in-depth approach. Few 
studies have focused on both the acquiring and target firms simultaneously, 
and followed the interaction between these over time. I have studied not only 
both sides of the dyad, but also included different functional areas and all 
levels of the hierarchy in the organizations, from the top management team 
to the “grass-roots”. This study takes the acquisition integration process as 
the unit of analysis, and theorizes the intricate and complicated interactions 
between organizational identities, the progress of the post-acquisition 
integration process and the expected and serendipitous outcomes of the 
acquisition. Through this, I contribute to the understanding of how 
organizational identity is related to the outcomes of acquisitions, and the 
conditions that either promote or restrain value creation in post-acquisition 
integration processes. 
My findings suggest that organizational identity plays a key role in how 
people make sense of post-acquisition integration processes, and the 
subsequent actions and events that follow from these sense making 
processes. Post-acquisition is where the acquirer and target firms come 
together to combine competencies and capabilities to realize the objectives 
of the acquisition. Organizational identity is important to gain an 
understanding of the mechanisms through which firm capabilities are 
leveraged in post-acquisition integration. Even though a large body of 
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research has explored both social identity phenomena in organizational 
settings and organizational identity development and change, there is a lack 
of knowledge of the consequences of organizational identity in 
organizational settings such as acquisitions. My findings indicate that the 
role of identity threat in post-acquisition integration is complex. Threats to 
the organizational identity of a target firm may trigger collective action in 
post-acquisition integration. I argue that these actions may be beneficial to 
acquisition outcomes. More specifically, my findings indicate that threats to 
the organizational identity of the target can be used constructively in post-
acquisition integration to preserve the strategic capabilities of the target. 
My findings show that not only is the absorptive capacity of the acquiring 
firm crucial to acquisition outcomes, but it is so in interplay with the target 
firm’s contributive capacity. The acquirer’s ability to make use of the 
strategic capabilities of the target firm to create value in acquisitions has in 
prior literature been a key concern connected to the performance of 
acquisitions. This prior view of absorptive capacity assumes that it is a 
characteristic of the acquiring firm, and as such not contingent on the context 
of the acquisition or characteristics of the target. This study shows how the 
target’s active participation in the post-acquisition integration process, 
through its contributive capacity, is crucial to the outcomes of the 
acquisition. My findings propose the mechanisms through which the 
interplay of the acquirer’s absorptive capacity and target’s contributive 
capacity creates value. 
The aim of the study was to examine and specify how organizational identity 
influences the post-acquisition integration, and furthermore, how this leads 
to the outcomes of the acquisition. The data suggests not only the process 
through which this happens, but also specifies contingencies of absorptive 
capacity, introduces the concept of contributive capacity and sketches the 
relationship between these. The main findings of this study are: 
• Organizational identity threats may lead to beneficial outcomes for 
the acquirer 
 Organizational identity threats are powerful triggers for 
organizational action.  
 Organizational identity threats trigger action and processes 
in post-acquisition integration that influence serendipitous 
value-creation 
• The target firm plays a major role in the post-acquisition integration 
process, and specifically in the creation of serendipitous value 
• The target’s contributive capacity and the acquirer’s absorptive 
capacity interact to generate value in post-acquisition integration 
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• The absorptive capacity of the acquirer is relative and co-evolves in 
a spiraling manner with the target’s contributive capacity 
As such, this study addresses both the question of how organizational 
identity influences the post-acquisition integration process, and how this 
process influences serendipitous value creation in acquisitions.  
13.2 Theoretical contributions 
My aim was to contribute both to the field of organizational identity and to 
the field of post-acquisition integration by generating theory on the impact of 
organizational identity on the post-acquisition integration process. My main 
theoretical contributions are: 
• Theorizing the mechanisms through which responses to 
organizational identity threats impact the post-acquisition integration 
process 
• Conceptualizing contributive capacity and the impact of the target 
firm on the post-acquisition integration process 
• Theorizing the post-acquisition integration process as an interaction 
of target contributive capacity and acquirer absorptive capacity, and 
the subsequent outcomes of the acquisition, specifically in terms of 
serendipitous value.  
• Extending the theory of absorptive capacity by viewing it as 
dynamic and relative, and by specifying the interaction with the 
external environment, in this setting the target firm 
• Further theorizing the concept of acquisition performance 
Below, these theoretical contributions to the field of organizational identity 
and the field of post-acquisition integration are elaborated.  
13.2.1 The field of organizational identity 
As mentioned in my theory chapter, the field of organizational identity is 
fragmented (Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006; Corley et al. 2006; 
Cornelissen et al. 2007). Scholars have called for the need to promote 
dialogue across the different perspectives. In addition, knowledge of the 
consequences of identity in organizational settings is lacking. This study 
addresses these gaps by studying organizational identity in an extreme case, 
such as the case of an acquisition represents.  
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In this thesis, I bring individual level identity mechanisms from social 
psychology to the organizational level through a sensemaking perspective. I 
build on social identity theory through my second order categories of 
identity orientation, status and perceived level of integration. The concept of 
identity threat consists of three dynamics. These are 1) identity orientation, 
the identity orientation of the target, not with the individual’s identity 2) 
status, not as in the individual’s perceptions of how the group’s status affects 
them, but rather how the group’s status affects them as a group, and finally 
3) the perceived level of integration, not the permeable boundaries as 
perceived by an individual, but the target’s boundaries as perceived by the 
target group, as they make sense of post-acquisition integration. 
I have, by theorizing the concept of identity threats, shown how these 
develop in an organizational change situation. Prior literature on 
organizational identity has focused on the organization’s response to threats, 
without theorizing what the dynamics of organizational identity threats are. I 
have built on Dutton and Dukerich’s (1991) study and argue that threats to 
an organization’s identity do not automatically arise in an acquisition 
process. Rather, in the case of acquisitions, threats are theorized to arise 
when the target has an identity orientation towards former owner, the target 
or their profession, and perceive former owner, the target or their profession 
as having higher status than the acquirer, and perceive they will be integrated 
in the acquirer and lose their distinctiveness as a group.  
My findings are in line with social identity theory in terms of the 
development of identity threats due to permeable group boundaries and 
status issues. I claim that identity threats not only lead to disruption, but also 
trigger organizational action. The latter has been conceptualized as the 
contributive capacity of the target. My findings connect organizational 
identity and action in organizations. Specifically, how action influences the 
post-acquisition integration process as it evolves. This is conceptualized as 
the target firm’s contributive capacity and the acquiring firm’s absorptive 
capacity. Value is created in post-acquisition integration through the 
interaction of these capacities. Subsequently, I have theorized the 
consequences of organizational identity threats on organizational 
performance in the context of organizational change.  
As discussed earlier, even though I bring the concept of identity to an 
organizational level, I argue that I am not reifying the concept of 
organizational identity. Instead, taking a sensemaking perspective and 
approaching the phenomenon from a social constructivist perspective, means 
that analysis on the organizational level is legitimate. Identity orientation, 
status and level of integration are all at an organizational level when viewed 
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through a sensemaking approach. My findings indicate that identity 
orientation, status and level of integration are dynamic, relational concepts 
developed through collective sense making in post-acquisition integration.  
Threats to organizational identity have in the acquisitions literature been 
seen as detrimental to the performance of the acquisition. However, my data 
shows that even though the integration process may be more fraught with 
conflicts if the target experiences threats to their identity, the responses to 
the threats to organizational identity may not be detrimental to outcomes of 
the acquisition in the long run. In some cases it may even be positive.  
An interest in organizational identity framed the research reported here. As 
the literature review showed, there are growing literatures on organizational 
identity in general and on individual level identity in acquisitions, however 
there is a lack of knowledge of the implications of organizational level 
identity in the context of acquisitions. My research has added to the literature 
on organizational identity by theorizing identity threats and conceptualizing 
the mechanisms though which identity triggers action in organizations. My 
research shows that the mechanisms through which organizational identity 
threats influence action in post-acquisition integration is complex. As such, I 
have provided a contribution to the call for the examination of the 
consequences of identity in organizations.  
 
13.2.2 The field of post-acquisition integration 
My study has contributed to theory development in several research streams 
in the field of strategic management. First, I have contributed to the 
interorganizational learning literature by building on the concept of 
absorptive capacity, introducing the concept of contributive capacity and 
exploring the relationship between these concepts (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990; Mowery et al. 1996; Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Lubatkin et al. 2001). 
Secondly, I have made a contribution to the acquisitions literature by 
specifying the target firm’s role in the post-acquisition integration process 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Birkinshaw et al. 2000; Graebner 2004). 
Finally, I have added to the conceptualization of acquisition performance.  
Absorptive and contributive capacity are conceptualized as constructs that do 
not describe a priori characteristics of the firms, but rather as dynamic 
capabilities that are developed through interaction. As a result, they are not 
static capabilities that can be matched through pre-entry analysis of the 
firms. Rather, they need to be nurtured in the post-acquisition phase. 
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Organizational identity threats are one way in which these capabilities are 
triggered.  
This thesis introduces the concept of contributive capacity and further 
develops the concept of absorptive capacity as dynamic and relational.  The 
mechanism through which absorptive and contributive capacity is leveraged 
has been conceptualized. These mechanisms are contingent on the social 
context and the perceptions, interpretations and actions of the members of 
the organizations concerned.  
Contributive capacity occurred in my research as an emergent theme not 
conceptualized in prior literature. As such, this is one of the major 
contributions of this study. Contributive capacity refers to the extent to 
which a target firm can teach and transfer knowledge, competencies and 
capabilities to the acquirer. I argue that the way in which the target interacts 
with the acquirer is influenced by the emergence of identity threats to the 
target in post-acquisition integration processes.  
Even though absorptive capacity is a well established and researched 
concept, the contingencies for absorptive capacity are less understood. My 
findings expand existing literature by further conceptualizing the 
mechanisms through which absorptive capacity is leveraged in an 
organization in general, and in post-acquisition integration specifically. My 
findings indicate that the acquirer’s ability to identify, organize and use new 
knowledge, competencies and capabilities is crucial to the development of 
the acquisition integration process and subsequent acquisition outcomes. The 
absorptive capacity of the acquirer is conceptualized as a dynamic and 
relative capacity that continuously develops in interaction with the external 
environment and the target. It is not a constant capacity the organization has, 
but rather in post-acquisition integration, it is influenced by the 
characteristics of the target and how the interaction process progresses.  
Acquisitions have been studied from a multitude of perspectives and fields, 
as discussed in my theory section. However, research on acquisitions has not 
been able to consistently explain why some acquisitions are successes and 
others failures. My research adds to this research by 1) examining the role of 
the target firm in the post-acquisition integration process and by 2) 
theorizing the capacity spirals of contributive and absorptive capacity in 
post-acquisition integration. 
Through the concept of contributive capacity, I have theorized the role of the 
target firm in post-acquisition integration. This has to a large extent been a 
neglected issue in the literature on post-acquisition integration. As 
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mentioned earlier, Graebner’s (2004) work focused on how target firm 
managers contribute to the generation of value in post-acquisition 
integration. She found that mobilizing and mitigating actions performed by 
target managers contributed to expected value and that the performance of 
cross-organizational roles contributed to serendipitous value. My findings 
indicate that both of these actions and roles, and the perceptions of 
individual autonomy are the mechanisms of contributive capacity 
influencing serendipitous value in post-acquisition integration. In addition, I 
have extended her work by adding the triggering mechanism of target 
managers roles and actions through identity threats.  
Furthermore, my data indicates that capacity spirals capture the complexity 
of the evolution of post-acquisition integration by linking motivation, action 
and structural issues in both target and acquiring firm. These spirals are 
dynamic and relational. That is, they are dynamic in that they are constantly 
in motion and in continuous change, and relational in that they are dependent 
on one another. Contributive capacity needs some level of absorptive 
capacity to be leveraged and vice versa. I argue that specifying these 
mechanisms in post-acquisition integration, contributes to our understanding 
of how post-acquisition integration evolves. It highlights the importance of 
the interaction of the target and the acquirer in post-acquisition integration. 
Finally, I argue that I have further theorized the concept of acquisition 
performance by including both expected and serendipitous value creation. 
Further, I have conceptualized the mechanisms through which serendipitous 
value is created in post-acquisition integration.  
13.3 Methodological contributions 
My study has through a grounded approach defined several theoretical 
concepts and the possible relationships between these concepts as they 
appear from my data. I have theorized the categories that make up the 
overarching concepts of organizational identity threats, contributive 
capacity, absorptive capacity and acquisition performance. This is a 
contribution to both the field of organizational identity and the field of post-
acquisition integration. As such, I argue that I have made a contribution in 
terms of providing a grounded basis for the development of indicators of 
these concepts for further quantitative studies for these fields. First, I have 
provided the bases for developing indicators to further examine the 
consequences of organizational identity threats during organizational 
change. Secondly, I have provided the basis for developing indicators to 
more specifically examine how the concepts are related in post-acquisition 
integration. Based both on my first order themes and second order 
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categories, indicators of organizational identity, absorptive capacity, 
contributive capacity and acquisition performance can be derived.  
A quantitative study could further investigate the relationships between these 
categories. It could examine how these concepts and the relationship 
between them play out in a different industries or different types of 
businesses. On the other hand, I argue that tapping into the sensemaking 
processes that I have argued are vital to the progress of post-acquisition 
integration and the organizational identity threats would be difficult to 
capture through this method.  
 
13.4 Managerial implications 
This study aimed to shed light upon what happens in post-acquisition 
integration specifically to understand 1) how organizational identity 
influences the post-acquisition integration, and 2) how the post-acquisition 
integration process in turn influences the outcomes of the acquisition. The 
findings of the study have implications for managers undertaking 
acquisitions. The study may also be found useful for managers in general, 
through its insights on capacity spirals and the consequences of 
organizational identity threats in the event of organizational change.  
The findings have implications for the mode and implementation of 
integration of targets in acquiring firms. My findings suggest that targets 
with a strong sense of organizational identity should be carefully managed to 
leverage the potential for capability transfer and knowledge sharing. 
Sustaining a sense of continuity and nurturing their uniqueness in the 
integration process may trigger some disruptions, but in the long run will 
facilitate the preservation of the strategic capabilities of these targets. 
Disintegrating and splitting these targets to avoid disruption and noise 
provides smoother integration processes in the short run, but destroys the 
strategic capabilities of the firms in the longer run.  
I argue against the necessity of constructing a common identity and culture 
in the early integration phase, to hinder value leakage and make sure the 
strategic capabilities are utilized in the acquisition, and to force momentum 
and contributive capacity in the acquisition. Allowing for a cocooning phase 
where the targets nurture their strategic capabilities, centered on core 
capabilities, competencies, products or services, to establish themselves as a 
distinct group in relationship to the acquirer is important. This cocooning 
phase protects the strategic capabilities of the target, and at the same time 
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allows for a mobilizing of collective actions. As such, making careful 
decisions about the pace of integration, the mode of integration and 
autonomy granted to the target firm is crucial. This implies that even though 
it is necessary with some level of “shared” identity later on, allowing the 
identity threats to evolve and be resolved is important.  
One of the key mechanisms in absorptive capacity is organizational 
structure. The event of an acquisition leaves organizational structures to 
some degree fragmented and ambiguous. I argue that it is critical to properly 
integrate one acquisition structurally, with communication lines, decision 
structures, roles and responsibilities implemented before making a new one. 
This is imperative to the leveraging of absorptive capacity in the acquirer. 
Leaving sufficient time for integration of one acquisition before embarking 
upon the next is subsequently vital for serendipitous value-creation.  
The cases in this thesis show how the acquisitions vary in terms of structural 
integration and structural autonomy. The choice of integrations versus 
autonomy is assumed to be made prior to announcement of the deal, and be 
determined by the acquisition motives. Studies show that structural 
integration increases the ability to leverage knowledge of the target, whereas 
structural autonomy leverages the capabilities for innovation (Puranam and 
Srikanth 2007). These findings are modified by the acquirer’s experience. 
Prior studies, however, have shown that by taking a hybrid integration 
approach (Schweizer 2005) may be the best way to address this dilemma.  
Managerial action both related to target and acquiring firm managers is 
crucial to the post-acquisition integration process. Mitigating and mobilizing 
actions performed by managers in post-acquisition integration can both be 
intended and unintended. In other words, actions may have a mobilizing 
effect without the manager being consciously trying to mobilize. In addition, 
the consequences of mobilizing and mitigating actions may have both 
intended and unintended consequences. I found that mobilizing actions 
performed by managers could have mitigating consequences and vice versa. 
This implies that focusing on human integration is important. However, it is 
even more important not to separate human integration from task integration 
activities. I argue that integration initiatives should to a large extent be 
performed by line managers, as business as usual, in the daily operations of 
the firm, and not as separate integration initiatives led by integration specific 
personnel. In addition this implies not only focusing on the acquiring firm’s 
managers, but specifically focusing on the roles of the target managers, and 
on facilitating their mobilizing and mitigating actions.  
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Multiple acquirers need to balance between creating generalized processes 
and structures to implement acquisitions and integrate targets, and on the 
other hand, taking into consideration the specific features of each acquisition 
is important. My findings indicate that differentiating each acquisition is 
crucial to post-acquisition integration. Treating each target uniquely is 
necessary to avoid generalizing erroneously from one acquisition to the next.  
First, the integration strategy needs to reflect the strategic motives behind 
each acquisition. Secondly, carefully assessing each target both in the due-
diligence process, but also immediately following the announcement of the 
deal, demonstrate what needs to be addressed in a target-specific integration 
plan. Thirdly, making sure these findings from this assessment are 
operationalized in the integration strategy, and, even more importantly, 
communicated to both support functions and middle managers that are 
operationally responsible for integration. Even though the motive behind the 
deal and how the deal needs to be implemented is clear to the top-
management team, the lower echelons of the organization, it is necessary to 
clearly communicate how the acquisitions and targets are different, and how 
this is to be operationalized.  
This challenge is related to communicating the motives, goals and particulars 
of each acquisition to the acquiring firm. In particular to the parts of the 
acquiring firm that are responsible for integrating the target. Communicating 
the level of integration and the operational consequences of this, and 
ultimately what these imply for the specific target unit and individuals 
involved is challenging. Not only may there be ambiguities in the acquiring 
firm regarding these issues, but integration processes are often fraught with 
unpredictable events that change the course of possible action, as such, the 
planned initiatives may need to be altered.  
Puranam and Srikanth (2007) find that structural integration may allow firms 
access to existing knowledge bases, but destroy target firm capabilities for 
further innovation. Whereas some level of interaction and integration is 
necessary for learning and transfer of knowledge, integration has been 
shown to impede the utilization of the target’s innovative capacity. I argue 
that in situations where target firms identify with the former owner, these 
capabilities may be preserved for longer simply because employees resist the 
adoption of processes and structures they see as inferior. Targets identifying 
with former owner, and perceiving their status to be threatened, may 
conceivably engage in identity preserving actions. They dismiss the ways of 
the acquiring firm, refuse to be socialized into their way of doing things and 
as such preserve their innovative capacity. Even so, this emphasizes and 
supports my call for distinguishing between different outcomes of the 
acquisition. Existing knowledge bases can be understood as one of the 
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expected benefits of an acquisition. These are the outcomes that could be 
detected prior to the acquisition and therefore could be expected. The target 
firm’s capabilities for further innovation, however, are more difficult to 
discover prior to the deal. This is because they are embedded in the social 
context of the firm. As such, they represent possible serendipitous outcomes. 
They represent a potential for value creation that is embedded in the target 
organization’s structures and culture, and are not easily detected before 
gaining in-depth knowledge of the firm.  
13.5 Limitations and implications for further research 
My study is of relatively small firms being acquired by a relatively large 
firm. This influences the dynamics between the firms. First of all, this has 
consequences for the impact of the acquisitions in the target and acquiring 
firm. Large parts of the acquiring firm were untouched by the acquisition. 
Employees had no perceptions of the consequences of the acquisition, and 
felt that it was irrelevant to them. The employees of the target firms 
experienced the acquisition as a large change involving identity issues. The 
acquiring firm did not, at least not in my material, experience any threats to 
their identity. In mergers of equals, the change for employees of both sides 
of the dyad could be expected and the identity dynamics would look 
different. In addition, this has ramifications for my findings regarding 
contributive capacity; in a merger of equals, the learning and knowledge 
transfer would probably be different. There is no reason to believe that 
identity threats to the acquirer or to a merger partner in a merger of equals 
should not yield the same drives. However, in this study, the empirical data 
did not show identity issues to be salient in the acquirer. As such, the 
findings of this research may be limited to relatively small acquisitions made 
by a relatively large acquirer. Future studies should explore these 
mechanisms in an announced merger of equals, or in an acquisition with a 
relatively larger target firm.  
The acquisitions in this study are limited to the IT-industry and one single 
acquiring firm. However, as the acquisitions vary in terms of type of 
business, the targets are both production firms and consulting firms, firms 
that are to be integrated and firms that were autonomous subsidiaries. As 
such, they represent a variety of targets. The processes and mechanisms 
theorized in this thesis have face-generalizability. That is, there is no reason 
to assume that the way identity dynamics evolved in these acquisition 
processes would be very different in other industries or other firms, or that 
the interaction of contributive and absorptive capacity would be very 
different in another acquirer or another industry. However, a venue for 
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further research is to investigate these dynamics in different industries and 
different types of businesses.  
I argue that just as absorptive capacity is relational, contributive capacity is 
dependent on the interaction and characteristics of the external environment 
that is receiving the knowledge from the target. A question that needs to be 
answered is to what extent contributive capacity is dependent on prior 
experiences.  As I have discussed, there is some knowledge on the effect of 
experience and the development of absorptive capacity. Further studies 
should examine the effect of experience on contributive capacity. 
Knowledge on this is critical from a managerial perspective both in terms of 
assessing potential targets for acquisitions, but also in assessing the mode 
and activities implemented to integrate the targets.  
My findings indicate that managerial action, in the shape of mitigating and 
mobilizing actions, is an important factor of both the target’s contributive 
capacity and the acquirer’s absorptive capacity. These actions show a 
parallel to the rent-seeking actions assumed to be one of the mechanisms 
through which value leaks in post-acquisition integration (Meyer 2008). As 
mentioned earlier, acquisitions have consistently shown to fail to create 
value. The concept of value leakage has been introduced as an explanation. 
Meyer (2008) argues that value can leak through two mechanisms: namely 
rent-seeking behavior by managers and implicit costs. 
I argue that distinguishing between mobilizing and mitigating actions on the 
one hand, and the rent-seeking behaviors of managers assumed to be an 
explanatory factor in value leakage in acquisitions is empirically difficult. 
Rent-seeking is intrinsically linked to the mobilizing and mitigating actions 
performed by the target and acquiring managers. I argue that the evidence 
shows that managers in the post-acquisition integration process bargained for 
their benefits in terms of decision power and positions. This bargaining was 
described differently in the various targets. Multifirm managers described 
the Datagon managers being concerned with their obtaining their personnel 
benefits, but once they attained these they did not continue mobilizing 
actions or the pursuit of management power.  In the Teknico acquisition the 
managers were described as having performed mobilizing actions. However, 
their motivation to do so may have been individual gains and rent-seeking. 
In consequence, their mobilizing actions may have been linked to the 
disruptions in the post-acquisition integration, and as such their mobilizing 
efforts may be argued to be the cause of disruption, and in consequence the 
rent-seeking behavior that facilitates value-leakage in post-acquisition 
integration.  
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To determine whether an action is rent seeking action performed by 
managers bargaining for power or a mitigating or mobilizing action 
performed for the good of the acquisition is difficult. This calls into question 
the intrinsic motivation of the manager’s actions in the post-acquisition 
integration process. It is also linked to the problem of intended and 
unintended consequences of actions. As such, there is a distinction between 
rent-seeking and value-leakage and consequential disruption on the one 
hand, and mobilizing and mitigating actions and the subsequent leveraging 
of contributive capacity on the other hand. Future studies could explore 
managerial actions, focusing on the motivations and consequences of these 
actions.   
It could be argued that it is the disruptions per se that cause the mitigating 
actions. And that the identity threats are responsible for only the mobilizing 
actions. In my material, mobilizing and mitigation appeared intertwined both 
in terms of intentions behind the actions, how they were perceived and their 
consequences. This however, could be a venue for further studies. Focusing 
on the antecedents and consequences of managerial action in post-
acquisition integration in post-acquisition integration and linking this to 
organizational identity. However, my findings indicate that both mitigating 
and mobilizing actions were generated through the identity threats to the 
target firms. I have shown that organizational identity threats can have 
beneficial outcomes on the post-acquisition integration through the target’s 
contributive capacity. However, the dynamics that shape these constructive 
responses to identity threats could be further developed and theorized. A 
related question for further research is examining the contingencies for 
channeling the action triggered by organizational identity threats into 
productive efforts. Even though this thesis has gone one step further in terms 
of theorizing the target firm’s and target managers’ role in the post-
acquisition process, further empirical studies should probe into the 
mitigating and mobilizing actions. Further studies are also needed on both 
intended and unintended consequences and formal and informal, planned 
and emergent integration initiatives.  
A methodological limitation may be the fact that the interview situation 
triggered the frame of mind of acquisition and pre-acquisition identity for the 
interviewees. As I did follow-up interviews, the informants were reminded 
of the acquisition and this may have framed their stories. It is possible that 
the distinction between the target and acquirer may have appeared more 
distinct than it would have been in situations where the acquisition was not 
probed. My starting point was an interest in organizational identity, and also 
how it evolved. However, when I analyzed my data, I saw no evidence of 
change in organizational identity. Rather, the respondents of the targets 
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referred to their prior organization and described themselves and their units 
indistinguishable from early in the acquisition process. The autonomous 
targets emphasized their distinctiveness in the post-acquisition integration. 
Their identity was tied to their consulting profession, and the acquirer 
represented the contrast to this identity and the type of firm they wanted to 
work for. They seemed to construct the idea of who they were in relationship 
to the acquiring firm. Therefore it is not that surprising that their 
organizational identity and distinctiveness did not change over the years I 
observed them. The acquisition may have long term consequences for their 
organizational identity. The integrated targets identity in the claims that they 
made of who they were did not change either. The stories they told of who 
they were, both at the beginning of the study and in the follow-up interviews 
were set in the context of the acquisition. I argue that to address these issues, 
the post-acquisition integration process needs to be followed over a longer 
time, and through participant observation, where the researcher is embedded 
in the firms, and not dependent on the respondents accounts of the 
organizations identity. 
If issue interpretation and certain issues are the elicitors of identity threats, 
and not the meta issue of the acquisition, then identifying and defining these 
issues are important to managing acquisitions. This is also an arena for 
further studies to identify, define and theorize post-acquisition integration, to 
further develop an understanding of sensemaking and issue interpretation, 
and subsequently responses to issues in acquisitions. 
I have defined the mechanisms through which the absorptive capacity of the 
acquirer and the contributive capacity of the target emerged. Even though I 
have speculated as to the relationship between the concepts, further large 
scale studies need to investigate the causal mechanisms at work. In addition, 
my findings indicate that one of the mechanisms of absorptive capacity is 
need for interaction. This need was motivated in two distinct ways in my 
data.: 1) the need to interact based on the individual acquiring firm’s 
employees wanting access to valuable new knowledge, resources or 
competencies in the target firm, regardless of level of integration. And 2) the 
need to interact based on organizational integration as defined in the 
acquisition strategy. I will argue that the need based on the necessity to 
integrate probably drives the interaction between the target and acquirer 
differently than the need to get access to knowledge, competencies and 
resources. This should be explored in future research. 
Lastly, my findings indicate that organizational identity threats are one 
trigger of the contributive capacity of the target firm. However, there 
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probably are other triggers of this capacity. Future studies should examine 
other possible triggers of contributive capacity.  
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